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In political campaigns, candidates often avoid taking positions on issues, in-
stead making vague statements that conceal the policy preferences that would
guide them if elected. The explanation for ambiguity proposed in the first
chapter is that voters do not understand the informational content of a non-
announcement. If voters are Bayesians, unraveling occurs, with only the most
extreme candidates remaining ambiguous. However, if voters under-appreciate
the relationship between candidates preferences and their strategies, moremod-
erate candidates may also choose to be vague. The first chapter develops a
model of candidate competition in which candidates can choose whether or not
to announce their policy preferences to voters and applies Eyster and Rabin’s
(2005) concept of cursed equilibrium, which allows for varying degrees of un-
derstanding of the connection between type and strategy. The second chapter
describes and analyzes the results of an experimental test in which subjects in
the lab play an election game based on an extension of the model that allows
candidates to choose whether or not to make policy commitments. While the
majority of subjects make choices that are consistent with the Bayesian model, a
substantial fraction shows varying levels of cursedness.
The third chapter (joint work with Dan Benjamin, Ori Heffetz, and Miles
Kimball) proposes foundations and a methodology for survey-based tracking
of well-being. First, we develop a theory in which utility depends on "fun-
damental aspects" of well-being, measurable with surveys. Second, drawing
from psychologists, philosophers, and economists, we compile a comprehen-
sive list of such aspects. Third, we demonstrate our proposed method for esti-
mating the aspects’ relative marginal utilities–a necessary input for constructing
an individual-level well-being index–by asking 4,600 US survey respondents to
state their preference between pairs of aspect bundles. We estimate high rela-
tive marginal utilities not only for happiness and life satisfaction, but also for
aspects related to family, health, security, values, and freedoms.
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CHAPTER 1
ARE VOTERS CURSEDWHEN POLITICIANS CONCEAL POLICY
PREFERENCES? THEORY
1.1 Introduction
In political campaigns, candidates often avoid taking positions on issues, in-
stead making vague statements that conceal the policy preferences that would
guide them if elected. For example, Tomz and Van Houweling (2009) analyzed
statements made regarding tax policy by the presidential and vice-presidential
candidates in 40 primary debates (25 Democratic, 15 Republican) and four gen-
eral election debates during the 2007-08 election cycle. They found that over
half of such statements were ambiguous. For example, a candidate might say
that he would not increase taxes, but he would not reveal the magnitude of the
decrease in taxes that he supported. Given such a statement, voters would be
left unsure whether the candidate would enact extreme tax cuts, moderate tax
cuts, or leave tax rates as they were. The existence of such ambiguity is a funda-
mental puzzle in political economy. Since a representative democracy relies on
having elections to choose officials who will make important decisions, it is cru-
cial that the electorate be able to select a candidate who represents its interests.
When voters must choose candidates without knowing their policy intentions,
it seems likely that elections will not be able to serve this function. An under-
standing of why politicians choose to be ambiguous will help society to form
policies that will make it more likely that elections serve the public interest.
This chapter proposes a novel explanation for ambiguity in elections: voters
do not fully understand the informational content of a non-announcement. If
voters were fully rational, they would be able to infer that the fact that a candi-
date chooses to conceal his preferences actually reveals information about those
preferences: they must not be congruent with the voters’ preferences. However,
if voters do not follow this reasoning, then candidates may actually be able to
conceal their preferences by making vague campaign statements.
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As in many economic contexts, information asymmetries abound in polit-
ical environments. As such, the tools and insights from analysis of games of
incomplete information played in economic environments also apply to many
problems in politics. This chapter focuses on a particular asymmetry: politicians
have more information about their own policy preferences than their opponents
and the electorate have. The key feature of signaling games is the opportunity
for a player whose type is unknown by other players to choose an action that
will be observed by other participants. If the payoffs associated with taking var-
ious actions differ by type, then a player’s decision to choose one action over
others may reveal information about his type to the other players.
In Akerlof’s (1970) classic example of the used car market, a seller knows the
quality of his car, but potential buyers do not. There, the unknown type is the
quality of the car. An owner of a low-quality car will have a low valuation and
be willing to accept a low price, while an owner of a high-quality car will prefer
to keep the car for himself rather than selling for a low price. Therefore, buyers
can make inferences about the value of the car after observing an action taken
by the seller: his willingness to sell the car at a given price.
Analogously, in the environment studied in this chapter, the type of a can-
didate is the policy that he would like to implement, known only to himself.
During the campaign, candidates may choose to announce their preferred poli-
cies to voters. Since a candidate’s willingness to reveal his true policy posi-
tion depends on the likelihood that announcing it will garner support from the
electorate, a candidate’s decision to conceal his preferred policy may actually
reveal information about that policy to voters. More concretely, consider the
following example, in which citizens must elect a representative who will make
a decision regarding gun control policy. Suppose that the median voter prefers
a centrist gun control policy: mandatory registration and background checks.
There are two political parties, each composed of three equally sized factions.
Candidates from the Left party generally prefer a higher level of gun control.
The Left party includes centrists, moderate Leftists who prefer somewhat more
stringent regulations (banning military-style assault rifles), and extreme Leftists
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who would ban private ownership of handguns. Within the Right party, there
are centrists, moderate Rightists who would allow some exemptions from back-
ground checks, and extreme Rightists who would not require gun registration.
Suppose that the median voter is equally dissatisfied with moving to the left or
to the right of her ideal policy. Figure 1.1 illustrates this environment graphi-
cally.
Figure 1.1: Graphical Representation of the Policy Space
b
Extreme Left
b
Moderate Left
b
Centrist
b
Moderate Right
b
Extreme Right
Left Party Right Party
Median Voter
Returning to the familiar used car example, Akerlof argues that if buyers are
naively willing to pay the expected value of a car, owners of high-value cars will
not be willing to accept this price. Buyers then infer that only below-average
cars are in the market, and they would be willing to pay the expected value of
a below-average car if this were the case. However, given this buyer behavior,
only cars of very low value, below the expected value of below-average cars,
would be in the market. The result of iterating through this logic is that the used
car market will not exist, because buyers would infer from a seller’s willingness
to participate that the car up for sale is a lemon.
Similar logic applies in the election example. A centrist candidate will not
want to pool with less desirable candidates and will clearly choose to announce
his preferred policy. Suppose first that only centrist candidates make announce-
ments. If voters update correctly, they would infer that a Left politician who
made no announcement either wants to ban assault rifles or also wants to ban
handguns. Therefore, a moderate-Left politician would be more appealing to
voters if he revealed his preferred policy than if he pooled with extremists by
taking no position. Thus, only the extreme candidates could possibly remain
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silent; regardless of whether they announce their true preferences or try to con-
ceal them, voters would infer that they are "lemons."
The standard model of play in games of incomplete information assumes
that players are able to go through the train of logic outlined above and up-
date their beliefs about other players’ types correctly. However, the unraveling
process may break down if voters lack sufficient cognitive ability or are sim-
ply unwilling to pay the effort costs that may be required to think through
a complex game. If when a candidate takes no position, voters (mistakenly)
put enough weight on the candidate being a centrist, they would instead prefer
the candidate who took no position to a candidate who revealed himself to be
moderate-Left or moderate-Right. If candidates anticipate this voting behav-
ior, then moderate Left and Right candidates may also choose to remain vague
rather than making a policy announcement. In this way, ambiguity in politics
may be a response by candidates to voters who are affected by this behavioral
bias when forming beliefs about candidates.
This chapter develops a game-theoretic model that formalizes the ideas de-
scribed above. In the model, an election is held to select a candidate who will
implement one of five possible policies. Each player receives a payoff that de-
pends only on how close the policy implemented is to his preferred policy. The
median voter prefers the centrist policy. There are two candidates, one from
either side of the political spectrum. Each candidate prefers either the centrist
policy, a policy that is moderate within his party (henceforth, simply moderate),
or an extreme policy; the candidates’ preferred policies are private information.
In the baseline analysis, it is assumed that each candidate chooses to an-
nounce his preferred policy or to take no position. Intuitively, this reflects that
politicians cannot credibly promise to implement policies that they do not sup-
port. This case will be referred to as the announcement game.
The model is solved using Eyster and Rabin’s (2005) concept of cursed equi-
librium. When a voter is "cursed," she under-appreciates the relationship be-
tween a candidate’s type (his policy preference) and his campaign strategy. Her
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posterior beliefs about the types of the candidates following the campaign stage
are a convex combination of her prior beliefs and the true Bayesian posterior
beliefs. This modeling assumption captures the idea that a person may accu-
rately predict the distribution of actions taken but have incorrect posterior be-
liefs about a player’s type given the action taken by that player. The cursed
equilibrium model allows for varying degrees of strategic sophistication, and it
has two special cases. If voters are not cursed (believe that candidates always
play their type-specific strategies), this concept is simply Bayes-Nash equilib-
rium. This generates the unraveling logic described above, which leads only
the most extreme candidates to have an incentive to take no position. On the
other hand, if voters are fully cursed, they do not update their beliefs at all
based on actions taken by other players. In this case, when a voter sees that a
candidate does not make a policy announcement, her belief that the candidate
has a given policy preference is simply her prior belief that the candidate has
that policy preference, based on the distribution of candidate preferences. The
model also allows individuals to be partially cursed, which means that they are
not completely naive but still do not fully understand the relationship between
preferences and strategies.
Mistaken beliefs about the likely preferred policy of a candidate who took
no position could lead voters to choose a candidate who concealed his pol-
icy preference over a candidate who revealed himself to be a moderate-Left
or moderate-Right candidate. This chapter will show that if voters are suffi-
ciently cursed, then moderate candidates would respond by remaining ambigu-
ous about their future plans.
A second game is also considered, to check which intuitions from the an-
nouncement game continue to hold when candidates have additional strate-
gies available to them. In what will be referred to as the commitment game,
candidates are not required to implement their preferred policies. During the
campaign stage, candidates choose to either commit to any policy or take no
position. The winning candidate must honor his commitment if he made one
during the campaign, but a candidate who takes no position can implement his
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preferred policy. Candidates thus face a trade-off between increasing the prob-
ability of winning the election by choosing a policy that the voter prefers and
being able to implement a policy that he prefers conditional on winning.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 provides a brief
literature review. Section 1.3 analyzes a model in which candidates decide
whether or not to announce their preferred policies to voters before the elec-
tion. Section 1.4 extends the model to allow candidates to commit to any policy.
Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Literature Review
This chapter contributes to the theoretical literature in economics and political
science that attempts to explain the prevalence of ambiguity in campaigns.
One class of explanations views ambiguous statements by candidates as re-
sponses to true voter preferences. Shepsle (1972) makes an important theoreti-
cal contribution with an extension of the Downsian model in which candidate
strategies are probability distributions, instead of points on a subset of the real
line. He shows that, when voters care intensely about getting their most pre-
ferred option and experience diminishing sensitivity further away from their
bliss points, a challenger can defeat an incumbent whose position is known
by choosing a non-degenerate lottery, rather than committing to a single point
in the policy space. On the other hand, if voters are risk-averse, a candidate
should not take actions that would make voters uncertain about his policy po-
sition (Bernhardt and Ingberman 1985). Aragonès and Postlewaite (2002) rein-
force Shepsle’s results in a model similar to his, except for the introduction of
asymmetry by requiring each candidate to put some minimum probability on
that candidate’s "preferred" policy. These authors are also responsible for the
framing of the key assumption as preference intensity, rather than risk-loving
preferences. Preference intensity will also play a role in the model developed
in this chapter; all else equal, a voter would have a stronger preference for a
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candidate whose policy preference is uncertain compared to a certain moder-
ate if the voter cares a great deal about obtaining her favorite alternative and is
less sensitive to changing from a moderate to an extreme position. This chapter
builds on the theoretical contributions made in these papers.
Several authors have noted that ambiguity on a given policy issue may be
beneficial for candidates when voters’ preferences are multi-dimensional. Ac-
cording to Page’s (1976) emphasis theory, candidates choose how much time
to devote to informing voters about their positions on each issue; ambiguity
is the result of spending little time on an issue. He shows in an example that
candidates optimally choose to focus voters’ attention on issues on which there
is consensus, leaving no attention to divisive issues. Dellas and Koubi (1994)
suggest that candidates hide information about their performance from voters
in order to win elections based on charisma and similar characteristics. While
this chapter considers political competition on a single dimension, future work
could consider the interaction of the mechanism analyzed here and the addi-
tional concerns that arise with competition on several dimensions.
Other models are motivated by the need for politicians to appeal to differ-
ent types of voters simultaneously. If candidates must simultaneously appeal
to moderate voters and extremist campaign contributors, as assumed in Alesina
and Holden (2008), candidates with different policy preferences may pool by
committing to enact a policy within an interval that contains both of their true
preferences. However, this result hinges on the assumption of a specific dis-
tribution of voter preferences, such that movement along the policy spectrum
changes the probability of winning the election non-monotonically. Relatedly,
candidates may face initial uncertainty regarding the location of the median
voter (Alesina and Cukierman 1990; Meirowitz 2005; Agranov 2012); voters are
ex ante identical, but they differ in their policy preferences ex post. In these
models, policy-motivated candidates do not reveal information about their pref-
erences when taking no position, because non-extreme candidates also have a
desire to remain ambiguous when the preference of the median voter is not
known with certainty. Without this assumption, introducing policy-motivated
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candidates would add a layer of complexity, since actions taken during cam-
paigns (and in office, in dynamic models) may reveal information about what
a candidate will do in the future. Given the present ubiquity of polls in the
time leading up to elections, explanations that rely on having enough of this
uncertainty may not seem as plausible as they did even a few years ago. The
model presented below drops the assumption of uncertainty about the location
of the median voter, implying that the only motive for keeping quiet about one’s
policy position is to conceal a preference for an unpopular policy.
Somewhat similarly, ambiguity may be a response to uncertainty about the
optimal policy that will not be resolved until after the election. Aragonès and
Neeman (2000) posit that ambiguity exists in elections because candidates care
directly about being ambiguous, because they would like to have the flexibility
to adjust policy if necessary. In their model, there exists a trade-off between
giving the median voter what she wants in order to get elected and remaining
ambiguous to have the flexibility once in office. This mechanism may be at
work in reality; this channel is shut down in the model described in this chapter,
because there is no shock to policy preferences after the election takes place.
This chapter is not the first work to point out that voters should make infer-
ences about the types of candidates who would choose to be vague; Chappell
(1994) also makes that argument. However, his model differs from this chap-
ter’s model in several important assumptions, and his results are not directly
comparable to those that will be discussed here. Two papers are most closely
related to this chapter in the sense that candidates are responding to behav-
iorally biased voters. Callander and Wilson (2008) develop a model of context-
dependent voting, in which voters care about each candidate’s platform directly
and in comparison to his opponent’s platform. Given this, and assuming that
there is uncertainty about the valence (dis)advantage held by each candidate,
each candidate chooses a probabilistic platform that put some weight on the
median voter’s position and some weight on a position closer to his own. In
Jensen’s (2009) model, voters interpret vague statements made by candidates
that they like for non-policy reasons by projecting their own views onto such
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candidates. His key result is that a well-liked office-motivated candidate can
defeat a candidate who commits to the median voter’s position by taking an
interval position around the median. Voters to the left of the median believe
that the ambiguous candidate is to the left (and thus prefer him to the median
voter’s position), while voters to the right of the median believe that he is to the
right (and thus also prefer him to the median voter’s position). It is not clear
how this bias would interact with cursedness, because Jensen does not analyze
the bias within a signaling game with policy-motivated candidates.
This chapter proposes a new explanation for why policy-motivated candi-
dates are sometimes able to get away with not making policy announcements
during campaigns. Ambiguity has a benefit for policy-motivated candidates
who do not agree with the median voter, because it gives them the opportu-
nity to implement their preferred policies without having to run on them. The
contribution of this chapter is to identify a novel mechanism that has not been
discussed in the existing literature. It provides a view of political competition
as a signaling game played by actors with less than complete cognizance of that
strategic environment. Future work should do more to connect these disparate
explanations, but an understanding of this key mechanism is a prerequisite for
such work.
1.3 Announcement Game
1.3.1 Environment
The purpose of the election is to select a candidate who will implement one of
five possible policies. There are two policy-motivated candidates1, one from
each side of the ideological spectrum. The reader may think of them as being
1
The assumption that candidates are policy-motivated, rather than purely office-motivated,
has become fairly standard since models using that assumption were studied byWittman (1983)
and Calvert (1985).
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randomly chosen (or chosen based on characteristics that are orthogonal to pol-
icy preference) from two entrenched political parties. Candidate 1 may prefer
policy A, B, or C, and Candidate 2 may prefer policy C, D, or E. There are N
voters distributed across the policy space, and the median voter prefers policy
C.2
The overall distribution of candidate preferences is symmetric, and this dis-
tribution is common knowledge. Let ij be the probability that Candidate i’s
preferred policy is j. Since the distribution is symmetric, the notation can be
simplified by writing A = 1A = 
2
E, B = 
1
B = 
2
D, and C = 
1
C = 
2
C. Each
player receives utility based on how close the implemented policy is to his pre-
ferred policy; payoffs are described in more detail below. Candidates are purely
policy-motivated and receive no additional reward from holding office.
In this game, all candidates will implement their preferred policies. The
decision for a candidate in the campaign stage is whether or not to reveal this
preferred policy to voters.
1.3.2 Timing
The timing of the announcement game is as follows:
Stage 0: Nature draws a preferred policy for each candidate, and each candi-
date learns his own preferred policy.
Stage 1: The candidates simultaneously choose campaign strategies. Each
candidate chooses whether to reveal or conceal his preferred policy.
2
The median voter theorem (Black, 1958) implies that, since majority rule is assumed and pref-
erences are single-peaked, the outcome of the election will be determined by the preference
of the median voter; hence, analysis is greatly simplified by focusing on the preference of the
median voter. Additionally, assuming that the median voter prefers C is consistent with work
done by Anderson and Meagher (2012), who show that, with endogenous party formation in
a continuous environment, the parties’ moderate boundaries lie on either side of the median
voter.
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Stage 2: Nature determines whether voters will observe3 each candidate’s
policy preference announcement. With probability  2 (0; 1) , any announce-
ment made by a candidate will be seen by voters; with probability 1    , voters
will see that the candidate took no position, regardless of the strategy he chose.
Realizations are independent across candidates. All players in the game under-
stand that strategies chosen by candidates are translated with some noise into
platforms observed by voters in this way. To clarify the difference betweenwhat
the candidates choose and what the voters observe, the actions chosen by the
candidates will be referred to as strategies, and the campaign messages viewed
by the voters after Nature has moved will be referred to as platforms.
Stage 3: Voters observe the campaign platforms and choose their preferred
candidates. If a voter is indifferent, she abstains.4 The candidate with the most
votes wins the election and implements his preferred policy. If both candidates
receive the same number of votes, a winner is chosen at random, with each
candidate having an equal chance of being chosen.
Stage 2 exists for technical reasons; allowing the no position platform to oc-
cur with positive probability regardless of the strategies chosen implies that the
Bayes-Nash equilibrium concept can be used without the need for refinements.
Suppose to the contrary that a candidate has perfect control over whether or
not his preferred policy is revealed to voters. If all candidates choose to reveal
their positions in equilibrium, then Bayes’ Rule does not prescribe beliefs if a
voter observes the off-path action of taking no position. This paper deals with
this technical issue by introducing a source of uncertainty and taking limits as 
approaches one (voters always observe the chosen strategies).
3
The theory is written as if there is some probability that a message sent by a candidate is not
received by the voters. Alternatively, one can interpret this as a probability that a candidate is
unable to convincingly convey his policy preference to the voters.
4
Nothing changes if she votes randomly when indifferent instead.
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1.3.3 Payoffs
Each player chooses his strategy to maximize his expected utility. Suppose that,
as illustrated in the introduction, each policy can be represented by a point on
the real line, with one unit of distance between each pair of adjacent policies.
Each player i receives utility payoffs that depend on his preferred policy, de-
noted by xi, and the policy implemented, x¯. Let zi denote the distance between
player i’s preferred policy and the policy implemented: zi = jxi  x¯j. Each player’s
preferences are represented by u(z) =   f (z)+', where f (z) is increasing in z. This
assumption implies that u is decreasing in the distance between the preferred
policy and the policy implemented. ' is a constant set such that u(4) = 0. This
normalizes the utility function, assigning the value 0 to the greatest distance
between policies possible in this environment.
If f () is a convex function, as is commonly assumed in the literature, then
players are risk-averse with respect to policies. For example, the median voter
(who prefers C) would prefer to implement B/D for sure to a lottery that gives
equal probability to C, B/D, and A/E (an expected distance of 1). In contrast,
if f () is concave, then the opposite is true. In this case, players care intensely
about receiving their preferred policies and are less sensitive to differences be-
tween policies further away from the preferred policy.
The utility function was defined above in a way that facilitates these com-
parisons between other this and other papers. However, for ease of notation,
define the following values: for i = 1; :::5, ui = u(i   1). It may also be easier
for the reader to remember that the index one corresponds to the best possible
situation, in which the preferred policy is equal to the policy implemented. u2 is
the utility received from the second-best policy, and so on.
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1.3.4 Equilibria
Let 1 and 2 denote the types of Candidate 1 and Candidate 2, respectively. A
strategy for Candidate 1, 1 (1), is a mapping from preferred policy 1 2 fA; B;Cg
to campaign action a1 2 f1; ;g; he chooses whether to announce his preferred
policy or to announce nothing. The strategy for Candidate 2, 2 (2), is defined
analogously. Let z1 and z2 denote the platforms of Candidate 1 and Candidate 2,
respectively. Recall that due to Nature’s move in Stage 2, z j = a j with probability
 and z j = ; with probability 1   . A strategy for voter i, vi (z1; z2ji), is a
mapping from observed candidate platforms z1 and z2 to a voting action avi 2
f1; 2; 0g. She chooses whether to vote for Candidate 1, vote for Candidate 2, or
abstain (denoted by 0) after viewing the platforms. Her strategy may depend
on her cursedness parameter i, which will be defined below.
The following definition applies the standard Bayes-Nash equilibrium solu-
tion concept to this game.
Definition 1. The Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the announcement game is a strategy
profile BN and set of beliefs ja for voters such that
1. For each candidate j, BNj

 j

maximizes his utility, given BN  j

  j

and
BNv1 (z1; z2),...,
BN
vN (z1; z2).
2. For each voter i, BNvi (z1; z2) maximizes her utility, given 
BN
1 (1), 
BN
2 (2), and
her beliefs ja.
3. Each voter forms posterior beliefs ja using Bayes’ Rule.
In the definition of the Bayes-Nash equilibrium, the notation in the voters’
strategies that allows the strategies to depend on  is suppressed because it is
not relevant for this solution concept. Given that all voters form beliefs in the
same way and have identical preferences over policies, all voters have the same
equilibrium strategies in the Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
When a voter observes that a candidate takes no position, she must form be-
liefs about the candidate’s preferred policy, since that is the policy that he would
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implement if elected. Due to Nature’s move at Stage 2, there is always positive
probability that a candidate’s platformwill be "no position". In addition, voters’
beliefs about the preferred policy of a candidate who makes an announcement
are determined by that announcement, since candidates can only make truthful
statements. A voter who did not expect a candidate to announce that he prefers
A/E nonetheless believes the statement if she does hear it. Therefore, beliefs
when platforms that are off the equilibrium path are observed are irrelevant
when considering the existence of equilibria.
In a Bayes-Nash equilibrium, all players use Bayes’ Rule to update their
beliefs about the likelihood that a candidate has each preferred policy condi-
tional on having taken no position. Alternatively, the game can be solved using
Eyster and Rabin’s (2005) solution concept of cursed equilibrium. This concept
is Bayes-Nash equilibrium, with a modification of the requirement that all play-
ers use Bayes’ Rule when updating their beliefs.
Definition 2. The cursed equilibrium of the announcement game is a strategy profile
 and set of beliefs ˜ja for voters such that
1. For each candidate j, j

 j

maximizes his utility, given   j

  j

and
v1 (z1; z2j1),...,vN (z1; z2jN).
2. For each voter i, vi (z1; z2ji) maximizes her utility, given 1 (1), 2 (2), and
her beliefs ˜ja.
3. Each voter i forms posterior beliefs ˜ja = (1   i) ja + i, where ja is con-
structed using Bayes’ Rule.
Cursed equilibrium is very much an as-if model. Beliefs are modeled as a
linear combination that puts weight 1    on the correct Bayesian posteriors
and weight  on the prior beliefs.  2 [0; 1] parameterizes the voter’s degree
of cursedness; a voter who is more cursed has less understanding of the link
between type (preferred policy) and strategy chosen. If  = 0, the voter un-
derstands that other players use type-contingent strategies, and the concept re-
duces to standard Bayes-Nash equilibrium. If  = 1, the voter is referred to
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as fully cursed, and she does not perceive a difference between the strategies
chosen by different types. A voter with  2 (0; 1) is called partially cursed; she
updates from her priors toward the correct Bayesian posterior, but does not fully
incorporate the fact that different types may choose different strategies.
 is allowed to vary across voters. Assuming that there is no correlation be-
tween policy preference and cursedness, for large N, the distribution of cursed-
ness conditional on policy preference will be the same as the unconditional dis-
tribution of cursedness. One can then think of the median voter in this environ-
ment as the voter who prefers C and is more cursed than one half of the voters
and less cursed than the other half of the voters. Let m denote this median
voter’s degree of cursedness. Voters with  < m will have a less positive view
of a candidate who takes no position than the median voter, and voters with
 > m will like a candidate who takes no position more than the median voter
does. Since voter preferences are single-peaked with respect to 5, the median
voter theorem applies, and a candidate whowins the vote of a voter with m will
also win the election. For ease of notation, the m subscripts will be dropped, but
the degree of cursedness referred to in what follows is m.
Candidates are assumed to be Bayesians, though this is without loss of gen-
erality in the announcement game. Since a cursed candidate would correctly
predict the average distribution of votes (while making mistakes regarding the
choices of individual voters), he does correctly anticipate the behavior of the
median voter. As will be shown below, candidates playweakly dominant strate-
gies in equilibrium; therefore, beliefs about the behavior of the opponent, which
would be distorted by cursedness, do not affect candidates’ behavior.
Unless stated otherwise, all results regarding equilibria refer to cursed equi-
5
Single-peakedness then follows from the definition of cursedness. Cursedness will only affect
the perceived expected utility from a candidate who took no position, and that expected util-
ity is simply a linear combination of the expected utility calculated using the correct Bayesian
posteriors beliefs and that calculated using the prior beliefs. Therefore, utility from voting for
a candidate who takes no position must either strictly increase in , strictly decrease in  or be
constant with respect to . If it does not depend on , then assumptions about the distribution
of  in the population are irrelevant.
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libria; however, since Bayes-Nash equilibrium is a special case of cursed equi-
librium with  = 0, these results also apply to Bayes-Nash equilibrium. Atten-
tion is restricted to equilibria in which players do not choose weakly dominated
strategies. This rules out the possibility that a voter would be indifferent be-
tween the candidates because she believes that her vote will not be pivotal. Un-
der this assumption, one can model a voter’s decision problem as if she alone
determines the outcome of the election. Since there are only two candidates and
there is no cost of voting, voting for her favorite candidate based on the pol-
icy she expects him to implement if elected weakly dominates all other voting
strategies.
Voters’ decisions are straightforward given most combinations of candidate
platforms. If candidates reveal that they prefer policies that would give the
voters the same payoff, then voters would be indifferent between the two can-
didates and would abstain. If both candidates reveal preferences, but Candi-
date 1’s preferred policy gives the voters a higher payoff than Candidate 2’s
preferred policy, then the voters would vote for Candidate 1. Voters would
also vote for a candidate who revealed that he prefers C over a candidate who
took no position, and would vote for a candidate who took no position over a
candidate who revealed that he prefers A/E. For voters, the interesting choice
is between a candidate who announced a preference for B/D and a candidate
who took no position.
The choice of a candidate who has the same preferred policy as the voters
is simple, and candidates who prefer C reveal that preference in all possible
equilibria. Additionally, it is straightforward to show that candidates who pre-
fer A/E do not reveal their preferred policies in equilibrium. A voter prefers
a lottery over implementing A/E, B/D, and C to a candidate who has revealed
A/E. Therefore, taking no position is a weakly dominant strategy for candidates
that prefer A/E, because it does strictly better when the opponent reveals A/E
and is at least as good as revealing A/E against all other strategies. Therefore,
equilibria differ only in the strategies chosen by candidates who prefer B/D.
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Because there is some probability that Nature will prevent a candidate from
credibly announcing his preferred policy, there will be uncertainty about the
preferred policy of a candidate who takes no position. However, it may be pos-
sible that almost all information about candidate types is revealed. If only one
type of candidate chooses to take no position and  is close to one, then the
probability that a candidate who has taken no position is of that type is very
high. The label attached to the equilibrium defined just below derives from this
fact.
Definition 3. Near-revelation equilibrium: Candidates who prefer A/E take no po-
sition, and all other types reveal their preferred policies. The median voter chooses a
candidate who reveals B/D over a candidate who takes no position.
To understand the decision problem faced by candidates who prefer B/D,
one must begin by understanding the voter behavior to which the candidates
are responding. Voters’ choices depend on their beliefs about the likely pre-
ferred policy of a candidate who takes no position. The following lemmas de-
scribe the beliefs held by Bayesian and cursed voters, respectively, under the
assumption that only candidates that prefer A/E choose to take no position.
Proofs of these and all other results are relegated to the Appendix. Addition-
ally, the equations that characterize equilibria more generally, not only in the
limit case, can also be found in the Appendix.
Lemma 1. Suppose that in equilibrium, only candidates who prefer A/E choose to take
no position. Then,
1. A Bayesian voter believes the following about a candidate who takes no position:
Aj; =
A
1    (1   A)
Bj; =
(1   ) B
1    (1   A)
Cj; =
(1   ) C
1    (1   A)
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In the limit as  ! 1:
Aj; = 1
Bj; = 0
Cj; = 0
2. A cursed voter believes the following about a candidate who takes no position:
˜Aj; =
A

1    (1   A)
1    (1   A)
˜Bj; =
B

1    (1   A)
1    (1   A)
˜Cj; =
C

1    (1   A)
1    (1   A)
In the limit as  ! 1:
˜Aj; = 1    (1   A)
˜Bj; = B
˜Cj; = C
Because there is some chance that a candidate whose platform is "no posi-
tion" did not choose "no position" as a strategy, uncertainty about the preferred
policy of a candidate who took no position remains. The effect on beliefs of
adding this uncertainty does not require cursedness as a mediator. However,
as the chance of Nature preventing a candidate from revealing goes to zero (as
 approaches 1), the beliefs of a Bayesian voter converge to putting full proba-
bility on that candidate preferring A/E. In contrast, a cursed voter may believe
that a candidate who takes no position prefers B/D or C even when  = 1. The
following proposition uses Lemma 1 to show that, when facing Bayesian voters,
candidates that prefer B/D are better off revealing their preferred policies than
concealing them.
18
Proposition 1. In the limit as  ! 1, the near-revelation equilibrium exists as a Bayes-
Nash equilibrium.
Since only candidates who prefer A/E choose to take no position in equilib-
rium, a Bayesian would know that, in the limit as  ! 1, a candidate who took
no position must be a candidate who prefers A/E. Given the voters’ behavior,
the best response of a candidate who prefers B/D is to reveal his preferred pol-
icy, since he would be more likely to win the election by doing so than by taking
no position.
In order for the near-revelation equilibrium to exist, even with Bayesian vot-
ers, it must be the case that voters would vote for a candidate who revealed
himself to prefer B/D over a candidate who took no position. As  approaches
one, the equilibrium will exist regardless of the other parameter values. How-
ever, given the uncertainty about the preferred policy of a candidate who took
no position caused by , it is otherwise necessary to ensure that voters do not
prefer a candidate who took no position. If the distribution of preferences were
skewed toward centrists and voters’ preferences were sufficiently convex over
policies, then voters would prefer a candidate who took no position, even if
only candidates who prefer A/E actually choose to do so. Introducing  alone
thus can potentially break down the unraveling argument.
The next proposition analogously considers the existence of the near-
revelation equilibrium when voters are cursed.
Proposition 2. As  ! 1, the near-revelation equilibrium exists as a cursed equilib-
rium if and only if
  NR  u2   u3(1   A) (u2   u3) + C (u1   u2) (1.1)
Given the distribution of candidate preferences and the median voter’s pref-
erences over outcomes, there exists a threshold degree of cursedness; if the me-
dian voter is sufficiently close to Bayesian, then the near-revelation equilibrium
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exists. In Proposition 5 below, it will be shown that NR 2 (0; 1) if AC < u1 u2u2 u3 .
In this case, if the median voter is sufficiently cursed, then the near-revelation
equilibrium does not exist for all paramter values. This is true even as the prob-
ability that a candidate will be prevented from revealing his preferred policy
goes to zero; cursedness alone can prevent the existence of the near-revelation
equilibrium.
Cursed voters do not understand how unlikely it is that a candidate who
took no position would implement the voters’ preferred policy, since their be-
liefs are formed as if other types of candidates also sometimes may choose to
take no position. If this mistake leads the updated beliefs to not move too far
away from the priors, then these voters would prefer a candidate who took
no position to one who revealed B/D; in this case, candidates who prefer B/D
would choose to deviate from their equilibrium strategies of revealing their pre-
ferred policies.
However, if A
C
 u1 u2u2 u3 , then NR  1, and the near-revelation equilibrium
exists, regardless of the degree of cursedness. This condition holds if and only
if the median voter prefers receiving u2 for certain to a random draw from the
distribution of candidate preferences. The cursed equilibrium model implies
that the most optimistic belief that a voter may hold about a candidate who
takes no position is that he is a random draw–rather than disproportionately
likely to be an extremist. If the median voter still prefers a candidate whowould
implement policy B/D, even if fully cursed, then cursedness has no effect on the
predictions of the model; the near-revelation equilibrium exists.
Alternatively, candidates who prefer B/Dmay choose to take no position by
making ambiguous campaign statements.
Definition 4. Ambiguity equilibrium: Candidates who prefer A/E or B/D take no
position, and candidates who prefer C reveal their preferred policies. The median voter
prefers a candidate who takes no position to a candidate who reveals B/D.
The following lemma gives the posterior beliefs that voters hold, given that
candidates who prefer both A/E and B/D choose to take no position.
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Lemma 2. Suppose that in equilibrium, only candidates who prefer C reveal their pre-
ferred policies. Then,
1. A Bayesian voter believes the following about a candidate who takes no position:
Aj; =
A
1   C
Bj; =
B
1   C
Cj; =
(1   ) C
1   C
In the limit as  ! 1:
Aj; =
A
1   C
Bj; =
B
1   C
Cj; = 0
2. A cursed voter believes the following about a candidate who takes no position:
˜Aj; =
A

1   C
1   C
˜Bj; =
B

1   C
1   C
˜Cj; =
C

1    +  (1   C)
1   C
In the limit as  ! 1:
˜Aj; =
A

1   C
1   C
˜Bj; =
B

1   C
1   C
˜Cj; =
C (1   C)
1   C
In this case, there will be uncertainty about the preferred policy of a candi-
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date who takes no position, even if  = 1, because more than one type chooses
that strategy in equilibrium. However, if  = 1, a Bayesian would know for
certain that a candidate who takes no position cannot prefer policy C. On the
other hand, as before, cursed voters perceive more uncertainty than actually ex-
ists because they put some probability on a candidate who prefers C choosing
to take no position.
The next proposition establishes that choosing to remain ambiguous cannot
benefit candidates that prefer B/D when voters are Bayesians.
Proposition 3. In the limit as  ! 1, the ambiguity equilibrium does not exist as a
Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
First, note that this result does not necessarily hold outside of the limit case.
If a Bayesian believed that only candidates who prefer C would choose to reveal
their preferred policies, she would know that a candidate who took no position
was very likely to prefer B/D or A/E. However, if the probability that a candi-
date will be prevented from making an announcement is high ( is low), then
a candidate who took no position is only somewhat more likely to prefer B/D
or A/E instead of C. Moreover, if in addition voters receive a large utility loss
from moving from policy C to B/D and a sufficiently small loss from moving
from B/D to A/E, then Bayesian voters would be willing to take on the risk of
voting for the candidate who took no position. If voters behaved this way, then
candidates who prefer B/Dwould maximize their winning probabilities by tak-
ing no position instead of revealing their preferred policies; a low probability of
being able to make an announcement can lead to the existence of the ambiguity
equilibrium, even with Bayesian voters.
However, in the limit as  approaches one, a Bayesian would infer that a
candidate who takes no position offers a lottery over B/D and A/E. The median
voter would prefer a candidate who announces to B/D to this lottery. Based on
this voter preference, a candidate who prefers B/D would gain by deviating
from taking no position to announcing B/D. Therefore, in the limit as  goes to
one, the ambiguity equilibrium does not exist as a Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
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In contrast, when appealing to cursed voters, candidates who prefer B/D
may choose to remain ambiguous.
Proposition 4. In the limit as  ! 1, the ambiguity equilibrium exists as a cursed
equilibrium if and only if
  A  A (u2   u3)
C [A (u2   u3) + (1   C) (u1   u2)] (1.2)
As was the case with NR above, it will be shown in Proposition 5 that A 2
(0; 1) when A
C
< u1 u2u2 u3 . When this holds, there does exist a threshold value of
cursedness; if the median voter’s degree of cursedness is above the threshold,
then the ambiguity equilibrium exists, even in the limit as  approaches one.
If the median voter is sufficiently cursed, she believes that a candidate who
took no position is fairly likely to prefer C, because she does not fully appreciate
how candidate preferences affect their strategy choices. These distorted beliefs
lead her to prefer a candidate who took no position to a candidate who revealed
a preference for B/D. In response to the median voter’s behavior, a candidate
who prefers B/D optimally chooses to take no position, rather than announcing
his policy preference.
In parallel to the case when the near-revelation equilibrium must exist, the
fact that A  1 when AC  u1 u2u2 u3 implies that, in this case, the ambiguity equilib-
rium does not exist for any degree of cursedness.
The next proposition establishes the conditions under which the near-
revelation and ambiguity equilibrium are unique. As is clear from the condi-
tions discussed above, the near-revelation equilibrium is the unique Bayes-Nash
equilibrium in the limit as  ! 1. However, depending on the value of , there
may be multiple cursed equilibria.
Proposition 5. In the limit as  ! 1:
1. If A
C
< u1 u2u2 u3 , then:
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(a) 0<A < NR < 1
(b) The near-revelation equilibrium is unique if and only if
 < A  A (u2   u3)
C (A (u2   u3) + (1   C) (u1   u2))
(c) The ambiguity equilibrium is unique if and only if
 > NR  (u2   u3)(1   A) (u2   u3) + C (u1   u2)
(d) The near-revelation and ambiguity equilibria both exist (and no other equi-
libria exist) if and only if A    NR
2. If A
C
= u1 u2u2 u3 , then the near-revelation equilibrium is unique if  < 1, and both the
near-revelation equilibrium and the ambiguity equilibrium exist if  = 1.
3. If A
C
> u1 u2u2 u3 , then the near-revelation equilibrium is unique, for all values of .
Let NR () denote the threshold value of  that determines whether the near-
revelation equilibrium exists, and let A () denote the threshold value of  that
determines whether the ambiguity equilibrium exists. The next set of results
show how these thresholds are affected by changes in the distribution of candi-
date preferences and voters’ risk preferences.
To analyze the effect of changing the distribution of candidate preferences,
the next proposition considers an increase in the share of extremists, while re-
ducing shares of moderates and centrists in fixed proportions.
Proposition 6. Suppose that A increases by ", while B decreases by " and C de-
creases by (1   ) " for  2 [0; 1]. Then, NR and A increase.
Recall that an increase in NR implies that the near-revelation equilibrium
is more likely to exist; similarly, an increase in A implies that the ambiguity
equilibrium is less likely to exist. This occurs when voters are less likely to
vote for candidates who take no position. The distribution of policy preferences
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matters in a straightforward way. If candidates who prefer A make up a larger
fraction of the candidate pool, then it is more likely that a candidate who takes
no position has that preferred position (and less likely that he has a position that
is better for the median voter). Thus, a voter must really not understand the link
between candidate type and strategy if she is still willing to vote for a candidate
who takes no position.
The following proposition examines the role of risk-aversion in electoral out-
comes. This chapter defines one set of preferences u as more risk-averse than
another set of preferences v if and only if the certainty equivalent of any lottery
is lower under u than under v.
Proposition 7. Suppose that utility function u represents more risk-averse preferences
than utility function v. Then NR and A are higher under u than under v.
The ambiguity equilibrium requires that voters vote for a candidate who
takes no position over a candidate who announces B/D. If a voter is too risk-
averse, then even if cursedness leads her to believe that a candidate who takes
no position is more likely to be a centrist than the candidate actually is, the voter
may still be reluctant to take the risk associated with voting for the candidate
who took no position. Cursedness and risk aversion thus work in opposite di-
rections.
In this game, risk aversion of candidates does not play a role. Since a can-
didate will implement his preferred policy regardless of the strategy that he
chooses, the two possible outcomes are winning the election and implementing
his preferred policy and losing the election and having the opponent’s preferred
policy implemented. A candidate has the same ranking of his opponent’s pre-
ferred possible preferred policies as the median voter does; Candidate 1 and the
median voter prefer C to D and prefer D to E. This implies that there is no in-
centive for the candidate to decrease his overall winning probability in order to
ensure that he defeats a certain type; if he is able to defeat the opponent candi-
date who is closest to his ideal point, he will also be able to defeat more extreme
opponents. In sum, a candidate simply maximizes his probability of winning
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the election; there is no risk-return trade-off.
1.3.5 Welfare
Proposition 5 showed that for a range of parameter values, the ambiguity
equilibrium exists if the median voter is sufficiently cursed, while the near-
revelation equilibrium exists if the median voter holds beliefs that are suffi-
ciently close to Bayesian. Given that cursedness may lead to the ambiguity
equilibrium being played instead of the near-revelation equilibrium, it is nat-
ural to consider the welfare consequences.
Proposition 8. Suppose that the near-revelation equilibrium exists as a Bayes-Nash
equilibrium and the ambiguity equilibrium exists as a cursed equilibrium. Then, as
 ! 1,
 The expected utility for players that prefer C and B/D is higher in the Bayes-Nash
equilibrium than in the cursed equilibrium.
 The expected utility for players that prefer A/E is higher in the Bayes-Nash equi-
librium than in the cursed equilibrium if and only if
u2 + u4 > u1
Note that, while the analysis focused on the median voter, who prefers C,
other voters are distributed across the policy space. Therefore, one may care
about the welfare effects on players that prefer B/D and A/E not because one
cares about the candidates’ welfare, but because many voters also hold those
preferred policies. Proposition 8 applies in the case when A
C
< u1 u2u2 u3 , when
the cursed equilibrium is the ambiguity equilibrium (for sufficiently high ),
while the near-revelation equilibrium is the Bayes-Nash equilibrium. Note that
in the limit as  approaches one, the near-revelation equilibrium necessarily ex-
ists as a Bayes-Nash equilibrium, but the ambiguity equilibrium may not exist
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as a cursed equilibrium for some parameter values. However, in the case when
cursedness matters, the expected electoral outcome is worse for voters if the
median voter is cursed than when she is Bayesian. Suppose that Candidate 1
prefers B and Candidate 2 prefers E. If the median voter knew these preferences,
she would prefer to elect Candidate 1. If Candidate 1 chooses to announce his
preferred policy, then, given that the median voter’s beliefs about his strategy
are correct, Candidate 1 would be elected if she is able to announce and will win
with probability 12 if she is prevented from announcing. However, if Candidate 1
chooses to take no position, then Candidate 1 and Candidate 2 would be equally
likely to win the election. Clearly, having the information about Candidate 1’s
preferred policy benefits the median voter.
The welfare effects of cursedness on candidates that prefer A/E are ambigu-
ous and depend on the shape of the utility function. It is particularly notable
that candidates that prefer B/D–the ones that change their behavior when vot-
ers are cursed–would prefer to live in a world in which the median voter is
a Bayesian. In other environments, one might talk about firms or politicians
taking advantage of a behavioral bias to increase profit. To borrow an exam-
ple from O’Donoghue and Rabin (2003), potato chip manufacturers are better
off when consumers have present-biased preferences than when consumers are
time-consistent. In contrast, moderate politicians take no position in response
to the voters’ behavior, but they would be better off if the voters understood in-
centives well enough to allow the moderate candidates to reveal their preferred
policies.
The main takeaway of the announcement game is that, since candidates
with different policy preferences have different incentives to announce their
preferred policy, a decision to not make an announcement should reveal in-
formation to voters. If voters are cursed and do not appreciate the link between
type and strategy, then they will not correctly take into account the candidates’
actions when updating their beliefs. Sufficiently cursed voters will prefer a can-
didate who takes no position to one who announces a preferred policy of B/D.
Candidates who prefer B/D will respond to the voters’ behavior by not an-
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nouncing a preferred policy. On the other hand, sufficiently Bayesian voters
will not vote for a candidate who took no position if the opponent announced
B/D; candidates who prefer B/D best-respond to their behavior by announc-
ing B/D. The candidates’ responses to voters’ choices, which may derive from
incorrect beliefs about the candidates, thus determine whether nearly all infor-
mation about candidates is revealed in equilibrium or whether only candidates
who share the median voter’s policy preference choose to announce their pre-
ferred policies.
1.4 Commitment Game
While it may be reasonable to assume that candidates will always implement
their preferred policies, it may be possible for a candidate to credibly make a
binding commitment to instead put into place a different policy. This section
considers the robustness of the results from the announcement game to the al-
ternative assumption that candidates may make binding commitments to any
policy. The structure of this game differs from the announcement game only in
the campaign stage:
Stage 1: The candidates simultaneously choose campaign strategies. Candi-
date 1 may choose to make a binding commitment to policy A, B, or C or to take
no position; Candidate 2 may choose to commit to policy C, D, or E or to take
no position.
If a candidate is able to make a commitment to voters, he must implement
the policy to which he committed if elected. If not, including if Nature pre-
vented a commitment from being observed, he is free to implement his pre-
ferred policy if he wins the election.
Formally, a strategy for Candidate 1, 1(1), is a mapping from preferred
policy 1 2 fA; B;Cg to campaign action a1 2 fA; B;C; ;g; he may choose to com-
28
mit to any policy6 or to take no position. As in the announcement game, a
strategy for Candidate 2 is defined analogously. Definitions of Bayes-Nash and
cursed equilibrium are not repeated here, as they are identical to those for the
announcement game. The candidate strategies defined here simply replace the
strategies with the limited action space defined in the announcement game.
Much of the intuition from the simpler announcement game described in the
previous section also carries through. While the candidates have different incen-
tives, the median voter’s decision problem has not changed. Beliefs conditional
on equilibrium strategies of candidates are not affected by the set of strategies
that were not chosen. As in the announcement game, voters’ beliefs about the
preferred policy of a candidate who makes a policy commitment continue to be
irrelevant. In this case, it is because commitments are binding. For instance, if
a voter believes that no candidate will commit to A/E but observes that a can-
didate does so, her beliefs about the candidate who chose this off-path strategy
do not affect her voting decision. In addition, the comparative statics regarding
how risk aversion and the distribution of candidate preferences affect the rela-
tionship between cursedness and the decision to vote for a candidate who takes
no position and a candidate who commits to B/D continue to hold.
Since candidates now have the option of committing to policies that are not
their preferred policies, more equilibria are possible. In particular, there now
exists a trade-off between choosing a strategy that would allow the candidate to
implement a more preferred policy and choosing a strategy that would give the
candidate a greater chance of winning the election7. Characterizing these equi-
6
For Candidate 1, committing to C dominates committing to D or E, since both the winning
probability and payoff conditional on winning is higher if he commits to C. Excluding D and E
from the action space is therefore without loss of generality.
7
This trade-off implies that candidates no longer have dominant strategies, because the prob-
ability of winning depends on the strategy chosen by the opponent. Therefore, the assumption
that candidates are Bayesians matters in the commitment game, because cursed candidates do
not correctly predict the policy that would be implemented by an opponent that does not take
a position. However, this has a small effect on incentives, only slightly changing the degree of
risk aversion that would lead a candidate to choose one strategy over another.
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libria requires more work; to show the existence of a particular equilibrium, it
is necessary to show that each type of candidate would not choose to deviate to
any strategy in the now expanded strategy space. This chapter restricts atten-
tion to equilibria in pure strategies.
As was the case in the announcement game, candidates who prefer C will
commit to C. While these candidates now have the option of committing to
other policies, these other policies are less preferred by both the candidate and
the voters; therefore, expanding the strategy space has no effect on these candi-
dates. It also remains true that candidates who prefer A/E will not commit to
A/E, for the same reason that they would not reveal A/E in the announcement
game. Additionally, no type of candidate will commit to A/E, because doing
so would be even less advantageous for a candidate who prefers a policy that
is closer to what the voter prefers than A/E. Keeping these properties in mind
allows one to consider fewer cases when analyzing possible equilibria. Equilib-
ria will differ in terms of the strategies chosen by candidates who prefer B/D
and A/E. This section begins with a discussion of when the near-revelation and
ambiguity equilibria introduced in the previous section also exist in the com-
mitment game.
Proposition 9. In the limit as  ! 1, the near-revelation equilibrium exists if and only
if the following conditions hold:
  NR  u2   u3(1   A) (u2   u3) + C (u1   u2) (1.3)
2u2   u1   u3
u1   u3 
A
A + B
(1.4)
1
2u1   u4
u3   u4 
A + B
A
(1.5)
u1   u2   u4
u2   u4 
A + B
A
(1.6)
Equation 1.3 ensures that voters vote for a candidate who committed to B/D
when the opponent took no position; it is the condition that established the ex-
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istence of the near-revelation equilibrium in the announcement game. Note that
this implies that, when voters are Bayesians, this condition will always hold in
the limit as  ! 1. Cursedness affects the equilibrium played only through this
condition; the others ensure that candidates do not deviate to other strategies.
Since it is assumed that candidates are Bayesians, conditional on the median
voter’s equilibrium strategy, the candidates’ decisions do not depend on .
Equations 1.4, 1.5 and 1.6 ensure that a candidate who prefers B/D will not
deviate to committing to C, that a candidate who prefers A/E will not deviate
to committing to C, and that a candidate who prefers A/E will not deviate to
committing to B/D, respectively. A candidate who prefers B/D has no incentive
to deviate to taking no position because by doing so, he would not affect the
policy that he would implement conditional on winning and he would decrease
his probability of winning.
In the announcement game, each candidate would implement his preferred
policy regardless of the strategy chosen; he could only choose whether or not
to announce that policy to voters before the election took place. In contrast, a
candidate in the commitment game may choose to commit to a policy that is
not his preferred policy in order to increase his chance of winning the election,
thereby preventing his opponent from implementing an even worse alternative.
Risk aversion has an important effect on candidates’ incentives, by influenc-
ing how candidates view the trade-off between the probability of winning the
election and the payoff conditional on winning. Compared to other equilib-
ria discussed below in which all types of candidates make commitments, the
near-revelation equilibrium requires that a candidate who prefers A/E choose
a more risky strategy. By doing so, he can win the election if he faces an op-
ponent who has also taken no position, though, even if that happens, he still
wins only half of the time. However, when he wins, he is able to implement his
preferred policy. If he deviated to a less risky strategy, such as committing to
B/D, he would win the election with higher probability, but he would have to
implement a less-preferred policy if elected.
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The following result establishes the conditions under which the ambiguity
equilibrium exists in the commitment game.
Proposition 10. In the limit as  ! 1, the ambiguity equilibrium exists if and only if
the following conditions hold:
  A  A (u2   u3)
C [A (u2   u3) + (1   C) (u1   u2)] (1.7)
u1 + u3   2u2
u3   u4 
A
A + B
(1.8)
u1 + u4   2u3
u4
 A
A + B
(1.9)
Given that equations 1.8 and 1.9 hold, candidates who prefer B/C and A/E,
respectively, cannot improve their expected payoffs by deviating to committing
to C. Neither candidate can benefit by deviating to committing to B/D because,
by doing so, a candidate would decrease his probability of winning the election
without increasing his payoff conditional on winning. Equation 1.7 is the condi-
tion that ensures that voters are sufficiently cursed, such that the median voter
prefers a candidate who took no position to a candidate who committed to B/D;
as in the announcement game, it cannot hold if voters are Bayesians.
In the commitment game, taking no position may not be the strategy cho-
sen by candidates who prefer B/D, even if they believe that the voters prefer
candidates who take no position to candidates who commit to B/D. Taking no
position is again a risky strategy, since it allows him to implement his preferred
policy if elected, but he risks receiving a low payoff if his opponent wins. This
risk does not affect decision-making in the announcement game because the al-
ternative is losing the election by revealing B/D and receiving the low payoff for
certain.8 However, in the commitment game, a candidate who prefers B/D has
8
The low payoff is not certain, sinceNaturemight intervene and cause the candidate’s platform
to be seen by voters as "no position." However, since the probability of this event does not
depend on the strategy chosen, the independence axiom implies that the candidate can simply
focus on the expected payoff differences between alternative strategies in the state of the world
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the option of committing to C, which would guarantee him his second-favorite
policy.
The remaining results in this section provide conditions under which equi-
libria that involve strategies that were not feasible in the announcement game
exist. The discussion begins with definitions of these new possible equilibria.
Definition 5. 1. Near-centrist equilibrium: Candidates who prefer B/D or C com-
mit to C, and candidates who prefer A/E take no position. The median voter would
vote for a candidate who took no position over a candidate who committed to B/D.
2. Centrist equilibrium: All candidates choose to commit to policy C, regardless of
type. Voters would vote for a candidate who took no position over a candidate who
committed to B/D.
3. Centrist-B equilibrium: All candidates choose to commit to policy C. Voters
would vote for a candidate who committed to B/D over a candidate who took no
position.
4. Commitment I equilibrium: Candidates who prefer C commit to C, and candi-
dates who prefer B/D or A/E commit to B/D. The median voter votes for a candi-
date who committed to B/D over a candidate who took no position.
The following proposition establishes conditions under which each of these
equilibria exist.
Proposition 11. In the limit as  ! 1:
1. The near-centrist equilibrium exists if and only if the following conditions hold:
2u2   u1   u4  0 (1.10)
u1   2u3  0 (1.11)
u1   u2
u2   u3 
1    (1   A)
C
(1.12)
when Nature does not intervene.
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2. The centrist equilibrium exists if and only if
u2  Au3 + Bu2 + Cu1 (1.13)
3. The centrist-B equilibrium exists if and only if
u2  Au3 + Bu2 + Cu1 (1.14)
4. The commitment I equilibrium exists if and only if the following conditions hold:
2u2   u1   u3
u1   u3 
A
A + B
(1.15)
1
2
u2 +
1
2
u4   u3  0 (1.16)
u2  Au3 + Bu2 + Cu1 (1.17)
As described above, the ambiguity equilibrium may not exist because can-
didates who prefer B/D have an incentive to deviate to committing to C. The
difference between the near-centrist equilibrium and the ambiguity equilibrium
in terms of strategies is that the candidates who prefer B/D commit to C in
equilibrium, even though voters continue to favor a candidate who took no po-
sition over a candidate who committed to B/D. In the announcement game,
such voter behavior always led candidates that prefer B/D to take no position,
resulting in the ambiguity equilibrium. However, once candidates are able to
make commitments, candidates that prefer B/D respond to these beliefs by in-
stead committing to policy C if they are sufficiently risk-averse. Taking no po-
sition and pooling with candidates that prefer A/E in order to implement his
preferred policy if he wins is a risky strategy, compared to committing to C and
receiving his second-best alternative for certain.
Choosing to commit to the median voter’s preferred policy, as all candidates
do in the centrist equilibria, is a safe strategy. When  < 1, candidates may have
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incentives to deviate because, given that all other candidates are committing to
C, there is no downside risk associated with deviating to B/D or no position.
Either the opponent commits to C (resulting in the same outcome regardless of
the potential deviator’s behavior) or the opponent is prevented from taking no
position, giving a candidate who deviates a chance to win and implement his
preferred policy. However, this potential gain from deviating disappears in the
limit as  ! 1.
The centrist and centrist-B behavior differ only in the voter behavior. Note
that in this equilibrium, as well as in other equilibria in which all candidates
choose to make commitments, voters’ decisions are driven entirely by the dis-
tribution of candidate preferences and the voters’ risk preferences. The median
voter would vote for a candidate who took no position over a candidate who
committed to B/D (if that off-path deviation were observed) if and only if she
prefers a random draw from the distribution of candidates to having B/D im-
plemented for certain. Cursedness can only make a candidate who took no
position more attractive to voters if more extreme candidates are more likely to
take no position than candidates whose preferences are more aligned with the
voters’; it has no effect when all candidates choose to make commitments.
In the commitment I equilibrium, candidates who prefer B/D and A/E bal-
ance the two opposing forces of wanting to implement a policy close to their
preferred policies and needing to win the election in order to do so. A candi-
date who prefers B/D optimizes by committing to his preferred policy, giving
up some probability of winning relative to committing to policy C, while a can-
didate who prefers A/E commits to a policy that lies between his preferred
policy and the median voter’s preferred policy. In equilibrium, only centrist
candidates commit to policy C. To a candidate who prefers A or B, this means
that there is a fairly high probability that the opponent will commit to D, giving
the candidate who prefers A or B a chance of being able to win the election and
implement policy B. However, there is also a chance that the opponent will be
able to implement policy D. This equilibria exists if candidates are willing to
take that risk, rather than committing to the median voter’s preferred policy.
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For completeness, the Appendix gives conditions for the existence of two ad-
ditional equilibria in pure strategies: one in which candidates who prefer B/D
commit to C and candidates who prefer A/E commit to B/D (commitment II),
and a counterintuitive equilibrium inwhich candidates who prefer B/D commit
to B/D while candidates who prefer A/E commit to C (reverse commitment).
However, in the limit as  ! 1, these equilibria can also only occur if prefer-
ences over policies are consistent with risk aversion in one part of the policy
space and risk lovingness in another part of the policy space.
The following proposition gives a uniqueness condition that applies when
candidates are risk-averse. This corresponds to the case often considered in
which agents minimize a convex loss function; deviations in the neighborhood
of the preferred policy do not result in large utility losses, but larger deviations
have much greater impacts.
Proposition 12. Suppose that candidates are risk-averse over policies. Then, in the
limit as  ! 1:
1. The centrist equilibrium is the unique pure-strategies equilibrium if and only if
u2  Au3 + Bu2 + Cu1
2. The centrist-B equilibrium is the unique pure-strategies equilibrium if and only if
u2  Au3 + Bu2 + Cu1
In the limit as  approaches one, all candidates choose to commit to the me-
dian voter’s preferred policy if they are risk-averse. Cursedness still makes tak-
ing no position more attractive; in the near-centrist equilibrium, voters would
prefer a candidate who takes no position to one who commits to B/D, even
though only extremists choose to take no position in equilibrium. However,
taking no position is too risky, given that the safer strategy of committing to
the voter’s ideal point is available. In the announcement game, candidates who
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prefer B/D or A/E could only choose between risky strategies; in that envi-
ronment, cursedness plays an important role in determining whether moderate
candidates choose to reveal their preferences to voters or to taken no position. In
contrast, when candidates can make credible commitments to any policy, risk-
averse candidates choose to commit to policy C, regardless of the voters’ degree
of cursedness.
1.5 Conclusion
To summarize, this chapter shows how the outcome of elections can be affected
if voters do not understand the strategic incentives faced by candidates. If a
candidate does not take a position, voters should infer something about his pre-
ferred policy from this action, assuming that candidates are not so risk-averse
that they all commit to moderate or centrist policies. However, if voters do not
make these inferences, then a candidate may respond by taking no position,
even when he prefers a moderate policy.
A key difference between the stylized model and a real-world election is
that, in actual elections, it is not always clear whether a candidate has taken no
position on an issue or has not discussed a particular issue simply because it is
not salient. In the model, there was a single policy dimension, and it was com-
mon knowledge that candidates would, with some objective probability, have
the opportunity to commit to a position. Theoretically, the noise introduced in
the model by randomly preventing candidates from committing works in a sim-
ilar way as noise in the real world generated by uncertainty about issue salience.
Think of candidates as having made a decision about a position (or lack thereof)
on each issue at the beginning of the campaign. With some probability, an is-
sue gains attention and the candidate’s strategy is enacted. If not, voters do not
observe that the candidate has taken a position on the issue. For example, if
voters do not observe a candidate make a statement about international trade
policy, they would be uncertain about whether the candidate has a campaign
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plank on this issue that has not been revealed because of lack of media attention
to the issue or whether the candidate intends not to take a position on trade
policy. The primary difference here is that different types of issues have a dif-
ferent probability of being made salient. For instance, in modern U.S. elections,
the probability that attention will be drawn to a candidate’s position on moral
issues such as abortion and gay marriage approaches one, while it is much less
likely that the media will focus on potential nominees to obscure positions.
Additionally, candidates may be heterogeneous with respect to other char-
acteristics that voters care about, such as integrity or decisiveness. Since such
traits may also affect a candidate’s decision about whether to remain ambigu-
ous, a platform of "no position" can be a signal of both policy preference and
other character traits. For example, a candidate who faces internal costs when
making decisions about taking action may also face similar costs when deciding
which policy to espouse during a campaign; taking no position would then be
a signal of indecisiveness. An extension of the model to this more complicated
signaling game is left for future work.
All unraveling arguments rely heavily on people’s understanding of the in-
centives involved. While this idea was applied here to study political cam-
paigns, it is relevant to many economic phenomena. An existing literature
studies disclosure of various types of information, from reviews by film crit-
ics (Brown, Camerer, and Lovallo 2012) to the quality and safety of a firm’s
products (Dranove and Jin 2010). It also has applications to lemons markets
and auctions in which the seller has private information about the value of the
good. If sellers are able to exploit individuals who are not able to understand
this logic, then the standard information revelation results disappear. Further
research is needed to determine how the presence of cursed individuals in a
market can affect outcomes if some or even most people are Bayesians.
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CHAPTER 2
ARE VOTERS CURSEDWHEN POLITICIANS CONCEAL POLICY
PREFERENCES? EXPERIMENT
2.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses a laboratory experiment that tests whether the mecha-
nism discussed in the previous chapter can generate ambiguity in elections as
predicted by the theory. In real-world elections, isolating a particular mecha-
nism for behavior is extremely difficult. In contrast, in the laboratory, other pos-
sible channels can be shut down. For instance, making the location of the me-
dian voter common knowledge removes uncertainty about the median voter’s
preference as a potential confound. Additionally, in the lab, preferences are in-
duced by paying subjects depending on the outcome of the election; this greatly
reduces the scope for electing a candidate based on some other dimension. Most
importantly, the parameters of the game can be manipulated, which, as will be
made clear later in the chapter, is key for the identification of partial cursedness.
The experiment is also useful because, while theorists would prefer to write
down theories that are portable across different contexts (Rabin 2013), whether
a given theory actually does apply in a particular setting is an empirical ques-
tion. As discussed below, evidence on the cursed equilibrium model is mixed,
suggesting that people may do a better job understanding the strategic incen-
tives that they face in some situations than in others. By recreating an election
setting in the lab, one can find out whether cursedness affects people in this
fairly familiar environment.
In the experiment, subjects play the commitment game described in the pre-
ceding chapter. Briefly, the model predicts that if voters are Bayesians, then the
median voter would vote for a candidate who committed to B/D over a candi-
date who took no position; candidates who prefer B/D would then optimally
choose to commit to B/D. On the other hand, if voters are sufficiently cursed,
then in equilibrium, the median voter would vote for a candidate who takes
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no position over a candidate who commits to B/D; candidates who prefer B/D
would respond by taking no position1. Subjects play 15 periods of this game,
with the distribution of candidate preferred policies and the probability that
Nature intervenes changing after every five periods. This changes the threshold
degree of cursedness that determines whether moderate candidates choose to
commit to their preferred policies or take no position. Analysis of the behavior
as values of the parameters change puts bounds on the degree of cursedness
that is consistent with subjects’ choices. Subjects receive feedback modeled af-
ter the information revealed after real elections; they view vote counts, know
who wins, and know what policy is implemented, but they do not know the
true preferred policy of any candidate or what the losing candidate would have
done.
To preview the main results, most subjects vote for a candidate who com-
mits to a moderate policy over a candidate who takes no position. This implies
that these subjects do understand the incentives. However, a significant frac-
tion of subjects do vote for candidates who take no position over candidates
who commit to a somewhat good policy from the voters’ perspective in some
circumstances, suggesting they they are partially or even close to fully cursed.
Surprisingly, many subjects do not vote for candidates who take no position
even when the opponent commits to the worst possible policy for the voters.
Several possible explanations for this reluctance to vote for an ambiguous can-
didate even in this circumstance are considered. As will be explained below, the
behavior seems consistent with a model in which voters value character, which
may mean that they prefer candidates who always commit to their preferred
policies or candidates who are open about their policy intentions. Either way,
taking no position signals a lack of character, and candidates who choose this
strategy are punished at the polls.
In addition, the experiment sheds light on the mechanism behind cursed
1
This is true as long as risk aversion does not lead candidates to instead choose to commit to
policies that are closer to what the median voter wants. The experiment uses paramterizations
such that the predictions listed in the main text generally apply.
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equilibrium. For example, one might hypothesize that uncertainty regarding
whether other people understand the incentives matters; behavior that deviates
from the Bayes-Nash prediction could be a rational response to a belief that oth-
ers are making mistakes. While other work has used computerized players to
control for this possibility, this experiment was designed to allow for compar-
isons of responses to fellow subjects and responses to computerized players. In
two treatments, the candidates are randomly chosen from among the subjects.
In the third, the candidates are programmed to play the Bayes-Nash equilib-
rium of the game: extreme candidates take no position and other types commit
to their preferred policies. By comparing two treatments that are identical in
every way except that the candidates are real subjects in one treatment and pro-
grammed to play as expected profit maximizers in the other treatment, one can
test howmuch of the difference between observed behavior and the Bayes-Nash
prediction is the result of uncertainty about the other players’ rationality. In fact,
subjects were much more likely to vote for a candidate who took no position in
the treatment with programmed candidates than the treatments with subject-
candidates. In addition, reported beliefs about candidate strategies were much
more closely aligned with the strategies actually chosen when the candidates
were fellow subjects. Guessing how other inexperienced subjects would play
by introspection was probably easier for subjects than trying to learn the equi-
librium of the game.
This study also confirms the value of taking advantage of the experimental
setting to get data on beliefs, which are typically not available in field settings.
In the programmed candidates treatment and one of the two subject-candidates
treatments, voters’ beliefs about the strategies that different types of candidates
would choose and the likely preferred policy of a candidate who took no posi-
tion are elicited before they vote. Because behavior does not differ significantly
between two treatments that are identical except that one includes the belief
elicitation and the other does not, prompting subjects to think about certain con-
tingencies does not seem to affect their play in this experiment. Belief data can
be used to confirm that behavior is consistent with the explanation proposed.
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Data on beliefs turned out to be incredibly useful, since a model in which voters
are cursed and one in which voters believe that all candidates make commit-
ments to signal character generate identical predictions about behavior. The
belief data can be used to separate out those subjects who believed that all can-
didates would commit, thus allowing for clean analysis of the remaining sub-
jects’ behavior. Among voters who do not believe that all types of candidates
make commitments, the main result that a minority of voters support a candi-
date who takes no position over a candidate who commits to the second-best
policy continues to hold.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses
how the chapter connects related literatures in experimental economics. Sec-
tion 2.3 outlines the experimental design. Section 2.4 provides a framework for
analyzing the results by explaining in more detail the predictions that the the-
oretical model makes for behavior in the experiment. Discussion of the results
of the experiment can be found in section 2.5. In section 2.6, several explana-
tions for why some subjects always avoid the candidate who took no position
are considered. Finally, section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
This chapter speaks to an experimental literature on the limits of strategic think-
ing in games with incomplete information. This brief review of that literature
focuses on papers that are most closely related to this work because they ex-
plicitly test the predictions of the cursed equilibrium model. The evidence is
mixed, with researchers finding evidence of different levels of cursedness in
different games. In an experiment that studies a different facet of voting behav-
ior, Battaglini, Morton, and Palfrey (2010) find that most uninformed subjects do
cast their votes strategically, taking into account the fact that others may be bet-
ter informed. In contrast, in a simultaneous-move game in which players either
compromise or fight after privately observing their strength, subjects behave in
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a manner consistent with a high degree of cursedness, though their estimates do
not allow for heterogeneity across people (Carrillo and Palfrey 2009). Charness
and Levin (2009) reinvent the acquire-a-company game as a simple individual
decision to eliminate uncertainty about other players and reduce the complexity
of the problem. If interpreted as a gamewith sellers, the data are consistent with
fully cursed equilibrium in some conditions, suggesting that uncertainty about
other players’ understanding of the game does not explain why behavior con-
sistent with the cursed model is observed. However, they do not test whether
partial cursedness could also (and potentially better) explain their results.
Papers that allow for heterogeneity in the degree of cursedness across peo-
ple typically find that some subjects are more sophisticated than others. Brocas,
Carrillo, Wang, and Camerer (2009) analyze choices and track which payoffs
subjects choose to look at in several games. They find different levels of sophis-
tication across subjects, with fully cursed equilibrium being able to explain the
behavior of some subjects, though they also do not develop the predictions un-
der the assumption of partial cursedness. Crawford and Iriberri (2007) is to my
knowledge the only paper that estimates subject-specific values of the cursed-
ness parameter while making appropriate restrictions regarding its possible val-
ues.2 Using data from several experiments on different types of auctions, they
find that almost half of subjects are fully cursed, about one fifth are Bayesians,
and the rest are partially cursed to some degree.
This chapter contributes to the debate regarding how well people take oth-
ers’ strategic incentives into account when they make decisions. It also provides
another test of the cursed equilibrium model, allowing both for partial cursed-
ness and heterogeneity in the degree of cursedness, and shows that a combina-
tion of full understanding of incentives, full cursedness, and partial cursedness
is needed to explain the results. However, as will be explained later in the pa-
per, in this particular context, this behavioral bias is somewhat overshadowed
2
Aswas explained in the previous chapter, the cursedness parameter must lie between 0 and 1.
Eyster and Rabin (2005) do not make this restriction in the empirical applications in their paper.
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by other factors that lead subjects to avoid candidates who do not take a posi-
tion.
Additionally, this work is part of a large and growing literature that uses
experimental methods to test predictions of political economy models. For re-
views of this literature, see McKelvey and Ordeshook (1990), Palfrey (2006), and
Palfrey (2009).
2.3 Experimental Design
As shown in the previous chapter, the degree of cursedness is a key determinant
of whether the near-revelation or ambiguity equilibrium is played. Further, for
a given value of , the equilibrium played may change as the distribution of
candidate preferences and the probability that a candidate is able to commit to
a policy change. By manipulating these parameters and observing the resulting
behavior, one can make inferences about the value of  that is consistent with
behavior in this election environment. The experiment described in this section
is designed to do just that.
The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree
(Fischbacher 2007). This paper uses data from eighteen sessions run in the Busi-
ness Simulation Lab at Cornell University between April 14 and April 28, 2013
and between July 7 and July 16, 2013, with 160 subjects.3 Participants were re-
cruited through an online recruiting tool. Students and staff members whowere
interested in participating in studies at the lab could sign up for an account that
3
23 sessions with 212 subjects were run in total. However, a programming error discovered
and fixed after the twelfth session caused the computer to draw from the wrong distribution of
candidate preferences during parts of some sessions. If this error occurred at the beginning of
the experiment, the entire session is excluded from analysis. If the error did not appear until
later in the session, then data collected before the error are not affected by it and remain in the
dataset. All analysis in this paper uses data that were not affected by the programming error,
though this is the reason for smaller sample sizes in some treatment cells. The additional July
sessions were added due to unexpectedly high no-show rates in the last week that the lab was
open for the spring semester.
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would allow them to gain access to a list of studies seeking subjects. As compen-
sation, subjects received their choice of two units of extra credit (only relevant
for students in a few business classes) or one unit of credit and a $5 show-up
fee, in addition to the incentive payments described below. Most students did
not choose the additional credit option. Incentive payments ranged from $5 to
$24.40, averaging $15.70. Sessions varied in length, with some sessions ending
in less than an hour and others hitting against the two-hour time constraint and
having to end with fewer periods completed than planned.4 This typically oc-
curred because one or two subjects took much more time to answer questions
than subjects in pilot sessions.
During the experiment, participants played one of three variations of the
election game. These variations will be referred to as treatments; each session is
assigned to one treatment. Treatments differ in terms of whether a belief elicita-
tion task is included and in terms of whether the candidate roles are played by
subjects or by the computer. The three treatments are: subject-candidates with
no beliefs, subject-candidates with beliefs, and programmed candidates with
beliefs. Each treatment will be described in more detail below. While more than
a third of subjects reported understanding the experiment completely and the
vast majority didn’t report major understanding problems, there were a hand-
ful of subjects who reported not understanding at all. 10 percent of participants
in the programmed candidates treatment fall into the latter category, while only
two percent of subjects in the subject-candidates with beliefs treatment did.
Demographic information about the subjects can be found in table 2.1. Most
participants were undergraduates, though more than 10 percent of subjects
were graduate or professional students and there were a few staff members.
Subjects were generally similar across treatments. However, there were a couple
of important differences. 30 percent of subjects in the programmed candidates
4
If time constraints required reducing the number of periods, subjects were told at the end of
a condition that the previous period was the last one for that condition. Thus, periods in these
sessions are still comparable to the same periods in other sessions, since subjects did not know
ahead of time that a period would actually be the last period.
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treatment had taken a course that covered game theory, while 42 percent of sub-
jects in the subject-candidates with beliefs treatment had done so. Thus, while
there were no differences that were statistically significant at five percent, it is
possible that some of the differences between these two treatments may be the
result of the fact that sessions with subject-candidates ended up having subjects
with more experience with game theory.
The experiment consisted of four phases: an election game, a test of ability
to use Bayes’ Rule, tasks to measure risk aversion, and a demographic ques-
tionnaire. Screenshots from each phase, along with the instructions given to
subjects, can be found in the Appendix.
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Table 2.1: Demographics
Subject
Candidates,
No Beliefs
Subject
Candidates,
With Beliefs
Programmed
Candidates,
With Beliefs
Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD N
Male 0.42 0.502 33 0.41 0.495 59 0.43 0.500 60
White 0.45 0.506 33 0.44 0.501 59 0.35 0.481 60
Asian 0.33 0.479 33 0.29 0.457 59 0.40 0.494 60
Age 21.82 2.920 33 20.90 1.873 59 21.63 5.039 60
Undergraduate 0.85 0.364 33 0.85 0.363 59 0.80 0.403 60
Grad/Professional 0.12 0.331 33 0.10 0.305 59 0.15 0.360 60
Student
Not a Student 0.03 0.174 33 0.05 0.222 59 0.05 0.220 60
No Game Theory 0.33 0.479 33 0.29 0.457 59 0.37 0.486 60
Knowledge
Took Game Theory 0.42 0.502 33 0.42 0.498 59 0.30 0.462 60
Course
Never Studied 0.12 0.331 33 0.12 0.326 59 0.20 0.403 60
Probability
Took Course in 0.70 0.467 33 0.63 0.488 59 0.60 0.494 60
Probability
Completely Understood 0.33 0.479 33 0.39 0.492 59 0.35 0.481 60
Experiment
Did Not Understand 0.06 0.242 33 0.02 0.130 59 0.10 0.303 60
Number of Subjects 41 59 60
Notes: The variable for "took game theory course" is equal to one if the subject reported
taking a course in game theory or another course that covered game theory. The differ-
ence in whether subjects did not understand, between the treatments with belief ques-
tions and subject-candidates and the treatments with belief questions and programmed
candidates, is marginally significant (p=0.056). Responses to demographic questions
were not saved in some sessions due to a technical problem.
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2.3.1 Election Game
The election game phase took most of the time for each session. The treatment
with subject-candidates and no beliefs is described first, and an explanation of
how the other treatments differ from this one follows. After receiving detailed
instructions, participants play 15 periods of the game detailed below, divided
into three conditions containing five periods each. The order in which subjects
face the conditions are counterbalanced across sessions within each treatment.
A condition is defined by the distribution of policy preferences and the amount
of noise in the platforms that comes from candidates not being able to commit.
In the low-noise skewed condition, A = 12 , B =
1
4 , and C =
1
4 , and candi-
dates are able to commit with probability 0.9. The low-noise uniform condition
uses the same commitment probability, but draws each preferred policy with
equal probability. In the high-noise uniform condition, candidates are able to
commit with probability 0.75, and all candidate types are equally likely. These
values were chosen to satisfy two requirements. First, the numbers had to be
familiar to subjects to avoid confusion—the denominator of each fraction is ei-
ther two, three, four, or ten. Second, given these sets of values, a model with
partially cursed voters has different predictions than a model with only fully
cursed and/or Bayesian voters; these predictions will be discussed in detail in
the next section.
Each period contains the following stages:
Role screen: At the beginning of each period, two subjects are randomly cho-
sen to be candidates. The remaining subjects play the role of voters. The first
screen that each subject sees tells him his role for the period, his preferred policy
(if he is a candidate), the preferred policy of voters, the distribution from which
candidate types are drawn, and the probability that a candidate who tries to
commit will be able to do so successfully.
Candidate strategy choices: Each candidate chooses a campaign strategy by
clicking a radio button. As in the commitment game described in section 1.4, a
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candidate may choose to make a policy commitment or to take no position.
Voter choices: The strategy method is used to learn which candidate each
subject would vote for given any possible combination of candidate platforms.
The instructions emphasize that a candidate’s platform is "no position" if the
candidate chose to take no position or if the computer intervened and randomly
prevented the candidate from making a commitment. Subjects have the option
of abstaining in each case, and they are told that they may use it if they like both
candidates equally. This option was added after pilot subjects reported being
confused about how to respond in such cases and were very concerned about
giving Candidate 1 an unfair advantage.
Election results: To determine the outcome of the election, the votes that cor-
respond to the candidates’ platforms are counted. If the winner made a com-
mitment, that commitment is honored. If not, the winner’s preferred policy is
implemented. Subjects see an outcome screen that lists each candidate’s plat-
form, the number of votes received by each candidate, the winner of the elec-
tion, the policy implemented, and the number of points earned by the subject in
that period. In each period, all subjects receive points based on the payoff chart
shown below in table 2.2; this chart was given to subjects with the instructions.
Table 2.2: Election Game Payoffs
Implemented Policy
A B C D E
Preferred Policy
A 10 4 2 1 0
B 4 10 4 2 1
C 2 4 10 4 2
D 1 2 4 10 4
E 0 1 2 4 10
49
Subjects gain experience with the game by playing five practice periods af-
ter reading most of the instructions. In these periods, the strategy method is not
used. Instead, candidates enter their strategies first, and voters only have to de-
cide which candidate they prefer based on those candidates’ actual platforms.
This allows them to get a feel for the game before they receive the rest of the in-
structions, which explain how the strategy method works. A box appears at the
top of the decision screens to remind subjects of the information presented on
the role screen. Participants may also use a calculator by clicking on a calculator
icon that appears at the bottom of all decision screens. One period is randomly
chosen for cash payment at the end of the experiment, and points are converted
one-for-one into dollars.
In the subject-candidates with beliefs and programmed candidates treat-
ments, beliefs are elicited from voters in each period, before the voter choices
stage. This is not done in one treatment, because there is some evidence that
prompting people to think in a certain way by eliciting beliefs leads them to
change their behavior (see Rutström and Wilcox (2009) and references therein).
A comparison of the subject-candidates with no beliefs and subject-candidates
with beliefs treatments will verify whether just asking these belief questions
causes changes in behavior. In the belief elicitation, subjects are first asked
which strategy they think the candidates will play, depending on their pre-
ferred policies. This is a direct test of cursedness, since it does not confound
the assumption that people understand strategic incentives with the ancillary
assumptions that people understand how to use prior beliefs when updating
and that they incorporate the noise correctly. Next, subjects give their posterior
beliefs that a candidate who has taken no position has each possible preferred
policy. Subjects answer these questions in one of two ways. They may answer
these questions by moving sliders that correspond to possible strategies or pol-
icy preferences. The further to the right a subject moves a slider, the more likely
he believes the candidate will choose the strategy or has the policy preference
associated with that slider. The computer calculates probabilities based on the
distance each slider was moved as a fraction of the total distance moved by
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all of the sliders. These probabilities are updated on the screen. This allows
people who do not understand probabilities to answer the questions in an intu-
itive way. If subjects prefer to enter probabilities directly, they may click a radio
button to switch the input mode. Subjects have three minutes to complete this
screen, and they may click on an icon to bring up a calculator.
The belief incentivization procedure is based on that developed by McK-
elvey and Page (1990). Details can be found in the Appendix. If a subject is
asked for her beliefs about the preferred position of a candidate who takes no
position and that candidate actually takes no position, the subject takes part in
a lottery. The probability that the subject wins the lottery is increasing in the
accuracy of the subject’s reported beliefs. The subject maximizes her expected
payoff by reporting truthfully as long as she prefers winning the lottery to los-
ing it; no risk neutrality assumption is needed. Similar lotteries are used to
incentivize beliefs about strategies; for these, the distance between the subject’s
beliefs about that candidate’s strategy given the realized type and the candi-
date’s actual strategy is used to compute the probability of winning. In order
to ensure that simply entering more lotteries (because candidates took no posi-
tion more often) doesn’t increase payoffs, subjects are paid the proportion of the
entered lotteries that they win multiplied by $3.
In the programmed candidates treatment, all subjects always take the role
of voters, and the candidate roles are played by the computer. Subjects are told
(truthfully) the payoffs of the candidates, as in the other treatments, and they are
told that the candidates are programmed to choose decisions that would maxi-
mize their expected profits, assuming that the voters are also maximizing their
expected profits. The purpose of this treatment is to address the concern that
subjects may not play the equilibria described above because they do not believe
that candidates are playing optimally. It also removes uncertainty about the
risk preferences of the candidates. By controlling what subjects believe about
the candidates, this treatment eliminates this as a possible explanation. In this
treatment, one is able to interpret cursedness as a mistake, not as a possibly
reasonable belief that candidates are making mistakes. Differences in behavior
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between the subject-candidates with beliefs and programmed candidates treat-
ments would be due only to the use of programmed candidates.
The remaining phases are the same for all treatments.
2.3.2 Test of ability to use Bayes’ Rule
Subjects complete a task that is designed to test whether, given candidates’
strategies and the distribution of possible candidate types, they are able to de-
termine the posterior probability that is a candidate who took no position is of
each type. Subjects answer six such questions, presented in random order. In
three of the questions, subjects are told that the candidate (always Candidate 1)
takes no position if his preferred position is A, chooses B if he prefers B, and
chooses C if he prefers C. In the other three questions, they are told that the
candidate chooses C if he prefers C and takes no position otherwise. Within
each set of three, the prior probabilities of candidate types and the amount of
noise vary as they do in the election conditions. For this task, subjects enter a
lottery corresponding to each question, and the chance of winning the lottery is
increasing in how close their reported probabilities are to the true probabilities.
See the Appendix for details. Subjects are paid their winning percentage in the
lotteries multiplied by $2.
2.3.3 Tasks to measure risk aversion
Subjects complete two tasks designed to measure risk aversion; however, this
chapter focuses on one task. In this task, subjects make six choices between a
lottery and four points. These choices are based on choices that a voter would
face if one candidate took no position and the other candidate committed to
policy B/D; the lottery always has some probability of receiving two points,
four points, and ten points. The task is fairly easy for subjects to understand, but
it gives coarse information about risk preferences. The other task uses a BDM
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(Becker, Degroot, and Marschak 1964) mechanism that allows for more precise
estimates of risk aversion, assuming that subjects understand the more complex
task. Subjects make four decisions. For each one, subjects are given a choice
between a lottery that pays some sum if they win and nothing if they lose and a
smaller sum for sure. They are asked for the lowest probability of winning that
would still be high enough to induce them to choose the lottery. The computer
then draws the probability of winning the lottery from a uniform distribution on
[0; 1] , and the subject’s choice is implemented. Subjects complete these two risk
tasks in random order. They see the results of both tasks after both have been
completed. One of the ten choices from these risk tasks is randomly chosen for
payment, with points converted one-for-one to dollars.
2.3.4 Demographic questionnaire
While incentive payments are tabulated, subjects complete a brief questionnaire.
It includes questions about standard demographic variables, such as age and
gender, as well as questions about the subjects’ experience with game theory
and their understanding of the experiment.
2.4 Using model predictions to look for evidence of cursedness
This section builds a bridge between this and the preceding chapter, moving
from fairly abstract theoretical results to testable predictions. As will be il-
lustrated below, manipulation of parameters changes the threshold degrees of
cursedness that determine equilibrium behavior. While the theoretical results
discussed in the previous chapter focus on the limit case as the probability that
a candidate will be able to make a policy commitment if he chooses goes to one,
the experiment utilizes this probability to change candidates’ incentives.
The existence of each possible equilibrium depends on the distribution of
candidate preferences and the probability that Nature will prevent a candidate
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frommaking a policy commitment, as well as preferences over policy outcomes.
In the theory chapter, preferences over policy outcomes were primitives of the
model. However, in the experiment, subjects receive monetary payments that
depend on the outcome of the election, and they have preferences over these
monetary amounts. Tomatch the laboratory behavior, themodelmust take pref-
erences over money as primitive, which requires some additional notation. Let
x denote a player’s election game payoff. Consistent with the theory outlined in
the previous chapter, the monetary payoffs used in the experiment depend only
on the distance between preferred policy and policy implemented. The payoffs
shown in table 2.2 reflect an assumption that players care intensely about receiv-
ing their most preferred alternative and are less sensitive to differences between
policies further away from their ideal points. Combined with anticipated risk
aversion with respect to monetary amounts, preferences over policies derived
from those preferences induced using monetary payments were expected to be
approximately risk-neutral.
Each player’s preferences over these payoffs can be represented by a
Bernoulli utility function u (x) that is increasing in x. In numerical calculations,
it is assumed that u (x) = 1

 
1   exp ( x), where  is the coefficient of absolute
risk aversion. Assume that  = c for each candidate and that all voters share
 = v. It often makes sense to assume that c = v, particularly in the exper-
imental treatments in which voters and candidates are drawn from the same
pool of subjects. However, it is instructive to distinguish between the two be-
cause candidate and voter risk aversion matter in different ways for the results.
Each candidate faces uncertainty because he does not know the preferred pol-
icy of his opponent when he chooses his strategy. Voters may face uncertainty
because they do not know what policy a candidate who takes no position will
implement. Additionally, programmed candidates are risk-neutral, while the
subject-voters may have different risk preferences.
Table 2.3 shows which equilibria exist within each condition, as a function of
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Table 2.3: Model Predictions
Abbreviations:
NR: Near-revelation equilibrium
Amb: Ambiguity equilibrium
CI: Commitment I equilibrium
Parameter Values Possible Equilibria
Candidate
Risk
Aversion
Voter Risk
Aversion
Voter
Cursedness
Low-
Noise
Skewed
Low-
Noise
Uniform
High-
Noise
Uniform
c =  0:07 v =  0:07
 = 0 NR NR NR,Amb
0 <  < 0:22 NR NR Amb
0:22    0:33 NR NR,Amb Amb
0:33 <  < 0:51 NR Amb Amb
0:51    0:59 NR,Amb Amb Amb
 > 0:59 Amb Amb Amb
c = 0
v = 0
 < 0:15 NR NR NR
0:15    0:19 NR NR NR,Amb
0:19 <  < 0:34 NR NR Amb
0:34    0:46 NR NR,Amb Amb
0:46 <  < 0:69 NR Amb Amb
0:69    0:75 NR,Amb Amb Amb
 > 0:75 Amb Amb Amb
v = 0:105
 < 0:40 NR NR NR
0:40    0:49 NR NR NR,Amb
0:49 <  < 0:54 NR NR Amb
0:54    0:66 NR NR,Amb Amb
0:66 <  < 1 NR Amb Amb
 = 1 Amb Amb Amb
v = 0:154
 < 0:54 CI,NR NR NR
0:54    0:63 CI,NR NR NR,Amb
0:64    0:75 CI,NR NR,Amb Amb
 > 0:75 CI,NR Amb Amb
c = 0:105,
c = 0:154
v = 0:105
 < 0:40 none none none
0:40   < 0:54 none none Amb
0:54   < 1 none Amb Amb
 = 1 Amb Amb Amb
v = 0:154
 < 0:54 CI none none
0:54   < 0:64 CI none Amb
  0:64 CI Amb Amb
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candidates’ and voters’ risk aversion. The table shows only cases in which can-
didates and voters have the same degree of risk aversion, plus cases in which
candidates are risk-neutral, as they are in the programmed candidates treat-
ment. The values of  used in these calculations were selected because they cor-
respond to bounds that can be identified using the binary risky decision task.
As only a handful of subjects made choices consistent with higher levels of risk
aversion or withmore risk-loving preferences (see Figure 2.1), predictions based
on the risk preferences of these outliers are not included in the table.
Given these parameter values, the only equilibria that are consistent with
low levels of risk aversion are the near-revelation and ambiguity equilibria.
However, if candidates are sufficiently risk-averse, then the commitment I equi-
librium exists, regardless of how cursed voters are. If this is the case, then vot-
ers may choose a candidate who commits to B/D over an opponent who takes
no position either because they are sufficiently Bayesian and are playing the
near-revelation equilibrium or because they face sufficiently risk-averse candi-
dates and are playing the commitment I equilibrium. Since this situation can
only arise in the low-noise skewed condition, it will not be discussed further.
However, the reader should keep in mind that the extent of cursedness may be
underestimated in this condition.
One can use table 2.3 to think about how simple comparisons of average be-
havior across different conditions can be used to learn something about cursed-
ness. By considering parameter values for which an equilibriummay exist, even
if it is not unique, it is still possible to draw conclusions about the value of the
cursedness parameter, given that behavior consistent with that equilibrium is
observed. Suppose that voters vote for a candidate who commits to B/D over
a candidate who takes no position in all conditions. This can happen only if
the near-revelation equilibrium exists in all conditions. If voters are also risk-
neutral, this would result only if   0:20. If a greater degree of risk-aversion
is assumed, the bound on  increases, to   0:50 if v = 0:105. Now, suppose
that the opposite occurs: voters prefer the candidate who took no position in all
conditions. This means that the ambiguity equilibrium must exist in all condi-
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tions. If voters are risk-neutral, this can only happen if   0:69. This threshold
also moves up, such that only a fully cursed voter would vote for the candidate
who took no position in all three conditions if v = 0:105. However, suppose
voters vote for the candidate who takes no position in the low-noise uniform
and high-noise uniform conditions, and it is assumed that  = 0:105. Then, one
can conclude that   0:53.
Now, consider what would be observed if there were two types of subjects:
Bayesians and fully cursed subjects. In this case, the Bayesians would vote for
the candidate who committed to B/D in all conditions, while fully cursed sub-
jects would vote for the candidate who took no position in the low-noise uni-
form and high-noise uniform conditions, while voting for the candidate who
committed to B/D in the low-noise skewed condition if they were sufficiently
risk-averse. This would imply that, in the low-noise uniform and high-noise
uniform conditions, the vote share of a candidate who took no position would
be strictly between zero and one, and this vote share would be constant across
these conditions. However, if differences in this vote share across the low-noise
uniform and high-noise uniform conditions are observed, then it must be that
at least some voters are partially cursed.
Finally, suppose that there is heterogeneity among subjects, with subjects
having varying levels of cursedness and at least some subjects being partially
cursed. The reader might think of subjects’ behavior as being drawn from dif-
ferent rows in the table, depending on their risk aversion and cursedness. There
are many rows that predict voting for B/D in the low-noise skewed column,
fewer rows that predict this in the low-noise uniform column, and even fewer
that predict this in the high-noise uniform column. Thus, as this heterogeneous
group of subjects moves through the conditions, it would be expected that the
vote share for candidates who take no position would increase from the low-
noise skewed condition, to the low-noise uniform condition, to the high-noise
uniform condition.
The above analysis assumed that candidates are risk-neutral. As shown in
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the lowest two blocks of the table, if candidates are somewhat risk-averse, an
equilibrium does not exist if voters are Bayesians. To address behavior here,
equilibria in mixed strategies have been partially characterized, and this anal-
ysis appears in the Appendix. The main result is that, in each condition, there
does not exist an equilibrium in mixed strategies in which voters strictly pre-
fer a candidate who takes no position to one who commits to B/D. Therefore,
observing that voters choose a candidate who takes no position must indicate
cursedness, not that agents are risk-averse and are playing a mixed-strategy
equilibrium that generates the same behavior.
In summary, the following conclusions can be drawn given data on average
vote shares across conditions:
1. If votes are cast for a candidate a took no position over a candidate who
committed to B/D, then the hypothesis that all subjects are Bayesians can
be rejected.5
2. If votes are cast for a candidate who committed to B/D over a candidate
who took no position, then the hypothesis that all subjects are fully cursed
can be rejected.
3. If vote shares remain constant across conditions, then the data is consis-
tent with a group of subjects who are approximately Bayesian and another
group of subjects who are close to fully cursed.
4. If the vote share for the candidate who took no position increases from the
LS to LU and/or from the LU to HU conditions, then there exists a group
of subjects who are partially cursed.
5
With noisy data and response error, this feature of the data does not necessarily reject the
Bayesian model. However, if observed in a subsample with very low response error, this is
inconsistent with all subjects being Bayesians.
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2.5 Results
2.5.1 Aggregate results
Choices between a candidate who committed to B/D and a candidate who
took no position across conditions
If all voters behave according to the Bayesian prediction, then the vote share
for the candidate who took no position when his opponent committed to B/D
would be zero in all conditions. This null hypothesis is clearly rejected in the
data. Averaging across all treatments and conditions, subjects voted for the
candidate who took no position 24.5 percent of the time, voted for the candidate
who committed to B/D 72.9 percent of the time, and abstained 2.7 percent of
the time. To look at differences between conditions and across experimental
treatments, the following estimating equation is used:
yi jt =
X
k2f1;2;3g
X
l2fLS ;LU;HUg
klTreatmentkConditionl + Candidate1i jt + "i jt
The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if subject j in pe-
riod t voted for candidate i if that candidate took no position when the opponent
committed to B/D and equal to zero if the subject abstained or voted for the can-
didate who committed to B/D. In each period in which he is a voter, a subject
is observed making two such choices: between Candidate 1 (B) and Candidate
2 (no position) and between Candidate 1 (no position) and Candidate 2 (D). i
is the label (1 or 2) of the candidate who took no position. Results of OLS re-
gressions6 are shown in table 2.4. Standard errors are clustered at the subject
level.
The regressors that are included in all specifications are interactions of a
dummy variable for the treatment (subject-candidates without belief questions,
6
Since all regressors are binary variables, the coefficients from the linear probability model are
the same as the marginal effects that would be calculated if a probit or logit model were used.
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subject-candidates with belief questions, or programmed candidates with belief
questions) with a dummy variable for the condition (low-noise skewed, low-
noise uniform, or high-noise uniform). This specification allows changes in the
parameter values to affect behavior differently in each treatment. One might
expect that subjects would be more attentive to changes in the parameter values
when they were prompted to form beliefs before making their choices, or that
the pattern of switching to a different candidate as the condition changes might
differ when the candidates are programmed. The marginal effects of moving
from one treatment to another, averaging across conditions, and from moving
from one condition to another, averaging across treatments, are also given in the
bottom panel of the table. Candidate1i jt is equal to one if the candidate who took
no position is labeled Candidate 1 and equal to 0 if that candidate is labeled Can-
didate 2. It is included in columns 2 and 4 to capture any bias toward choosing
the candidate listed first, though no statistically significant bias is found.
In all treatment-condition combinations, the proportion of votes cast for the
candidate who took no position was significantly greater than zero. In the
subject-candidates with no beliefs treatment, this vote share increased from 8.6
percent in the low-noise skewed condition to 18.5 percent in the low-noise uni-
form condition (p=0.03), while there was no significant difference between the
low-noise uniform and high-noise uniform conditions. In the treatment with
subject-candidates and beliefs, there was no significant difference between the
low-noise skewed and low-noise uniform conditions, but the vote share in-
creased from 10.1 percent in the low-noise uniform condition to 19.3 percent in
the high-noise uniform condition (p=0.02). In the treatment with programmed
candidates, therewas also no difference between the low-noise skewed and low-
noise uniform conditions, while the vote share increased from 33.5 percent in the
low-noise uniform condition to 40.5 percent in the high-noise uniform condition
(p=0.05). Taking all treatments together, the vote share increased by 7.7 percent-
age points from low-noise uniform to high-noise uniform conditions (p=0.02).
If one takes the model seriously, the vote share for candidates who took no
position in the low-noise skewed condition gives an estimate of the fraction of
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Table 2.4: Proportion of Votes That Were For A Candidate Who Took No
Position Over A Candidate Who Committed To B/D
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Subject
Candidates,
No Beliefs
Low-Noise Skewed 0.086*** 0.079** 0.100*** 0.093**
(0.033) (0.033) (0.037) (0.038)
Low-Noise Uniform 0.185*** 0.178*** 0.201*** 0.194***
(0.057) (0.057) (0.064) (0.064)
High-Noise Uniform 0.252*** 0.244*** 0.281*** 0.274***
(0.062) (0.062) (0.068) (0.068)
Subject
Candidates,
With Beliefs
Low-Noise Skewed 0.121*** 0.114*** 0.121*** 0.114**
(0.043) (0.043) (0.045) (0.045)
Low-Noise Uniform 0.101*** 0.094*** 0.104*** 0.097***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.027) (0.027)
High-Noise Uniform 0.193*** 0.186*** 0.180*** 0.173***
(0.040) (0.040) (0.039) (0.039)
Programmed
Candidates,
With Beliefs
Low-Noise Skewed 0.340*** 0.333*** 0.360*** 0.353***
(0.053) (0.053) (0.055) (0.055)
Low-Noise Uniform 0.335*** 0.328*** 0.355*** 0.348***
(0.057) (0.057) (0.061) (0.061)
High-Noise Uniform 0.405*** 0.398*** 0.435*** 0.428***
(0.056) (0.056) (0.058) (0.058)
Candidate 1 0.014 0.014
(0.012) (0.013)
R-Squared 0.29 0.29 0.31 0.31
N 3494 3494 3222 3222
(# of subjects) (160) (160) (147) (147)
Marginal Effects
Subject Candidates, No Beliefs 0.042 0.042 0.065 0.065
(0.054) (0.054) (0.059) (0.059)
Programmed Candidates, With Beliefs 0.222*** 0.222*** 0.249*** 0.249***
(0.056) (0.056) (0.058) (0.058)
Low-Noise Skewed -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014
(0.026) (0.026) (0.028) (0.028)
High-Noise Uniform 0.077*** 0.077*** 0.079*** 0.079***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024)
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy for voting for the candidate who took no
position when the opponent committed to B/D. Models estimated using OLS. Subjects
who made choices in the binary risky decision task consistent with   0:305 are ex-
cluded from the sample in models 3 and 4. Standard errors clustered at the subject
level. *, **, and *** indicate that a coefficient is statistically different from zero at the
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. In all specifications, differences between the LS
and LU conditions are significant only in the no beliefs treatment (p<0.05). Differences
between the LU and HU conditions are significant in the subject-candidates with be-
liefs treatment (p<0.05) and programmed candidates treatment (p<0.04). Differences
between the subject-candidates with beliefs and programmed candidates treatments
were significant in each condition (p<0.01). There were no significant differences be-
tween the two treatments with subject-candidates. Marginal effects are relative to the
omitted category. For effects of treatment, the omitted category is "Subject Candidates,
With Beliefs"; for effects of condition, the omitted category is "Low-Noise Uniform."
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votes cast by subjects whose  is above the highest threshold, close to 1. While
this design can only give bounds on , this model combined with the data does
indicate that voting behavior in the subject-candidate with beliefs treatment is
consistent with a model in which 12 percent of votes are cast by voters who are
fully (or almost fully) cursed, and behavior in the programmed candidates treat-
ment suggests that 34 percent of votes are cast by voters behaving as if (almost)
fully cursed. At the other end of the spectrum, the vote share for candidates
who committed to B/D in the high-noise uniform condition gives an estimate
of the fraction of votes cast by subjects whose  is below the lowest threshold,
close to zero. By subtracting the coefficients on the interactions with the high-
noise uniform condition from one, one can infer that 75-81 percent of votes were
cast by subjects who are approximately Bayesian in the treatments with subject-
candidates, while 60 percent of votes were cast by Bayesians in the programmed
candidates treatment.
Differences between conditions indicates that some subjects have a  that
implies playing one equilibrium in one condition, then switching to playing an-
other equilibrium in another condition. The significant difference between low-
noise skewed and low-noise uniform rounds in the treatment with no beliefs
suggests that some subjects switched there. The following calculations assume
risk neutrality. To see how the conclusions depend on the assumption about risk
preferences, consult table 2.3. Under the assumption that the near-revelation
equilibrium is played whenever both it and the ambiguity equilibrium exist,
a difference between low-noise skewed and low-noise uniform rounds implies
that some subjects made choices consistent with 0:46    0:75. If one instead
assumes that the ambiguous equilibrium is played whenever both it and the
near-revelation equilibrium exist, this implies that 0:34    0:69. In the other
two treatments, the switch happened between the low-noise uniform and high-
noise uniform conditions. Assuming that the near-revelation equilibrium is
played whenever it exists, this implies that the partially cursed subjects chang-
ing behavior have a lower 0:19    0:46. This range shifts to 0:15    0:34 if
one assumes that the ambiguity equilibrium is played if it exists.
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Accounting for risk aversion
Recall that while the predictions discussed above hold for some levels of risk
aversion, one would not expect to observe even fully cursed voters supporting
a candidate who took no position if they were too risk-averse. To focus attention
on the subjects for whom these predictions apply, choices in the binary risky de-
cision task can be used to identify subjects who are too risk-averse for those
predictions to apply to them. Recall that subjects faced six choices between re-
ceiving four points for sure and a lottery that paid two points, four points, or ten
points. Denote the probability of receiving two points in question j by p j and
denote the probability of receiving ten points in question j by q j. Individual i
would choose the lottery if and only if p jui (2) +

1   p j   q j

ui (4) + q jui (10) 
ui (4), where ui (x) = 1i
 
1   exp ( ix).7 A subject’s choices in this task imply
bounds on his coefficient of absolute risk aversion, i. A histogram of these co-
efficients can be found in figure 2.1. Bounds were not constructed for 44 subjects
because their choices were inconsistent or for one subject who left the experi-
ment before beginning the risky decisions tasks. Among the remaining subjects,
the median lies between 0.105 and 0.155. 13 subjects made choices consistent
with   0:305; these subjects are classified as too risk-averse for the experiment
to say anything about cursedness, since subjects with this level of risk aversion
would always choose a candidate who committed to B/D regardless of the de-
gree of cursedness.
Columns 3-4 of table 2.4 show results of the same regressions as columns
1-2, except that the subjects who were classified as too risk-averse are excluded
from the sample. The vote shares for the candidate who took no position in-
crease slightly, and they now range from 10.0 percent for the low-noise skewed
condition in the no belief treatment to 43.5 percent in the high-noise uniform
condition in the programmed candidate treatment. Including this control does
not change the results regarding differences between conditions and between
7
Initial wealth is implicitly assumed to be zero, perhaps not an unrealistic assumption for
undergraduate subjects.
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Figure 2.1: Distribution of Coefficient of Absolute Risk Aversion
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Notes: This figure shows the number of subjects who made choices in the binary risky
choice task that are consistent with each coefficient of absolute risk aversion parameter
range. Subjects who made inconsistent choices are not included in the figure.
treatments.
Differences between treatments
There were no significant differences between the two treatments with subject-
candidates. This suggests that simply asking the belief questions did not cause
subjects to behave differently. There are several possible differences between
the treatment with subject-candidates with beliefs and the treatment with pro-
grammed candidates. First, while the programmed candidates behaved as a
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risk-neutral candidate would, subject-candidates most likely were somewhat
risk-averse. However, risk-neutral candidates and somewhat risk-averse candi-
dates behave very similarly. The difference is that where the near-revelation
equilibrium existed with risk-neutral candidates, there is no equilibrium in
pure strategies with risk-averse candidates. However, the equilibrium in mixed
strategies also cannot involve voters supporting a candidate who took no posi-
tion. Thus, differences in candidate risk-aversion should not lead to differences
in voter behavior across the two treatments.
The main difference is that, while subjects know that the programmed can-
didates are responding optimally, they may be uncertain about whether the
subject-candidates are able to do so. In this case, the interpretation of cursedness
could be that voters believe that candidates sometimes draw from the average
distribution of strategies, not because the voters don’t understand the incen-
tives, but because the voters believe that the candidates don’t understand the
incentives. This would imply that, conditional on a subject’s ability to under-
stand the incentives, the behavior would be consistent with a higher level of
cursedness in the subject-candidates with beliefs treatment. Therefore, if these
beliefs about others’ understanding of the incentives were driving cursed be-
havior, then we would expect to see the ambiguous candidate get a higher vote
share in the subject-candidates with beliefs treatment. However, having pro-
grammed candidates actually significantly increased the likelihood that voters
would choose the candidate who took no position. Comparing the subject-
candidates with beliefs and programmed candidates treatments, the marginal
effect of having programmed candidates is 22.2 percentage points. It is clear
that the evidence of cursed behavior is not driven by Bayesian voters believing
that subject-candidates make mistakes.
Response error
One possible explanation for the fact that voters chose the candidate who took
no position some fraction of the time could be that some subjects were simply
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answering randomly. Data from choices that should have been trivial can be
used to get an idea of the extent to which this could explain these choices. When
both candidates committed, but one candidate committed to a policy that was
better for the voter, monotonicity alone implies that the voter should choose
the candidate who committed to the policy that would give her a larger payoff.
The results of analysis of these choices can be found in Appendix table B.2.
The dependent variable is equal to one if the voter chose the candidate whose
election guarantees her a lower payoff and zero otherwise. As in column 2 of
the previous table, the dependent variable is regressed on a Candidate 1 dummy
and dummies for each treatment-condition cell.
When one candidate committed to the voters’ favorite policy, it was very
unlikely that voters would choose the other candidate, though there were a few
mistakes. It is plausible that response error could generate the pattern of voting
for a candidate who took no position over one who committed to B/D. If one as-
sumes that subjects are more likely to make errors when the utility cost of mak-
ing the error is small, then one would expect more errors in conditions in which
the expected payoff from electing a candidate who took no position is closer to
4. This implies that Bayesians who respond with error would occasionally vote
for a candidate who took no position in the low-noise skewed condition, more
often in the low-noise uniform condition, and still more often in the high-noise
uniform condition. One could imagine estimating the degree of response er-
ror in choices with the potential for monotonicity violations and using this to
construct the probability of voting for a candidate who took no position under
the assumption that voters are Bayesians who respond with error. However, it
seems quite possible that subjects would take more care to avoid response error
if they expected the election to be close, but cared less aboutmaking errors when
they did not expect their vote to be pivotal. If a subject expected that enough
other participants would make the correct choice, she could respond randomly
in these choices and only focus on decisions in which her vote would be more
likely to determine the outcome. When facing a choice between a candidate
who committed to B/D and one who took no position, subjects may expect that
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they may disagree with other subjects about the identity of the best candidate,
since voters’ risk aversion and beliefs may differ. Thus, voters may be inclined
to take more care with this decision than with the trivial ones. For this reason,
using data on trivial choices to estimate the response error in more meaningful
choices would generate misleading conclusions.
Moreover, a small number of subjects were responsible for a large number of
violations of monotonicity. At the other end, 75 subjects never violated mono-
tonicity, and 21 subjects only violated it once. Among these subjects, response
error seems to be extremely low. Appendix table B.3 repeats the main analysis
with the sample restricted to subjects who violated monotonicity at most once.
The main results continue to hold, though the loss of power makes it difficult to
find statistically significant differences across conditions within a treatment.
2.5.2 Individual behavior
Categorization of voting behavior
To confirm the results of the aggregate analysis, one can look at individual be-
havior. For each condition, each subject is classified as showing a preference
for the candidate who committed to B/D, a preference for the candidate who
took no position, or indifference. Each subject made up to 10 choices between
this pair of candidate platforms within each condition.8 The fraction of votes
cast for each candidate is calculated by adding the votes cast, giving half a vote
to each candidate if the subject actively chose to abstain. If the subject cast at
least 60 percent of her votes for a candidate in a condition, she is classified as
supporting that candidate in that condition. If each candidate receives between
8
In treatments with subject-candidates, a subject would not have made all 10 choices if she had
been chosen to be a candidate for one or more periods during that condition. Subjects would
also have made fewer than 10 choices if they were in a session that had fewer periods in that
condition due to time constraints.
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40 and 60 percent of the votes, the subject is classified as being indifferent.9
Table 2.5: Individual Voter Choices Between A Candidate Who Took No
Position and A Candidate Who Committed to B/D
Vote Pattern Subject- Subject-, Programmed Cumulative
Candidates, Candidates Candidates, Probability
LS LU HU No Beliefs With Beliefs With Beliefs
B/D or - B/D B/D 24 38 25 66.4
B/D or - B/D ~ 1 2 1 69.5
B/D or - B/D n.p. 4 5 3 78.6
B/D ~ n.p. 0 1 1 80.2
B/D n.p. n.p. 0 0 4 83.2
~ n.p. n.p. 1 0 1 84.7
- n.p. n.p. 5 0 0 88.6
n.p. n.p. n.p. 0 2 13 100
Not categorized 1 7 8
Notes: ~indicates that the subject was indifferent. n.p stands for "no position." LS, LU,
and HU denote the low-noise skewed, low-noise uniform, and high-noise uniform con-
ditions, respectively. Within each condition, a subject is said to vote for a candidate if
she cast at least 60 percent of her votes during those periods for that candidate. Sub-
jects who made choices in the binary risky decision task consistent with a coefficient of
absolute risk aversion   0:305 are classified as too risk-averse and not included here.
"-" indicates missing data for that condition due to the programming error.
Table 2.5 shows the transitions that individual voters make as they move
through different conditions. This table does not include very risk-averse sub-
jects, since their voting for the candidate who committed to B/D in each con-
dition is not informative regarding their degree of cursedness. 59 percent of
9
Changing the vote threshold to 70 percent does not affect the pattern. Appendix table B.4
presents results using this threshold.
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subjects made choices consistent with Bayesian updating, or with a very low
level of cursedness. At the other end of the spectrum, 10 percent of subjects sup-
ported the candidate who took no position across all conditions, consistent with
 above 0.75. Most of these subjects were in the treatment with programmed
candidates. Aside from the 11 percent of subjects who made choices that were
not consistent with the model (being indifferent in more than one condition,
or being more likely to vote for a candidate who took no position in the low-
noise skewed condition), the remaining subjects made choices consistent with
partial cursedness. Many of these subjects supported the candidate who took
no position only in the high-noise uniform condition, which is consistent with
0:19    0:46. While the aggregate results could also have been consistent
with all subjects slightly increasing the probability of voting for the candidate
who took no position across conditions, the individual-level analysis lends cre-
dence to the interpretation that the changes were driven by individuals making
significant changes in their behavior when the condition changed.
Structural analysis
The results described above provide reduced-form evidence in support of a
model that incorporates partial cursedness. In this section, choices between a
candidate who committed to B/D and a candidate who took no position, in
combination with choices made in the risky decision task, are used to identify
. Let xit be equal to one if subject i voted for the candidate who took no posi-
tion in choice t and equal to 0 if subject i voted for the candidate who committed
to B/D. Choices to abstain are dropped from the analysis; this affects very few
observations. If a subject always voted for the same candidate within each con-
dition, then his behavior is consistent with the model without response error.
Bounds on his cursedness parameter can be constructed directly using the equa-
tions derived in the Appendix to the theory chapter, by assuming either that the
near-revelation or ambiguity equilibrium is played. i comes from the choices
made in the risky decision task, as described above. Since the risky decision
task allows for inference of bounds on the risk aversion parameter, bounds for
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the cursedness parameter are constructed using each bound on the risk aver-
sion paramter. Subjects for whom this coefficient could not be estimated are not
included in this exercise.
Because this task also gives only bounds on the risk aversion parameter, one
can provide a range of possible values for i, corresponding to different assump-
tions that may be made. For example, suppose that a subject never votes for a
candidate who takes no position when the opponent committed to B/D. The
lower bound on  must be zero; these voting choices are consistent with being
Bayesian. The upper bound is the threshold that would make the subject indif-
ferent between the candidates. As shown in the theory chapter, the threshold is
higher for any given parameter values for the ambiguity equilibrium than the
near-revelation equilibrium. In addition, the threshold is higher when the sub-
ject is more risk-averse. Therefore, the upper bound is the value of  calculated
assuming that the ambiguity equilibrium is being played and using the upper
bound on the subject’s coefficient of absolute risk aversion.
The behavior of most of the subjects who change behavior within a condition
can be modeled using a standard discrete choice model that allows for response
error. Subject i’s utility from voting for the candidate who took no position is
˜Ajnui (2) +
 
1   ˜Ajn   ˜Cjn ui (4) + ˜Cjnui (10). her utility from voting for the candi-
date who committed to B/D is ui (4). Under the assumption that response errors
are independent and follow the extreme value distribution, the probability that
subject i votes for the candidate who took no position is
exp
 
˜Ajn (ui (2)   ui (4)) + ui (4) + ˜Cjn (ui (10)   ui (4))
exp
 
˜Ajn (ui (2)   ui (4)) + ui (4) + ˜Cjn (ui (10)   ui (4)) + exp (ui (4))
=
1
1 + exp
 
˜Ajn (ui (4)   ui (2))   ˜Cjn (ui (10)   ui (4))
Suppose first that the near-revelation equilibrium is being played. The be-
liefs about a candidate who took no position, as a function of , are ˜Ajn =
A[1 (1 A)]
1 (1 A) and ˜Cjn =
C[1 (1 A)]
1 (1 A) . Given these beliefs, the probability of voting
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for a candidate who took no position is
1
1 + exp

A[1 (1 A)]
1 (1 A) (ui (4)   ui (2))  
C[1 (1 A)]
1 (1 A) (ui (10)   ui (4))

Let Ti denote the number of choices made by subject i. The likelihood of
observing the choices made by subject i is
Li =
TiY
t=1
0BBBBBBBBBB@ 11 + exp A[1 (1 A)]1 (1 A) (ui (4)   ui (2))   C[1 (1 A)]1 (1 A) (ui (10)   ui (4))
1CCCCCCCCCCA
xit

0BBBBBBBBBB@ 11 + exp C[1 (1 A)]1 (1 A) (ui (10)   ui (4))   A[1 (1 A)]1 (1 A) (ui (4)   ui (2))
1CCCCCCCCCCA
1 xit
The log likehood function is then
ln (Li) =
TiX
t=1
 xit ln[1 + exp(A

1    (1   A)
1    (1   A) (ui (4)   ui (2))
 C

1    (1   A)
1    (1   A) (ui (10)   ui (4)))]
  (1   xit) ln[1 + exp(C

1    (1   A)
1    (1   A) (ui (10)   ui (4))
 A

1    (1   A)
1    (1   A) (ui (4)   ui (2)))]
Each subject’s i is estimated using maximum likelihood, by running the
model for each subject’s choices separately. As with subjects who were consis-
tent within each condition, the model is estimated separately using the lower
and upper bounds on the subject’s risk aversion paramter. Analogous models
are estimated under the assumption that candidates are playing the ambiguity
equilibrium. In addition to the 45 subjects who were dropped because of a miss-
ing risk aversion parameter, two risk-loving subjects have only a maximum 
and eight very risk-averse subjects have only a minimum . There were also
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several subjects for whom the model could not be fit with one or both of their
 bounds: this occurred for both equilibrium assumptions for nine subjects,
for the near-revelation equilibrium only for seven subjects, and for the ambigu-
ity equilibrium for one subject. In these cases, the subjects made inconsistent
choices across and within conditions, such that the likelihood functions were
not well-behaved.
Averaging across subjects for whom at least one bound could be con-
structed10, the mean lower and upper bounds of  assuming the near-revelation
equilibrium are 0.32 and 0.66, respectively. Assuming the ambiguity equilib-
rium, the mean lower and upper bounds are 0.38 and 0.69, respectively. Note
that the lower bounds use the lower bound for  constructed using the lower
bound on the risk aversion parameter, and the upper bounds use the upper
bound for  constructed using the upper bound on the risk aversion parameter.
Given the heterogeneity observed in the experiment, it is appropriate to look
at the entire distribution, rather than just the means. Figure 2.2 shows the esti-
mated distributions of the lower and upper bounds of , under each equilibrium
assumption.
10
If maximum likelihood failed for a subject, the bound was not constructed, rather than set to
zero or one
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Figure 2.2: Distributions of Cursedness Parameter
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Notes: This figure shows upper and lower bounds of the cursedness parameter, con-
structed as described in the text. Subjects for whom the risk aversion parameter could
not be estimated are excluded. A bound is also missing if the maximum likelihood es-
timation failed for that subject due to inconsistent choices between candidates across
conditions.
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2.5.3 Extreme avoidance of candidates who take no position
Voters’ behavior
Interestingly, a significant share of voters did not choose the candidate who
took no position when the other candidate committed to the worst possible pol-
icy from the voters’ point of view. Pooling across all treatments and conditions,
subjects voted for the candidate who took no position only 67.9 percent of the
time, voted for the candidate who committed to A/E 27.5 percent of the time,
and abstained 4.7 percent of the time. Results frommodels that use a dummy for
whether the voter abstained or voted for the candidate who committed to A/E
when the opponent took no position as the dependent variable can be found
in table 2.6. While the share of votes for the candidate who committed to A/E
should have been close to zero, it ranged from 24.4 percent in the high-noise
uniform condition in the treatment with programmed candidates to 46.9 per-
cent in the low-noise skewed condition in the treatment with subject-candidates
and no belief questions. The vote share was 8.0 percentage points higher in the
low-noise skewed condition than in the low-noise uniform condition (p=0.005),
while there was no statistically significant difference between the low-noise uni-
form and high-noise uniform conditions. There were no statistically significant
differences between treatments, though subjects in the programmed candidates
treatment did vote for the candidate who committed to A/E less often. The
control for subjects who were too risk-averse is included in columns 3 and 4;
however, its coefficient is not statistically significant.
Effect on main results
Discussion of possible explanations for this result is deferred until section 2.6.
Regardless of the reason why voters behaved this way, it is important to ac-
count for it when interpreting the main results. It is likely that a voter who
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Table 2.6: Proportion of Votes That Were For A Candidate Who Commit-
ted To A/E Over A Candidate Who Took No Position
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Subject
Candidates,
No Beliefs
Low-Noise Skewed 0.469*** 0.479*** 0.529*** 0.539***
(0.094) (0.094) (0.100) (0.100)
Low-Noise Uniform 0.394*** 0.404*** 0.417*** 0.428***
(0.070) (0.071) (0.076) (0.076)
High-Noise Uniform 0.345*** 0.356*** 0.360*** 0.370***
(0.067) (0.067) (0.073) (0.073)
Subject
Candidates,
With Beliefs
Low-Noise Skewed 0.414*** 0.425*** 0.432*** 0.443***
(0.072) (0.072) (0.075) (0.075)
Low-Noise Uniform 0.311*** 0.321*** 0.329*** 0.340***
(0.058) (0.058) (0.061) (0.061)
High-Noise Uniform 0.296*** 0.306*** 0.315*** 0.325***
(0.059) (0.060) (0.062) (0.063)
Programmed
Candidates,
With Beliefs
Low-Noise Skewed 0.317*** 0.327*** 0.315*** 0.326***
(0.056) (0.056) (0.058) (0.059)
Low-Noise Uniform 0.253*** 0.263*** 0.251*** 0.262***
(0.055) (0.056) (0.056) (0.057)
High-Noise Uniform 0.244*** 0.254*** 0.246*** 0.257***
(0.049) (0.050) (0.051) (0.052)
Candidate 1 -0.021* -0.022*
(0.011) (0.011)
R-Squared 0.33 0.33 0.35 0.35
N 3494 3494 3222 3222
(# of subjects) (160) (160) (147) (147)
Marginal Effects
Subject Candidates, No Beliefs 0.063 0.063 0.075 0.075
(0.089) (0.089) (0.095) (0.095)
Programmed Candidates, With Beliefs -0.067 -0.067 -0.086 -0.086
(0.074) (0.074) (0.077) (0.077)
Low-Noise Skewed 0.080*** 0.080*** 0.088*** 0.088***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029)
High-Noise Uniform -0.020 -0.020 -0.020 -0.020
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022)
Notes:The dependent variable is a dummy for voting for the candidate committed to
A/E or abstaining when the opponent took no position. Models estimated using OLS.
Subjects who made choices in the binary risky decision task consistent with   0:305
are excluded from the sample in models 3 and 4. Standard errors clustered at the sub-
ject level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively. The only significant difference between conditions was between the low-
noise skewed and low-noise uniform conditions in the subject-candidates with beliefs
treatment (p0.05) and programmed candidates treatment (p<0.10). There were no sig-
nificant differences between treatments within a condition.Marginal effects are relative
to the omitted category. For effects of treatment, the omitted category is "Subject Can-
didates, With Beliefs"; for effects of condition, the omitted category is "Low-Noise Uni-
form."
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would not vote for a candidate who took no position over a candidate who
committed to A/E would also not vote for the candidate who took no position
if the opponent committed to B/D, regardless of the degree of cursedness. To
address this, one can add a control for whether the voter did not vote for the
candidate who took no position when the opponent committed to A/E. Results
are reported in table 2.7. Column 1 repeats the baseline specification in column
1 of table 2.4. In column 2, the model includes the control for voting for the
candidate who committed to A/E interacted with treatment dummies. Com-
pared to other voters, those who supported the candidate who committed to
A/E were 19, 6 (not statistically significant), and 28 percentage points less likely
to vote for a candidate who took no position when the opponent committed to
B/D in the no beliefs treatment, treatment with subject-candidates with beliefs,
and programmed candidates treatment, respectively. Coefficients on treatment-
condition dummies, which are vote shares adjusted to take account if this be-
havior, increased by 0.02-0.09 when this control was added to the baseline spec-
ification shown in column 1. Column 3 estimates the same model as column 2,
excluding too risk-averse subjects from the sample. The effect of voting for A/E
is similar, though it is now marginally significant in the subject-candidates with
beliefs treatment.
Table 2.7: Proportion of Votes That Were For A Candidate
Who Took No Position Over A Candidate Who Committed
To B/D: Control For Voting for A/E Over No Position
(1) (2) (3)
Subject
Candidates,
No Beliefs
Low-Noise Skewed 0.086*** 0.177*** 0.220***
(0.033) (0.062) (0.074)
Low-Noise Uniform 0.185*** 0.261*** 0.296***
(0.057) (0.073) (0.085)
High-Noise Uniform 0.252*** 0.318*** 0.362***
(0.062) (0.076) (0.086)
Voted for A/E vs No Position -0.192*** -0.227***
(0.071) (0.081)
Subject
Candidates,
With Beliefs
Low-Noise Skewed 0.121*** 0.147*** 0.146***
(0.043) (0.044) (0.047)
Low-Noise Uniform 0.101*** 0.121*** 0.123***
(0.025) (0.026) (0.027)
High-Noise Uniform 0.193*** 0.211*** 0.199***
(0.040) (0.041) (0.040)
Voted for A/E vs No Position -0.062 -0.058
(0.045) (0.045)
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Table 2.7 – continued from previous page
Programmed
Candidates,
With Beliefs
Low-Noise Skewed 0.340*** 0.430*** 0.455***
(0.053) (0.067) (0.069)
Low-Noise Uniform 0.335*** 0.407*** 0.431***
(0.057) (0.068) (0.072)
High-Noise Uniform 0.405*** 0.474*** 0.509***
(0.056) (0.066) (0.068)
Voted for A/E vs No Position -0.282*** -0.301***
(0.071) (0.075)
R-Squared 0.29 0.33 0.35
N 3494 3494 3222
(# of subjects) (160) (160) (147)
Marginal Effects
(1) (2) (3)
Subject Candidates, No Beliefs 0.042 0.056 0.086
(0.054) (0.056) (0.062)
Programmed Candidates, With Beliefs 0.222*** 0.206*** 0.228***
(0.056) (0.053) (0.054)
Low-Noise Skewed -0.014 -0.001 0.002
(0.026) (0.025) (0.027)
High-Noise Uniform 0.077*** 0.073*** 0.075***
(0.023) (0.021) (0.022)
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy for voting for the candidate who took
no position when the opponent committed to B/D. Models estimated using OLS.
Standard errors clustered at the subject level. Models estimated using OLS. Sub-
jects who made choices in the binary risky decision task consistent with   0:305
are excluded from the sample in model 3. "Voted for A/E" is a dummy variable
equal to one if the voter abstained or chose the candidate who committed to A/E
over the candidate who took no position and 0 otherwise. *, **, and *** indicate
that a coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively. Differences between LS and LU in the no beliefs treatment are sig-
nificant in (1) (p<0.03) and (2) (p<0.07). Differences between LU and HU are sig-
nificant in the subject-candidates with beliefs treatment (p<0.05) and programmed
candidates treatment (p<0.06 in 1, p<0.03 in 2-3). In all specifications, the two treat-
ments with beliefs are statistically different within each condition (p<0.01). The
treatments with subject-candidates are marginally different in LU in models 2-3
(p<0.08,p<0.06) and in HU in model 3 (p<0.09). Marginal effects are relative to the
omitted category. For effects of treatment, the omitted category is "Subject Can-
didates, No Beliefs"; for effects of condition, the omitted category is "Low-Noise
Uniform."
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2.5.4 Using belief data
Evidence from stated beliefs
Subjects’ stated beliefs provide further evidence on the subjects’ understand-
ing of the candidates’ incentives. Figures 2.3 and 2.4 contain graphical repre-
sentations of the average reported beliefs about candidates’ strategies in the
subject-candidates and programmed candidates treatments, respectively. The
figures use coefficient estimates from regressions of the reported probability that
a candidate of a given type chooses a given campaign strategy on treatment-
condition dummies. The results of this analysis can be found in Appendix tables
B.5-B.7.
Figure 2.3: Mean Beliefs About Subject-Candidates’ Strategies
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Notes: This figure and figure 2.4 correspond to Appendix tables B.5-B.7. The coefficients
from those regressions are average reported beliefs about candidate strategies, within
treatment-condition cells.
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Figure 2.4: Mean Beliefs About Programmed Candidate Strategies
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Voters clearly did not expect that extreme candidates would take no position
in order to conceal their policy positions. Pooling across conditions, voters in
the treatment with subject-candidates believed that these candidates would take
no position with only 25.1 percent probability. It is possible that voters believed
that the equilibrium of the game would involve these candidates committing to
a policy that was more moderate than their preferred policy in order to try to
win the election. This may explain why voters believed that these candidates
would commit to policy C 23.0 percent of the time and commit to policy B/D
17.0 percent of the time. However, voters believed that extreme candidates were
most likely to commit to the extreme policies (34.9 percent). Beliefs about pro-
grammed candidates followed a similar pattern, though voters were even more
likely to believe that an extreme candidate would commit to A/E (60.7 percent)
and less likely to commit to policy C (16.1 percent) or policy B/D (8.6 percent)
than subject-candidates. Voters believed that extreme candidates were more
likely to commit to A/E and less likely to commit to C in the low-noise skewed
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condition than in the low-noise uniform condition. They also believed that can-
didates were less likely to commit to B/D and more likely to take no position in
the high-noise uniform condition than in the low-noise uniform condition.
Next, consider beliefs about candidates who prefer B/D. While the aver-
age probability that such candidates commit to A/E is positive, it is not very
large, at only 3.7 percent in the subject-candidates treatment and 9.4 percent
in the programmed candidates treatment. Subjects believed that these candi-
dates were most likely to commit to their preferred policies, with probability
57.9 percent with subject candidates and 61.3 percent with programmed candi-
dates. They believed that it was also fairly likely that these candidates would
go to the center and commit to policy C, 28.9 percent of the time for subject-
candidates, though just 16.8 percent of the time for programmed candidates.
While voters did not believe that extreme candidates were very likely to take no
position to begin with, they believed that candidates who preferred B/D were
about half as likely to do so. They believed that subject-candidates took no
position with probability 9.5 percent and programmed candidates did so with
probability 12.6 percent.
Subjects clearly understood that candidates who agreed with the voters
should commit to their common preferred policy. Subjects believed that subject-
candidates did so 91.0 percent of the time, while committing to A/E 2.3 percent
of the time, committing to B/D 2.1 percent of the time, and taking no position
4.6 percent of the time. Again, there appeared to be more confusion or response
error in the programmed candidates treatment. There, only 77.0 percent proba-
bility was put on committing to C, while subjects believed that these candidates
would commit to A/E with 8.5 percent probability, commit to B/D with 7.0
percent probability, and take no position with 7.5 percent probability.
It turns out that subjects’ beliefs were actually fairly well-calibrated when
compared to subject-candidates’ behavior. In the middle panel of Appendix
tables B.5-B.7, the true choice probabilities are given for comparison. Since
these choices are not statistically different between treatments that include be-
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lief questions and those that do not, both treatments with subject-candidates are
pooled.11 Given the behavior of extreme candidates, subjects’ beliefs were ac-
tually fairly close. In fact, these candidates actually chose to commit to policy
A/E evenmore often than the subjects predicted, 40.0 percent of the time. These
candidates also tried committing to more moderate positions, though they were
more likely to commit to B/D (35.8 percent) than to go all the way to C (11.6
percent). Voters also correctly believed that these candidates were reluctant to
choose to take no position, doing so just 12.6 percent of the time.
Voters were generally correct about candidates who preferred B/D as well,
though voters’ beliefs had someweight shifted from committing to B/D to com-
mitting to C, relative to what the candidates actually did. These candidates were
most likely to commit to B/D (70.7 percent), though they did commit to C 25.3
percent of the time. They chose to take no position with probability 4.0 percent,
slightly less often than voters predicted. Candidates who preferred C chose to
commit to C 96.2 percent of the time, indicating that while there were a few
mistakes, they understood their role as well as voters thought they did.
Voting behavior conditional on beliefs about candidates
Since subjects believed that all types of candidates were not likely to choose to
take no position, the posterior probability that a candidate has a given preferred
policy conditional on having taken no position does not vary much across pre-
ferred policies. This is shown graphically in figure 2.5. This presents the average
probabilities that subjects put on a candidate who took no position having each
preferred policy.12.
11
The full results about candidates can be found in Appendix table B.8 if the reader is interested.
However, this paper focuses on voters, and the experiment was not designed to have sufficient
power to analyze the candidates’ behavior.
12
Analysis of this belief data, using the probability that a candidate who took no position has a
given preferred policy as the dependent variable and regressing it on treatment-condition cells,
can be found in Appendix table B.9
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Figure 2.5: Mean Beliefs About the Preferred Policy of a Candidate Who
Took No Position
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Notes: This figure corresponds to Appendix table B.9. The coefficients from those re-
gressions are average reported beliefs about the preferred policy of a candidate who
took no position, within treatment-condition cells.
The expected value of a candidate who took no position is a useful mea-
sure, because it combines the answers to several questions about beliefs and is
relevant to the choices between such a candidate and one who committed to
B/D. Table 2.8 shows the average expected value of a candidate who took no
position, by treatment-condition, estimated by regressing the expected value on
treatment-condition dummies. It is calculated in one column using the beliefs
about strategies and in the other using the reported posterior beliefs. The ex-
pected value consistent with several benchmarks (beliefs of a fully cursed sub-
ject, beliefs consistent with the near-revelation equilibrium being played, and
the empirical expected value based on candidate behavior) are also presented
for comparison. The expected values derived from beliefs were close to the fully
cursed benchmark; however, this is also consistent with believing that all can-
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didates commit.
This potentially creates a problem. If a voter believed that all candidates
were equally likely to take no position because she believed that all candidates
would choose to commit, then she would choose to vote for a candidate who
took no position (assuming she is not too risk-averse). Her behavior could not
be distinguished from the behavior of a cursed voter. To address this possible
issue, belief data was used to classify subject-period observations by the belief
about the equilibrium being played. The possible categorizations were: belief
that at least one type of a candidate would choose to take no position, belief
that all types would commit to either policy B/D or C, and belief that all can-
didates would commit, with candidates who prefer A/E committing to A/E.
Table 2.9 lists the percentage of subject-period observations in each belief cate-
gory, broken down by treatment and condition. While most subjects believed
that the candidates were playing an equilibrium that involved all types commit-
ting, there remains a substantial fraction who believed that candidates might
choose to take no position.
In table 2.10, the regression models include controls for belief in an equilib-
rium that involves all candidates making commitments. Once this is taken into
account, expected values are much lower, though still higher than those consis-
tent with Bayesian updating in the near-revelation equilibrium. There is also
a difference between the expected value constructed using reported posteriors
and that constructed using beliefs about strategies; the differences between con-
ditions are smaller with reported posteriors. This implies that base rate neglect
is affecting subjects’ ability to move from beliefs about strategies to posterior
beliefs to some extent. It is possible that more changes in behavior across con-
ditions would have been observed, given subjects’ beliefs about strategies, had
they correctly perceived how the changes in the parameters of the game would
affect the probability that a candidate who took no position had each preferred
policy.
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Table 2.8: Expected Value of a Candidate Who Took No Position
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reported
Posteriors
Derived
From Beliefs
About
Strategies
Based on
Actual
Behavior
Fully
Cursed
Voters
Subject
Candidates,
With Beliefs
Low-Noise 4.266 3.895 3.696 4.50
Skewed (0.303) (0.116)
Low-Noise 4.252 4.496 4.710 5.33
Uniform (0.271) (0.109)
High-Noise 4.570 4.874 4.996 5.33
Uniform (0.264) (0.072)
Programmed
Candidates,
With Beliefs
Low-Noise 4.690 4.303 2.455 4.50
Skewed (0.159) (0.057)
Low-Noise 5.426 5.115 2.833 5.33
Uniform (0.206) (0.078)
High-Noise 5.457 5.198 3.667 5.33
Uniform (0.176) (0.048)
R-Squared 0.88 0.98
N 2680 2670
(119) (119)
Marginal Effects
Programmed Candidates, 0.847*** 0.453***
With Beliefs (0.308) (0.105)
Low-Noise Skewed -0.397*** -0.716***
(0.115) (0.048)
High-Noise Uniform 0.161** 0.217***
(0.073) (0.038)
Notes: Estimates produced by regressing the expected value of a candidate who took no
position on dummies for each treatment-condition cell. In column (1), expected value
is constructed using the reported beliefs that a candidate who took no position has
each preferred policy. In column (2), reported beliefs about the strategy that each type
of candidate would choose are used to construct posterior beliefs using Bayes’ Rule,
and these beliefs are used to compute expected value. Standard errors clustered at the
subject level. In (1), the LU and HU conditions are statistically different in the subject-
candidates treatment (p=0.02) and the LS and LU conditions are statistically different
in the programmed candidates treatment (p=0.000). In (2), the LS and LU conditions
and LU and HU conditions are statistically different in the subject-candidates treatment
(p=0.000) and the LS and LU conditions are statistically different in the programmed
candidates treatment (p=0.000). In (1) and (2), the two treatments were statistically dif-
ferent within the LU and HU conditions (p<0.01), and in (2) they were also statistically
different within the LS condition (p=0.002). (3) gives the expected value that voters
would have had if they knew the actual average candidate choices, pooling treatments
with and without belief questions. (4) gives the beliefs that fully cursed voters would
have. Marginal effects are relative to the omitted category. For effects of treatment,
the omitted category is "Subject Candidates, With Beliefs"; for effects of condition, the
omitted category is "Low-Noise Uniform." *, **, and *** indicate that a marginal effect is
statistically different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 2.9: Belief Breakdown
Believes a
Candidate
Will Take
No
Position
Believes
All
Commit to
B/D or C
Believes
All
Commit,
Some
Commit to
A/E
Sample
Size
Subject
Candidates,
With Beliefs
Low-Noise 32.4 25.3 42.4 340
Skewed (21) (16) (26) (46)
Low-Noise 33.9 28.2 37.8 436
Uniform (27) (23) (28) (59)
High-Noise 33.9 29.6 36.5 436
Uniform (31) (28) (31) (59)
Programmed
Candidates,
With Beliefs
Low-Noise 15.8 4.8 79.4 462
Skewed (15) (6) (54) (60)
Low-Noise 21.8 11.8 66.4 500
Uniform (21) (12) (46) (60)
High-Noise 20.8 9.7 69.6 496
Uniform (19) (9) (47) (60)
Notes: This table gives the percentage of subject-period observations (number of sub-
jects in parentheses) with reported beliefs in each category. The final column lists the
total number of subject-period observations (total number of subjects in parentheses).
The numbers of subjects may not add up to the total across a row if a subject’s belief cat-
egory changes during the experiment. A subject is said to believe that a candidate will
play a given strategy if she reports that strategy as at least five percentage points more
likely than every other strategy. If the subject puts at least 40 percent probability on
each of two strategies, she is said to believe that the candidate will play both strategies.
A subject is said to believe that a candidate will take no position if she believes that at
least one type of candidate will choose no position, either alone or in combination with
another strategy. She is said to believe that all commit to B/D or C if she believes that
all types of candidate commit to B/D, commit to C, or play both of these strategies. She
is said to believe that all commit, with candidates who prefer A/E committing to A/E
if she believes that candidates who prefer A/E choose A/E, alone or in combination
with another commitment strategy, and the other candidates choose any combination
of commitment strategies. There were no subjects who believed that another type of
candidate would commit to A/E if a candidate who prefers A/E would not.
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Table 2.10: Expected Value of a Candidate Who Took No Po-
sition: Control for Belief in Commitment Equilibrium
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reported
Posteriors
Derived
From Beliefs
About
Strategies
Based on
Actual
Behavior
Fully
Cursed
Voters
Subject-
Candidates,
With Beliefs
Low-Noise 3.061 3.148 3.696 4.50
Skewed (0.210) (0.115)
Low-Noise 3.093 3.772 4.710 5.33
Uniform (0.167) (0.119)
High-Noise 3.417 4.153 4.996 5.33
Uniform (0.187) (0.102)
Commitment 1.474*** 0.991***
Belief-B/D/C (0.425) (0.144)
Commitment 1.964*** 1.173***
Belief-A/E (0.311) (0.117)
Programmed
Candidates,
With Beliefs
Low-Noise 3.770 3.681 2.455 4.50
Skewed (0.331) (0.181)
Low-Noise 4.460 4.544 2.833 5.33
Uniform (0.360) (0.195)
High-Noise 4.512 4.617 3.667 5.33
Uniform (0.349) (0.177)
Commitment 2.484*** 0.644***
Belief-B/D/C (0.865) (0.188)
Commitment 1.013*** 0.745***
Belief-A/E (0.321) (0.184)
R-Squared 0.90 0.99
N 2668 2670
(# of subjects) (119) (119)
Marginal Effects
Programmed Candidates, 0.713** 0.290***
With Beliefs (0.318) (0.070)
Low-Noise Skewed -0.391*** -0.755***
(0.105) (0.038)
High-Noise Uniform 0.176** 0.212***
(0.074) (0.039)
86
Table 2.10 – continued from previous page
Notes: Estimates produced by regressing the expected value of a candidate who
took no position on dummies for each treatment-condition cell. In column (1), ex-
pected value is constructed using the reported beliefs that a candidate who took no
position has each preferred policy. In column (2), reported beliefs about the strat-
egy that each type of candidate would choose are used to construct posterior beliefs
using Bayes’ Rule, and these beliefs are used to compute expected value. Mod-
els also include controls for having beliefs that imply that no candidate chooses
to take no position in equilibrium. See the notes to table 2.9 for details on the
construction of these variables. Standard errors clustered at the subject level. In
(1), the LU and HU conditions are statistically different in the subject-candidates
treatment (p=0.02), while the LS and LU conditions are statistically different in the
programmed candidates treatment (p=0.000). The treatments are statistically dif-
ferent in the LS (p=0.07), LU (p=0.001) and HU (p=0.007) conditions. In (2), the
LS and LU conditions are statistically different in both treatments (p=0.000), and
LU and HU are statistically different in the subject-candidates treatment (p=0.000).
The treatments are statistically different in the LS (p=0.02), LU (p=0.001), and HU
(p=0.03) conditions. (3) gives the expected value that voters would have had if they
knew the actual average candidate choices, pooling treatments with and without
belief questions. (4) gives the beliefs that fully cursed voters would have. Marginal
effects are relative to the omitted category. *, **, and *** indicate that a marginal
effect or coefficient on a belief control variable is statistically different from zero at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
To confirm that the main results were driven by some subjects being cursed,
rather than by some subjects believing that all candidates committed, controls
for belief that an equilibrium in which all candidates commit are added to the
main specification. Results of this analysis are reported in table 2.11. Adding
these controls does not change the results. This may seem counterintuitive,
since these subjects should have behaved differently. However, consider why
subjects would have had those beliefs. The equilibrium in which all candidates
commit to B/D or C does exist when candidates are sufficiently risk-averse. A
voter who attributed a high degree of risk aversion to candidates is probably
quite risk-averse herself, and a risk-averse subject would not choose a candi-
date who took no position in that situation. If a subject believed that candidates
who prefer A/E commit to A/E, it is likely that she did so because she believed
that a candidate who took no positionwould lose to a candidate who committed
to A/E–otherwise, the candidate should not have committed to A/E. If a sub-
ject held this belief, it is likely that she would not herself vote for a candidate
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who took no position. This reasoning is consistent with the evidence that voters
who believed that an equilibriumwith commitment by all candidates was being
played were not more likely than other voters to support a candidate who took
no position.
Table 2.11: Proportion of Votes That Were For A Candidate
Who Took No Position Over A Candidate Who Committed
To B/D: Control for Beliefs About Equilibrium
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Subject
Candidates,
With Beliefs
Low-Noise Skewed 0.121*** 0.151*** 0.121*** 0.149***
(0.043) (0.042) (0.045) (0.043)
Low-Noise Uniform 0.101*** 0.131*** 0.104*** 0.132***
(0.025) (0.034) (0.027) (0.038)
High-Noise Uniform 0.193*** 0.223*** 0.180*** 0.209***
(0.040) (0.051) (0.039) (0.053)
Believes All Commit -0.056 -0.051
to B/D or C (0.050) (0.055)
Believes All Commit, -0.037 -0.036
A/E to A/E (0.047) (0.048)
Programmed
Candidates,
With Beliefs
Low-Noise Skewed 0.342*** 0.462*** 0.362*** 0.476***
(0.053) (0.111) (0.055) (0.115)
Low-Noise Uniform 0.335*** 0.437*** 0.355*** 0.452***
(0.057) (0.108) (0.061) (0.112)
High-Noise Uniform 0.403*** 0.509*** 0.432*** 0.533***
(0.056) (0.103) (0.058) (0.106)
Believes All Commit -0.011 -0.030
to B/D or C (0.157) (0.160)
Believes All Commit, -0.151 -0.142
A/E to A/E (0.108) (0.113)
R-Squared 0.31 0.32 0.33 0.34
N 2662 2662 2492 2492
(# of subjects) (119) (119) (111) (111)
Marginal Effects
Programmed Candidates, 0.222*** 0.244*** 0.248*** 0.266***
With Beliefs (0.056) (0.059) (0.058) (0.060)
Low-Noise Skewed 0.013 0.023 0.012 0.021
(0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.033)
High-Noise Uniform 0.078*** 0.081*** 0.077*** 0.079***
(0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
88
Table 2.11 – continued from previous page
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy for voting for the candidate who took
no position when the opponent committed to B/D. Models estimated using OLS.
The sample is restricted to observations that contain non-missing belief data. Sub-
jects who made choices in the binary risky decision task consistent with   0:305
are excluded from the sample in models 3-4. Models 2 and 4 include controls for
having beliefs that imply that no candidate chooses to take no position in equilib-
rium, interacted with treatment dummies. See the notes to table 2.9 for details
on the construction of these variables. Standard errors clustered at the subject
level. *, **, and *** indicate that a coefficient is statistically different from zero
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. In models 1-2, there are differences
between the LU and HU conditions in the subject-candidates treatment (p<0.02)
and programmed candidates treatment (p<0.07) and between the two treatments
in all conditions (p0.01). In 3-4, there are differences between the LU and HU
conditions in the subject-candidates treatment (p<0.05) and programmed candi-
dates treatment (p<0.05) and between the two treatments in all conditions (p<0.01).
Marginal effects are relative to the omitted category. For effects of treatment, the
omitted category is "Subject Candidates, With Beliefs"; for effects of condition, the
omitted category is "Low-Noise Uniform."
2.6 Discussion of avoidance of candidates who took no posi-
tion
The discussion below is largely speculation about an unexpected result, and it
should be interpreted with this caveat in mind. As will be described below,
voting for a candidate who committed to A/E may be consistent with a model
in which voters value character. Other alternative theories can be ruled out,
leaving this as a plausible interpretation that is consistent with the data.
2.6.1 Preference for character interpretation
While other possible interpretations of the result are plausible (and discussed
below), the most likely explanation seems to be that, even in this experimental
setting, voters have preferences over characteristics of candidates that are not
related to policy. Kartik and McAfee (2007) develop a theory in which voters
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care both about policy and about whether candidates have character. In their
model, character is an exogenous characteristic of candidates that is unobserved
by the voters. Candidates with character commit to the policy that they believe
in, while candidates without character are purely office-motivated and choose a
platform to maximize the probability of being elected. A platform then becomes
a signal of whether a candidate has character. This setting differs from theirs,
because the candidates are policy-motivated; this complicates the incentives for
candidates without character, which in turn increases the complexity of the sig-
naling game. The possibility that candidates will not be able to commit further
complicates the game.
Extending the theoretical model to include some notion of character is be-
yond the scope of this paper. Moreover, the experiment is not an ideal test for
this type of model. Testing a model that includes character in the lab would
require that electing a candidate with character have some meaning in the lab-
oratory setting. Since the candidate elected only implements one policy, there
is no sense in which it would be better for the voters if the elected candidate
had character. We might still observe some of this behavior in the experiment
conducted, possibly because subjects have social preferences and would like
to elect a candidate with character, not because it would benefit the voter di-
rectly, but because they would like to reward another subject that they believe
has character with a higher payoff. These explanations do not apply when the
candidate roles are played by the computer, which is consistent with voters in
the programmed candidates treatment being less likely to vote for the candi-
date who committed to A/E. However, subjects may still avoid programmed
candidates who take no position if they bring in their intuitions and heuristics
from real-world elections and do not consider how well they apply in the lab
environment.
Even without solving the model, it is still possible to consider how adding
character to the model might help to explain otherwise puzzling results in the
experiment. Since candidates with character always commit to their preferred
policy, a candidate who took no position could only have character if he had
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been randomly prevented from making this commitment. On the other hand,
it is possible that a candidate without character may decide to take no position.
One would expect to see some candidates commit to A/E, if some subjects did
experience the disutility from committing to a different policy that underlies
the notion of character. This suggests that adding character to the model may
rationalize the choices that we observe between a candidate who committed to
A/E and one who took no position. It is also consistent with the observation
that many voters believed that candidates who preferred A/E would commit to
A/E and the fact that subject-candidates often did so.
One can also consider a variant of the model in which voters would prefer a
candidate who is direct and transparent. They don’t mind if a candidate com-
mits to a policy that he does not favor for the sake of implementing what the
voter wants. However, they do not want a candidate who will conceal informa-
tion when it may benefit him to do so. In this alternative model, we may think
of forthrightness as an exogenous characteristic. Forthright candidates are not
required to commit to their preferred policy, but they must make a policy com-
mitment. Candidates who are not forthright are not limited in their choice of
strategies. Here, in contrast to Kartik and McAfee (2007), both types of candi-
dates behave strategically, since forthright candidates still must choose whether
to commit to their preferred policy or to commit to a more moderate policy. By
thinking through how this change to the model affects the candidates’ incen-
tives, one can see that it may be possible to explain the results in this way. A
forthright candidate who prefers A/E may want to make that commitment if
he does not guarantee himself a loss by doing so, since voters see taking no
position as a strong signal that a candidate is not forthright.
2.6.2 Alternative explanations
First, it is not simply the result of response error. Consider again the subsam-
ple of subjects who violated monotonicity at most once during the experiment.
It is very unlikely that these subjects were answering randomly or did not un-
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derstand the experiment, since they were able to make other choices that re-
quired understanding of the payoffs. Appendix table B.10 shows the results of
regressions using as the dependent variable a binary variable equal to one if
the subject abstained or voted for a candidate who committed to A/E when the
opponent took no position, using only data from this subsample. Averaging
across all treatments and conditions, these subjects voted for the candidate who
took no position 82.2 percent of the time, voted for the candidate who commit-
ted to A/E 14.0 percent of the time, and abstained 3.8 percent of the time. The
vote share for candidates who committed to A/E among these subjects is half of
what it was in the full sample, implying that subjects who responded with error
or did not understand the experiment were responsible for most of these choices
(though that does not necessarily mean that these particular choices were mis-
takes). However, the voters who made only one or zero mistakes when compar-
ing other pairs of candidates still opted not to vote for the candidate who took
no position when the opponent committed to A/E nearly one-fifth of the time,
suggesting that this result is more than just response error.
Readers who are familiar with the experimental literature on choice under
risk may be aware that there has been some experimental work that shows that
people sometimes do value lotteries less than they value its worst possible out-
come (e.g., Gneezy, List, andWu 2006; VanDijk and Zeelenberg 2003). However,
this work has exclusively used between-subject designs. Subjects were asked to
make some choice in which one alternative was either one certain outcome, an-
other lower certain outcome, or a lottery over these two outcomes; each subject
made just one of these three choices. When choices were compared across the
three groups, the percentage of people who chose the lower certain outcome
was higher than the percentage of people who chose the lottery over that out-
come and a higher outcome. Though, Gneezy, List and Wu report that "the
internality axiom is so transparent and compelling that we expect participants
to obey internality in a within-subject test"; in one variant of the experiment in
which subjects made all three choices, the result went away. In the experiment
studied here, subjects are confronted with a choice between a lottery and re-
92
ceiving for sure the worst outcome possible in the lottery. The previous work
implies that since they face the lottery and the sure option at the same time,
subjects would choose the lottery. Thus, the result that voters sometimes choose
the candidate who committed to A/E does not reflect a previously documented
behavioral bias. Instead, there must be something particular about this environ-
ment that leads subjects to behave in this way.
Another possible explanation is that there are repeated game effects. The
idea is that subjects may punish candidates who take no position by never vot-
ing for them, even if this means receiving a lower payoff this period by electing
a candidate who commits to A/E. This would remove the incentive for candi-
dates to take no position and lead them to commit to policies that the voters
prefer. If the voters are sufficiently patient, they might be willing to occasion-
ally accept low payoffs in order to receive higher payoffs in other periods. If this
were the primary explanation for voters choosing the candidate who committed
to A/E over a candidate who took no position, then this behavior would not be
expected in the final period of the experiment, when there would no longer be
any repeated game concerns. However, behavior in the final period is no dif-
ferent from behavior in the rest of the experiment. Appendix table B.11 shows
the results of regressions that use a dummy equal to one if the voter abstained
or voted for the candidate who committed to A/E when the opponent took no
position as the dependent variable and include a dummy for whether the choice
occurred in the last period of a session. The coefficient on this dummy was not
statistically significantly different from zero. Therefore, one can conclude that
repeated game effects are not responsible for candidates who committed to A/E
receiving votes.
2.7 Conclusion
The experimental evidence shows that while many people do behave in a way
consistent with partial or full cursedness, approximately three-fourths of sub-
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jects are able to understand the strategic incentives well enough to vote for the
right candidate. If one believes that a sample of students at an Ivy League uni-
versity is representative of the electorate in terms of ability to understand strate-
gic incentives, this implies that cursed behavior alone cannot be an explanation
for ambiguity in elections, because a candidate who attempts to take advantage
of voters who do not understand the incentives will not succeed in winning the
election. However, it is quite possible that the majority of Americans resemble
those subjects who were unable to understand the informational content of a
refusal to make a policy commitment. This experiment demonstrated the exis-
tence of cursed behavior in this important setting. If one thinks that the extent
of this behavior observed with these students is a lower bound on the amount
of this behavior that one would expect to see in the general population, then ad-
ditional research would need to be done, on a representative sample of adults,
to determine whether this phenomenon could affect elections.
Further, apparent preference for character also reduces the potential bene-
fit of strategically not revealing a policy preference. Additional experiments
should be done to verify that this finding is robust, with careful attention paid
to whether subjects understand the game. Future theoretical work that allows
signaling on more than one dimension of type should formally analyze the ef-
fects of these preferences, defined either as a preference for candidates who al-
ways carry out their preferred policies or as a preference for candidates who
are forthright about their policy intentions, on electoral outcomes. The results
of this experiment also suggest that such models can even be tested in a labo-
ratory setting, though additional work should be done to make this non-policy
factor relevant.
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CHAPTER 3
BEYOND HAPPINESS AND SATISFACTION: TOWARDWELL-BEING
INDICES BASED ON STATED PREFERENCE
The cornerstone of neoclassical welfare economics is the principle of revealed
preference, according to which the ultimate criterion for judging what makes
a person better off is what she chooses, in a situation in which she is well-
informed about the consequences of her options. Yet for most policy decisions,
a government cannot directly infer an individual’s welfare from her choices
over policies because individuals rarely make such choices.1 Hence in practice
economists often rely on revealed preference indirectly, evaluating policy op-
tions by how they affect indicators–most prominently, GDP–that can be viewed
as summarizing, under some assumptions, a set of generally-desired outcomes.
But because GDP and other available indicators have known limitations as well-
being measures, economists have been seeking additional indicators that go
"beyond GDP" (for a recent survey, see Fleurbaey 2009). In this paper, we fo-
cus on developing one such indicator: an individual-level index that combines
together different aspects of well-being that may be measured by survey ques-
tions.
As candidate measures of individuals’ well-being, economists and psychol-
ogists have recently been investigating survey measures of "subjective well-
being" (SWB); while we use this term to refer to any subjective assessment of
some aspect of well-being, economists have primarily focused on questions
about one’s own happiness or life satisfaction. Because responses to such ques-
tions reflect a wide range of experiences, including those unrelated to market
exchange (Diener and Seligman 2004; Kahneman and Krueger 2006), many
researchers have advocated conducting nation-wide SWB surveys and using
the responses to calculate indicators alongside GDP-like measures (e.g., Diener
1
Holding a referendum on every issue would incur prohibitively high transaction costs. More-
over, for many issues, even a direct vote would not reveal preferences because voters lack full
information about–and might systematically mispredict–the consequences of alternative policy
options (see Gilbert 2006, for evidence on systematic misprediction of happiness).
95
2000; Diener 2006, signed by 50 researchers; Layard 2005; Stiglitz, Sen, and Fi-
toussi 2009).
Although these proposals are controversial among economists, policymak-
ers have begun to embrace them. For example, starting in April 2011, the U.K.
Office of National Statistics (ONS) began including the following SWB ques-
tions in its Integrated Household Survey, a survey that reaches 200,000 adults
annually (ONS 2011):
Overall, how satisfied are you with your life nowadays?
Overall, how happy did you feel yesterday?
Overall, how anxious did you feel yesterday?
Overall, to what extent do you feel the things you do in your life are worthwhile?
According to Prime Minister David Cameron, "it’s time we focused not
just on GDP but on GWB–general wellbeing."2 Other governments around the
world have expressed similar intentions to field SWB surveys and use the re-
sponses to guide policy.3
Notwithstanding this recent enthusiasm, there are many open questions re-
garding the endeavor of tracking well-being with surveys. Among the most
urgent practical questions are the following two. First, which SWB questions
should governments ask? It is increasingly recognized that more than one ques-
2
"David Cameron aims to make happiness the new GDP." The Guardian, November 14,
2010. http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2010/nov/14/david-cameron-wellbeing-inquiry
as accessed on May 13, 2011.
3
For example, in December 2011, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences Committee on Na-
tional Statistics convened the first in a series of meetings of a "Panel on Measuring Subjective
Well-Being in a Policy Relevant Framework." As part of its Better Life Initiative, the OECD
has held several conferences on "Measuring Well-Being for Development and Policy Making"
since May, 2011; the organization’s Better Life Index website (www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org) in-
vites visitors to rate 36 countries by interactively creating indices from 11 dimensions of well-
being that include SWB. Moreover, this interest is not limited to rich, Western countries; indeed,
Bhutan is considered the pioneer of Gross National Happiness, a concept conceived there in the
1970s.
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tion is likely to be needed because SWB is multi-dimensional (e.g., Ryff 1989;
Kahneman and Deaton 2010) and because widely-used SWB measures may not
capture all factors that enter into preferences (Benjamin, Heffetz, Kimball, and
Rees-Jones 2012, 2013). Current proposals for survey questions, however, rely
on different experts own readings of the SWB literature rather than on a system-
atic method.4 Second, how should responses to different questions be weighted
relative to each other? Current proposals are virtually silent on relative weight-
ing (in some cases purposefully so). But in practice, due to an apparently in-
evitable demand for summary indicators, ad hocweights often end up being ap-
plied implicitly by users or explicitly in published indices (Micklewright 2001).
This paper has two overarching purposes. First, we propose a framework,
grounded in a preference-based theory, for conceptualizing and discussing
survey-based measurement of well-being. Second, we demonstrate a disci-
plined approach, anchored in revealed preference–albeit based on hypothetical
choices–to applying our framework to the development of well-being surveys
and indices. We emphasize that relative to the many decades of theoretical and
practical work that underlies the present well-developed state of measures such
as GDP, efforts to construct and apply survey-based well-being indicators are
still in their infancy. Hence, we view this paper as primarily methodological,
proposing an agenda for a new approach, and we view our specific contribu-
tions as first steps to be improved upon by future work.
In Section 3.1, we present our theoretical framework. We assume that utility
u(w) depends on a vector w of fundamental aspects of well-being, for example
those that can bemeasuredwith survey questions similar to the four above. Any
vector proportional to the vector of marginal utilities Dwu(w) can then be used
as relative weights for combining the components of w into an individual-level
index that tracks small changes in well-being. For large changes in the aspects,
the index can still be used to track changes in well-being but only provides a
4
For prominent–and conflicting–proposals to the U.K. Office of National Statistics, see Dolan,
Layard, and Metcalfe (2011) and Deaton, Kahneman, Krueger, Schkade, Schwarz, and Stone
(2011).
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partial welfare ordering. While we do not make novel contributions regarding
how to aggregate well-being indices across individuals, our framework could
be used in conjunction with existing approaches to aggregation.
In Section 3.2, we describe our attempt to identify the major components of
w. We compile a list–of 136 aspects of well-being–aimed at including all the
main factors that have been proposed as important components of well-being
in a sample of major works in philosophy, psychology, and economics, from
Maslow (1946) to Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi (2009) and beyond. The list includes
aspects that have been considered as fundamental, as well as broader, "combi-
nation aspects" that may single-handedly capture many fundamental aspects.
While it includes SWB measures widely used by economists (e.g., happiness
and life satisfaction), it also includes other items, such as goals and achieve-
ments, freedoms, engagement, morality, self-expression, relationships, and the
well-being of others. While far from exhaustive, our list represents, as far as we
know, the most comprehensive effort to date to construct such a compilation
(cf., Alkire 2002).
Next, as described in Section 3.3, we design and conduct a survey to esti-
mate a vector proportional to the vector of marginal utilities Dwu(w). We present
more than 4,600 Internet survey respondents–a demographically diverse (albeit
not representative) sample of the US adult population–with sets of hypothetical-
choice scenarios. We first provide detailed scenario instructions and an exam-
ple. Then, in each scenario we elicit respondents’ stated preference between
two options that differ only on how they rate on a small set of aspects. For an
example, see figure 3.1. In our estimation procedures, the dependent variable is
the response to the choice question above, and the independent variables are the
relative ratings of the aspects (the "X"s) in the table above. Because we randomly
assign which aspects vary between the options and by how much, we can iden-
tify the relative marginal utility of each aspect. We call this stated-preference
survey for estimating relativemarginal utilities a SP survey to distinguish it from
a SWB survey that would measure individuals’ levels of aspects of well-being.5
5
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Figure 3.1: Sample Scenario
We highlight differences between our specific SP-survey implementation and
the theoretical ideal that we anticipate governments could approximate more
closely.
Section 3.4 presents our main survey findings. Using personal-choice sce-
narios similar to the one above and pooling across all of our respondents we
find, among other things, that while commonly-measured aspects of well-being
such as happiness, life satisfaction, and health are indeed among those with
the largest relative marginal utilities, other aspects that are measured less com-
monly have relative marginal utilities that are at least as large. These include
Broadly speaking, our SP survey can be viewed as an application of conjoint analysis (Green
and Rao 1971). In the context of assessing welfare, our survey design is closely related to the
method proposed in Adler and Dolan (2008), who argue that policymakers’ weighting of dif-
ferent aspects of well-being should be informed by how survey respondents rank alternative
"lives" that vary in the aspects. They illustrate their method with an exploratory study of 72
undergraduate respondents and four aspects: income, health, happiness, and life expectancy.
Relatedly, Adler (2013) proposes a conceptual framework similar to ours, viewing w as a hybrid
of "mental" (e.g., emotions) and "non-mental" (e.g., freedoms) aspects. He encourages using
stated-preference surveys for learning about u(w).
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aspects related to family (well-being, happiness, and relationship quality), se-
curity (financial, physical, and with regard to life and the future in general),
values (morality and meaning), and having options (freedom of choice, and
resources). Using policy-choice scenarios, in which respondents vote between
two policies that differ in how they affect aspects of well-being for everyone in
the nation, we continue to find the patterns above and in addition find high rel-
ative marginal utilities for aspects related to political rights, morality of others,
and compassion toward others, in particular the poor and others who strug-
gle. While we find some differences across demographic-group and political-
orientation subpopulations of our respondents, most of these main results hold
across the subpopulations we examine.
We present a long list of robustness checks in Section 3.5. These include
exploring the sensitivity of our findings to: estimating alternative econometric
specifications; excluding alternative candidates for (non-fundamental) combi-
nation aspects from the estimation; examining subsets of our respondents based
on the time they took to complete the survey; and varying survey design ele-
ments that we randomly manipulated.
In Section 3.6 we return to the two practical questions above–which items to
include on a SWB survey, and how to weight them to construct an index–and
discuss potential solutions, both in theory and in practice. We outline directions
for thinking about implementation challenges such as avoiding double counting
and reducing the number of survey questions.
Our paper contributes to a long line of research on social welfare measures,
recently surveyed by Fleurbaey (2009) and Fleurbaey and Blanchet (2013).6 Our
approach has the appealing feature that it accommodates several traditions that
are often considered conflicting. It is, at the same time, "super-liberal" (Fleur-
baey 2009) since we weight aspects based solely on our respondents’ stated pref-
erences; "welfarist" (Sen 1979a) since utility can be viewed as our exclusive crite-
6
Fleurbaey’s (2009) title, "Beyond GDP: The Quest for a Measure of Social Welfare," inspired
the title of our paper.
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rion for judging well-being;7 and an application of Sen’s (1985, 1992) "capabili-
ties" approach since the vector w can be considered to include both functionings
(achieved states, e.g., material standard of living, health) and capabilities (op-
portunities for such achievements, e.g., freedoms).8 Indeed, as described above,
we find that our respondents put a large weight on capabilities, especially in
policy scenarios.9
The central assumption underlying our SP-surveymethodology is that a per-
son’s stated preference in our abstract scenarios is an unbiased measure of her
("true") preference.10 This assumption is surely wrong; indeed, there are known
ways in which stated preference is biased relative to incentivized choice, for ex-
ample when one choice option is viewed as more socially desirable (Camerer
and Hogarth 1999; Ding, Grewal, and Liechty 2005). Nonetheless, we believe
it is more attractive to rely on what people’s own stated preferences suggest
7
Sen (1979a) defines welfarism as the imposition of the following "informational constraint":
"[t]he judgment of the relative goodness of alternative states of affairs must be based exclusively
on, and taken as an increasing function of, the respective collections of individual utilities in
these states." Sen criticizes this notion and argues that information beyond individual utilities
may be needed for making moral judgments. To partially address this concern, our approach
attempts to include important specific examples of such information as additional arguments in
the utility function (i.e., as elements of w).
8
From the capabilities-approach perspective, our empirical effort is an attempt to address the
"index problem," namely the problem of choosing weights for functionings and capabilities.
This problem has been considered a key obstacle to systematically applying the capabilities ap-
proach (Fleurbaey 2009) and is in general central to the construction of multi-dimensional well-
being indices (Decancq and Lugo 2013). Although Sen initially opposed combining measures
of capabilities and functionings into an index, he later seems to have become more sympathetic
(Micklewright 2001).
9
This also gives some support to Rawls’s (1971) contention that most people would prioritize
basic rights ahead of other goods.
10
While we interpret our results in light of this assumption, we believe that our empirical con-
tribution can be useful also in the context of alternative theoretical perspectives, such as that
of Fleurbaey, Schokkaert, and Decancq (2009), who single out a specific survey question–a life
satisfaction question–and propose to use it as the primary source of information about prefer-
ences, and those explored by Decancq, Van Ootegem, and Verhofstadt (2011), who pre-select
nine survey questions and evaluate alternative weighting schemes by directly asking survey
respondents how important they consider each of the nine to be. In particular, our approach
can inform researchers regarding the link between different survey questions and stated prefer-
ences.
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about what they themselves care about than to paternalistically rely on the opin-
ions and introspections of "experts" (such as researchers and policymakers) re-
garding which aspects to track and how to weight them. Moreover, some of
the objections to using stated preferences as if they are descriptive of incen-
tivized choice may have less force when stated preferences are used norma-
tively. In particular, while hypothetical choices in abstract scenarios may elicit
meta-preferences (the preferences peoplewant themselves to have), rationalized
preferences (more deliberated, internally consistent preferences), or otherwise
laundered preferences (e.g., omitting "dirty" preferences such as racism), it is
sometimes argued that these are more relevant for evaluating welfare than the
preferences that describe actual behavior. For example, our SP survey may put
respondents in a deliberative frame of mind, causing them to weight emotional
factors less than they do in "real life"–but doing exactly that is common prescrip-
tive advice for avoiding emotion-induced mistakes (e.g., Camerer, Issacharoff,
Loewenstein, ODonoghue, and Rabin 2003, pp.1238-1240). We discuss related
points when interpreting our results (in Section 3.4).
In Section 3.7, wemention some concerns regarding trackingwell-beingwith
surveys that we do not address. We conclude by discussing possible extensions
of our approach, andwe point to a few readily actionable steps suggested by our
findings. Throughout, we highlight the limitations of our specific implementa-
tion and point out promising directions for further developing the agenda we
propose.
3.1 Theoretical Framework
We start with the standard framework for aggregating an individual’s consump-
tion of different commodities. This framework underlies empirical expenditure-
and income-based measures of well-being, including GDP; below we adapt it
for conceiving a well-being index. We then discuss how this index-oriented
framework can be viewed more generally as an application of choice theory,
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with preferences elicited via our SP survey. We use this more general perspec-
tive to highlight the assumptions underlying the construction and use of our
proposed index.
In the consumption context, an agent’s well-being is represented by a
continuously-differentiable utility function u(c). The vector, c = (c1; ; cM)0, repre-
sents the quantities of M market goods. Following a change in the consumption
vector, c, the change in utility can be approximated up to an arbitrary multi-
plicative scale as
u  (Dcu (c))0  4c =
MX
m=1
@u (c)
@cm
4cm /
MX
m=1
pm4cm: (3.1)
The proportionality follows because, at the optimum, as long as the con-
sumer chooses a strictly positive amount of each good cm, each marginal util-
ity @u(c)
@cm
is equal to a Lagrange multiplier times the market price pm. By fixing
prices,p1; :::; pM, at their levels in some base period and measuring the agent’s
consumption vector over time, the government can track a quantity index of
real consumption,
PM
m=1 pmcm. For small changes in c, changes in this index are
approximately proportional to changes in utility.
Perhaps the biggest limitation of this consumption-based approach is that it
only considers a narrow set of determinants of well-being. To broaden its scope,
we follow other researchers in shifting attention away from standard consump-
tion goods (for example, rice, TVs, train rides) and toward more fundamental
aspects of well-being (for example, health, emotional states, freedoms). This ap-
proach is intended to be more general in that these fundamental aspects include
all objects of desire for individuals regardless of which specific consumption
goods are in an agent’s choice set at a given time and place. In this framework,
consumption matters for well-being through its effects on these more funda-
mental aspects of well-being, but non-consumption determinants of well-being
are also accounted for via their effects on these fundamental aspects.11
11
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Consider the utility function u(w), wherew = (w1; ;wJ)0 represents the quan-
tities of J fundamental aspects. Analogously to the consumption formula above
(equation 3.1), a change in utility resulting from a change in the fundamental
aspects can be approximated as
4u  (Dwu (w))0  4w =
JX
j=1
@u (w)
@w j
4w j (3.2)
Instead of measuring the agent’s consumption vector c, the government would
measure her fundamental-aspects vector w; and instead of tracking a quan-
tity index for standard consumption goods, the government would trackPJ
j=1
@u(w)
@w j
w j, with the marginal utilities fixed at a base period. We termPJ
j=1
@u(w)
@w j
w j the agent’s well-being index. Since the marginal utilities are defined
only up to an arbitrary multiplicative constant, so is the index. From the per-
spective of this theoretical framework, the purpose of a SWB survey is to mea-
sure the w j’s.
Because there are no observable prices that can be used in place of the
marginal utilities–by which here and henceforth we mean the relative marginal
utilities–the government will need direct marginal-utility estimates in order to
calculate the agent’s well-being index. The purpose of our SP survey is to
demonstrate a method for generating such estimates. We envision governments
applying such a method on nationally representative samples and, because the
marginal utilities may change as w changes, doing so on a regular basis (just as
prices are currently re-measured on a regular basis).
This description of our theoretical framework highlights the analogy be-
tween our proposed index and standard consumption-based indices. Our
framework, however, is more general. Indeed, our SP survey could in prin-
ciple be extended to elicit an individual’s entire indifference map by design-
ing the survey to elicit stated preference between every pair of (explicitly and
This perspective is essentially a variant of consumer theory in which preferences are defined
over goods’ characteristics (Lancaster 1966); the fundamental aspects can be thought of as the
ultimate underlying characteristics that people care about when making choices.
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fully listed) vectors of conceivable responses to a SWB survey. Regardless of the
shape of preferences, ordinal welfare comparisons could then be made between
any of the individual’s SWB-survey occasions. In practice, however, such an un-
restricted approach is unimplementable with more than a handful of aspects for
two reasons. First, even if assuming transitivity and monotonicity eliminated
the need to directly compare every pair of aspects, the number of pairwise com-
parisons required on the survey would grow exponentially with the number of
elements in w. Second, each such pairwise comparison would require respon-
dents to compare two long vectors of aspects, arguably an excessive cognitive
demand on survey respondents. Moreover, even if the list of aspects were short,
stated-preference data may be less reliable the farther the vectors to be com-
pared are from the respondent’s current w because it may be more difficult for
respondents to introspect regarding distant, unfamiliar situations.
Our approach in this paper–and the resulting design of our SP survey de-
tailed in Section 3.3 below–can be understood as a more practical version of
this generalized procedure, whereby we restrict ourselves in two ways. First,
we elicit preferences only locally at the status quo, where we think stated-
preference data are most reliable.12 Second, we assume that preferences can
be represented by a continuously-differentiable utility function, and hence are
locally linear. Local linearity makes the SP survey more feasible: the absence of
complementarities allows us to alleviate respondents’ cognitive task by present-
ing them with a series of pairwise comparisons that involve a tradeoff between
as few as two aspects at a time deviating from current w; and the fact that the
functional form of local preferences is known reduces the number of SP-survey
questions needed to estimate the (local) indifference surface. The continuous-
differentiability assumption underlies the discussion surrounding equation 3.2
above: as long as w remains within a small neighborhood around the w prevail-
ing when a SP survey was conducted, the well-being index can be used to make
12
While our scenarios do not explicitly frame the choice as being relative to respondents current
aspect levels, we believe that this is the natural interpretation (see language in the example
scenario in the introduction). One could more explicitly instruct respondents to interpret the
choice this way by simply adding a few words to the scenarios’ preamble.
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welfare comparisons between SWB-survey occasions.
Such a local welfare ordering may often be sufficient, as many individuals
may have reasonably stable w’s for long periods of time. However, under some
circumstances w may drift away (as time goes by) or even jump discontinu-
ously (perhaps due to a change in policy or in personal circumstances). Be-
tween a w within the neighborhood where a SP survey was conducted and a w
outside that neighborhood, the index does not provide a complete welfare or-
dering. Nonetheless, under additional assumptions on preferences, the index
could provide a partialwelfare ordering. For example, suppose that preferences
are convex. Figure 3.2 is adapted from Sen (1979b) who discusses how convex-
ity generates a partial ordering in the context of a real consumption index. The
Figure 3.2: Partial Welfare Ordering from Non-Local Changes in the Well-
Being Index
b w0
A
B
b w1
b w2
b w3
b w4
Aspect 1
Aspect 2
line AB–the tangent to the indifference curve going through w0, whose slope is
in our case estimated with a SP survey at w0–partitions all bundles into a south-
west set and a northeast set. Using the weights calculated from a SP survey at
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w0, the index values decrease from w0 to every aspect bundle in the southwest
and increase from w0 to every bundle in the northeast. Thus if the index value
decreases from w0 to any bundle (e.g., w1 in the figure), no matter how far away,
then due to convexity, we can conclude that the individual is worse off. If the
index value increases fromw0, however, the individual could be worse off (w2 in
the figure), indifferent (w3), or better off (w4). If a new SP surveywere conducted
at the new bundle, then it is possible that w0 would lie in the new southwest set,
completing the ordering by revealing that the new bundle is unambiguously
better than w0. It may also be possible to make a partial ordering more complete
by applying transitivity to a sequence of unambiguous pairwise comparisons.
In summary, with a given set of weights estimated at w0, our index pro-
vides a complete local ordering, and a partial global ordering, of w’s. Locally,
increases and decreases in the index are both interpretable as reflecting welfare
changes, while globally, comparisons require more involved logic such as that
above.
Although in this paper we focus primarily on survey-based measures of the
fundamental aspects that comprise w, our theoretical framework also applies
when some or all of the aspects are measured objectively. For example, some di-
mensions of health could be measured with physiological tests, and, arguably,
some freedoms could be quantified. Indeed, widely-used indices such as the
UN’s Human Development Index and Okun’s "misery index" (the sum of the
inflation and the unemployment rates) consist entirely of objective measures
that are combined by using ad hoc weights. Regardless of whether the compo-
nents of w are measured objectively or subjectively, we propose using a data-
driven method for estimating the marginal utilities; our SP survey is an attempt
at implementing such a method. Even with objective measures that have ob-
servable prices, directly estimating the marginal utilities may be considered an
alternative to making the assumptions necessary for using prices as weights.
While our theory above focuses on constructing a well-being index for a
single agent, in order to construct a national index in practice, governments
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would need to, first, construct indices for many people and, second, aggregate
them. To construct indices for many people, a method such as our SP survey
could be used to estimate marginal utilities for each person in a representative
sample. Since doing so may require a long (and hence potentially expensive)
survey–especially if w includes many aspects–in practice pooling data within
respondent subpopulations may sometimes be a required compromise. Given
our own very limited resources, when demonstrating our methodology in Sec-
tion 3.4 our main specification pools data across all respondents–something that
governments should avoid, as we discuss in Section 3.6.
How to aggregate utility across individuals is a central question of welfare
economics and an active area of research in the literature on social choice. Al-
though this paper focuses on constructing an individual-level well-being index,
in principle our framework and empirical contribution are compatible with a
variety of approaches to aggregation, as we briefly discuss in Section 3.7.
3.2 Aspects of Well-Being
A major obstacle to any real-world application of our theoretical framework is
that no one knows which fundamental aspects comprise the vector w. Indeed,
different authors have proposed different sets of aspects as important compo-
nents of well-being. Our treatment of aspects as arguments of utility requires
that for our purposes, any proposed set must be exhaustive, i.e., include all argu-
ments of preferences; and it must comprise aspects that are nonoverlapping, i.e.,
that are conceptually distinct.
Our approach in this paper is to construct as comprehensive a list of can-
didate fundamental aspects as we practically can. We additionally include
what we believed would be broader, non-fundamental "combination aspects"–
by which wemean facets of well-being that are not themselves fundamental but
contain information regarding multiple fundamental aspects–which might cap-
ture more of the variation in u. Our comprehensiveness has three advantages.
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First, it reduces the risk of missing important components of w, thereby making
the list closer to exhaustive. Second, it allows us to minimize the influence of
our own ex ante beliefs on the set that emerges as important from our analy-
sis.13 Third, it renders our results as broadly useful as possible, since different
researchers can focus on the subset of our results that pertains to the aspects
they believe comprise w–or to those they happen to have data on in an exist-
ing social survey. On the other hand, our attempt to be comprehensive has the
drawback of increasing the likelihood that different aspects on our list overlap
with each other. Our analysis in Section 3.5, in which we exclude some poten-
tially overlapping aspects from the analysis, suggests that such possible overlap
does not meaningfully affect our marginal utility estimates. However, in select-
ing which aspects to include in a well-being index, a method will be required
for ensuring that fundamental aspects are not double-counted. We summarize
a proposal for such a method in Section 3.6; we discuss it in more detail and
formalize it in Appendix section C.4.
In this section we summarize our method for compiling our master list of
136 aspects of well-being (see Table 3.2 for a version of the list). The list, as
well as much more detail regarding the process of compiling it, dividing it into
different sub-lists, and creating different versions of it, is available in Appendix
section C.1.
Our list draws from six classes of survey measures. First, we include single-
question SWB measures, modeled after the SWB questions most commonly
asked in large-scale social surveys (for example, those asked in or proposed for
the U.K. survey discussed above). These include mostly measures that are con-
sidered evaluative/cognitive (e.g., life satisfaction)–i.e., measures based on ques-
tions that may trigger respondents to engage deliberative cognitive processes in
order to evaluate their life–and those that are considered hedonic/affective (e.g.,
13
That said, in compiling the list we draw exclusively on English-speaking sources, introducing
a cultural bias–but one compatible with our respondents’. In addition, "dirty" aspects (such as
racist objectives) are typically absent from our sources, but as we discuss in Section 3.4, the few
aspects on our list that could be considered "dirty" (e.g., social status) are ranked very low by
our SP-survey respondents anyway.
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felt happiness)–i.e., measures that are aimed at eliciting respondents positive or
negative feelings.
Second, we include measures based on items in multi-question survey mea-
sures of SWB. These are primarily drawn from scales commonly used in psy-
chology, such as the PANAS (Positive and Negative Affect Scale).
The third and largest class contains aspects of well-being proposed by
prominent economists, psychologists, and philosophers that are not typically
elicited on large surveys. We drew on proposals from the Stiglitz Commission
(Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi 2009), the systematic compilation effort by Alkire
(2002), as well as many classic sources (e.g., Maslow 1946; Sen 1985; Nussbaum
2000) and more recent contributions (Seligman and Diener 2004; Loewenstein
andUbel 2008; Graham 2011). A complete list of theworkswe reviewed, includ-
ing references by aspect, is given in Appendix section C.1.3. The many aspects
in this class include some that can be understood as capabilities, i.e., access to
resources, choice sets, and freedoms. The aspects also include some that would
be considered eudaimonic SWBmeasures (for example, having a meaningful life;
Ryff 1989). Such measures relate to human thriving or flourishing; the Greek
word eudaimo¯n is commonly translated to mean happy in an Aristotelian sense,
i.e., as associated with having a meaningful, valuable, or worthwhile life.
The fourth class of measures resulted from our own introspection and dis-
cussion. Some of our proposed additions were confirmed to be important in our
past work (Benjamin, Heffetz, Kimball, Rees-Jones 2012), and others resulted
from extensive discussions among ourselves and with colleagues. Some reflect
our attempt to break down important parts of life into more fundamental as-
pects. For example, while many writers have proposed that religion is impor-
tant for well-being, we refined "religion" into 15 aspects of well-being that may
help explain the value of religion but that are also valued by many nonreligious
people (e.g., "you having people around you who share your values, beliefs and
interests").
While these four classes of measures represent our attempt to include fun-
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damental aspects in our list, our fifth and sixth classes serve different purposes.
The fifth class represents our attempt to formulate combination-aspect survey
questions that, if broad enough, might even serve as good empirical proxies
for u itself, thus possibly obviating the need for an index. These include novel
(in wording, not necessarily in concept), evaluative well-being measures, such
as "how much you like your life" and "the overall well-being of you and your
family."
Finally, as a sixth class, we crafted survey versions of "objective" indica-
tors that are widely-used as measures of well-being, such as the rates of GDP
growth, inflation, and unemployment, or income inequality. The weights re-
spondents put on such measures can serve as a benchmark against which we
can compare measures from our first five classes.14
After compiling an initial list, we revised it according to several criteria. To
make its length more manageable, we combined similar items into single mea-
sures (but we preserved commonly-used survey questions close to their original
form). To reduce subject confusion and response error, we oriented all items so
that rating higher would conventionally be considered desirable; for example,
"not feeling anxious." We further edited items in order to use vocabulary that
would be understandable by most respondents in a national sample.
The final list of 136 aspects includes 113 "private good" aspects–relating to
an individual’s own well-being (e.g., "your health")–and 23 "public good" as-
pects (also labeled public-aspects)–relating to an entire society’s well-being (e.g.,
"equality of opportunity in your nation"). Among the private-good aspects, we
distinguish between what we label you-aspects–108 that pertain to the respon-
14
In principle, we could have additionally included receipt of different amounts of money as
an aspect on our list. Doing so would have allowed us to scale the estimated marginal utilities
of the nonmoney aspects, converting them to dollar units, in turn enabling one to sum equiva-
lent variation across individuals. In practice, however, this approach would have significantly
complicated our current (purposefully simplified, proof-of-concept) survey design. For exam-
ple, dollar amounts would require their own quantitative scales that could not be made easily
comparable to the rating scales of all other aspects without considerable design changes (see the
discussion in Section 3.3.3 below).
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dent but could in principle pertain to everyone (e.g., "your health")–and you-
only-aspects–5 that pertain to the respondent and could not meaningfully and
distinctly pertain to everyone at the same time, for example due to their being
inherently relative (e.g., "your social status").
Finally, from each of the 108 you-aspects we constructed two additional as-
pect versions: an everyone-aspect that pertains to everyone in a nation (e.g., by
replacing "your health" with "people’s health"); and an others-aspect that per-
tains to typical others (e.g., "others’ health"). In the next section, we explain the
purpose of those aspect versions and discuss them further.
3.3 Survey Design
The core of our online SP survey consists of 30 hypothetical-choice scenarios,
one per screen. They are preceded by a screen of detailed instructions and fol-
lowed by a multi-screen exit questionnaire.
3.3.1 Scenario Screens
An example scenario, as it appears on the screen, was reproduced in the intro-
duction. Each such screen has three components. First, the preamble frames the
scenario as a choice between two options, neutrally labeled "Option 1" and "Op-
tion 2," that have different consequences over the next four years. Second, the
aspect table describes the difference in consequences between the two options.
Finally, the choice question elicits a participant’s stated preference between the
two options.
Preamble.–The preamble appears in one of two versions. The first version (re-
produced in the introduction) introduces personal-choice scenarios. Since much
of the discourse regarding SWB surveys is focused on private-good aspects,
personal choice seems the relevant setting for eliciting these aspects’ weights
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through respondents’ pairwise decisions that trade them off.
The second preamble version introduces policy-vote scenarios: the opening
clause "Imagine you aremaking a personal decision" is replacedwith the clause
"Imagine that you and everyone else in your nation are voting on a national
policy issue."15 Policy-vote scenarios have two purposes. First, as with stan-
dard public goods, our 23 public-aspects cannot typically be affected by one in-
dividual’s personal choice–but are routinely traded off in policy-vote contexts.
Second, even for you-aspects, if a national SWB survey is to be used for evalu-
ating policy, it may be useful to elicit the relative weights also in a setup where
the aspects pertain to everyone (and are traded off by policy in the same way
for everyone). Due to other-regarding preferences, for example, these everyone-
weights could differ from their corresponding you-weights elicited in personal-
choice scenarios. While our empirical effort is focused on personal scenarios,
we also explore such personal-vs.-policy comparisons below.
The rest of the preamble is identical across all scenarios. Designed to elicit
participants’ "single-period" utility, it explicitly limits the duration of the pre-
dicted difference between the options. While four years is a somewhat arbitrary
duration, it does not seem unreasonable as a time frame for assessing policy
(for example, it is the length of the term of the US President) as well as personal
choices. The preamble ends with a sentence that effectively asks participants to
imagine that anything not explicitly stated to differ is held constant.
Aspect table.–Each row of the aspect table compares the two options in terms
of one aspect, with an "X" positioned to indicate that either Option 1 or 2 rates
"much higher," "somewhat higher," or "slightly higher" on that aspect. The
15
We chose this voting frame for two reasons. First, it is designed to imitate a situation that,
while hypothetical, is as close as possible to the policy choice setup people have real-world
experiencewith; while most people are never in a position to actually choose a policy that would
get implemented, people often face choices over real policies in the voting booth. Second, the
frame is designed to elicit participants’ own preferences. While these preferences might well
incorporate a concern for others, we did not want the choices to put extra weight on others out
of concern that these others would be left out of the decision-making process. For this reason
the question explicitly states that "you and everyone else in your nation" are voting.
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"about equal" column in the middle never contains an "X"; it serves as a re-
minder to participants that unlisted aspects are to be considered as affected
equally by the two options.
Personal scenarios draw aspects randomly from the set of 113 private as-
pects (which consists of 108 you- and 5 -you-only-aspects). The policy scenarios
we analyze in this paper instead draw aspects randomly from the set of 108
everyone- and 23 public-aspects; these 131 aspects are effectively public goods
because they affect everyone in the same way. Each respondent faces, in ran-
dom order, 11 personal scenarios, 5 of these policy scenarios, and 14 additional
exploratory versions of policy scenarios that we do not analyze in this paper.16
The number of aspects (or rows) in a scenario’s aspect table is randomly
drawn from the set {2, 3, 4, 6}. While a shorter table may be easier for respon-
dents to read and think through, a longer one improves statistical power for
identifying marginal utilities.
The rating of each aspect–i.e., the location of the "X" in each row–is randomly
drawn from the six feasible ratings. However, we place two restrictions on the
combination of ratings within a scenario. First, scenarios with an even number
of aspectsmust be balanced: exactly half of the aspects favor Option 1 and exactly
half favor Option 2. Second, scenarios with four or six aspects must additionally
be symmetric: each rating in favor of Option 1–i.e., "much higher," "somewhat
higher," or "slightly higher"is matched by a rating of the same intensity in favor
of Option 2 on another aspect.17
16
These additional versions are designed to explore issues related to other-regarding prefer-
ences that are beyond the scope of this paper. (For example, to what extent do people’s votes
on policy reflect their willingness to sacrifice their own utility for increasing others’?) These
policy scenario versions draw aspects from sets that consist of different combinations of you-,
you-only-, others-, and public-aspects.
17
We require 2-aspect scenarios to be balanced because, otherwise, half of them are expected
to elicit a trivial choice, as one of the options would rank higher on all aspects. By placing no
restrictions on 3-aspect scenarios, we allow such trivial cases to occur (with 25 percent probabil-
ity), and we use them as a secondary robustness check to identify respondents who might have
answered at random (see footnote 29 below). Finally, we require 4- and 6-aspect scenarios to be
balanced and symmetric because our pre-tests suggested that otherwise, participants faced with
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Choice question.–The choice response scale is identical across all scenarios.
It is designed to elicit intensity of preference on a six-point scale ("Much pre-
fer Option 1," "Somewhat prefer Option 1," "Slightly prefer Option 1," "Slightly
prefer Option 2," etc.). To discourage "lazy" responses, we omitted an "indiffer-
ent" option; our "slightly" options are intended to allow for nearly-indifferent
choices.
3.3.2 Instructions and Questionnaire
The instructions screen is reproduced in Appendix section C.2. Respondents
could reopen it from every scenario screen by clicking a hyperlink. It includes
an example aspect table that is more complex than that shown in the introduc-
tion, illustrating and explaining more possibilities. The instructions empha-
size a number of scenario design points, including: the distinctions between
personal-choice and policy-vote scenarios; that the two options differ only on the
consequences listed in the aspect table; and that "The items and their rankings
in the tables are randomly chosen by the computer so that we [the researchers]
learn as much as possible from your choices."18
In addition, the instructions explain that in each row of the aspect tables, one
word is emphasized in boldface type (in the example in the introduction, you
and your). Participants are asked to "pay careful attention to the emphasized
words, and interpret a consequence with the following emphasized words as
affecting the following people:"19
these longer scenarios may adopt "visual shortcut" heuristics–such as choosing an option that
ranks better on most aspects–and pay less attention to the identities of the aspects. We compare
results estimated separately from 2-, 3-, 4-, and 6-aspect scenarios in Section 3.5.
18
This randomization disclosure is intended to prevent respondents from perceiving random
combinations of aspects as reflecting an intentional design decision to construct a particular
scenario. Such mistaken inferences could give rise to undesired experimenter-demand effects.
19
We included the bolding and this "legend" (reproduced here as it appears on the screen) be-
cause pre-tests without the bolding indicated that participants might quickly skim the aspect
tables, mistakenly assuming that, for example, all aspects apply to only them personally. The
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you/your: affects only you (and, when stated, your family or close friends).
others/others’: does not affect you, your family, or your friends–but does
affect other people. The table indicates the average effect on other people in
your nation.
nation/society/people: affects everyone in your nation (including you, your
family, and your friends).
world/humanity: affects everyone in the world.
Once participants complete the scenarios, they fill out an exit questionnaire.
We ask participants, in both a multiple-choice question and an open-ended
question, whether they understoodwhatwewere asking them to do (in themul-
tiple choice, 92.5 percent answered "always" or "mostly"; 7.5 percent answered
"not really"). We also ask basic demographic questions, as well as questions
about ideology, political party affiliation, and religiosity.
3.3.3 Design versus Theory
As discussed above, our SP survey is intended as a first-pass demonstration of
feasibility. As such, it is a considerably simplified version of the theory-based
ideal that should guide governments as they design their surveys. We now
briefly describe what a theoretically ideal survey might involve, and we high-
light a few key deviations of our SP survey from that ideal.
In an ideal application of our theory, a SP-survey component would fol-
low a SWB-survey component in a single, combined survey. The SWB com-
ponent would elicit a respondent’s current aspect levels (i.e., her w). Each of
the J fundamental-aspect questions would have its own scale: while a subjec-
tive scale with verbal labels may be a natural choice for some aspects, for other
bolding scheme allows us to keep the aspects short and simple and at the same time visually
clear and coherent. The legend provides respondents with a quick reference that clarifies the
bolded words’ intended meaning.
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aspects it may be possible to use an objective scale with quantitative units. Af-
ter respondents report their current w in the SWB-survey component, the SP
component would elicit their choices between pairs of options, where each op-
tion involves a small change from the current w; these small changes would be
spelled out using each aspect’s own units. With sufficiently many such choices,
each respondent’s vector of marginal utilities could then be estimated.
Our SP survey deviates from this ideal in a number of ways. First, it is a
stand-alone survey, rather than the second component in a combined SWB+SP
survey. We concentrate our efforts on a stand-alone SP survey since SWB sur-
veys are already conducted routinely and do not require a demonstration of
feasibility. Second, our survey uses verbal, relative rating scales that are identi-
cal for all aspects ("much," "somewhat," and "slightly higher") rather than stating
differences using each aspect’s own units. We do this to simplify and streamline
the survey and its instructions. It also allows us to interpret relative marginal-
utility estimates as informative regarding aspects’ relative "importance" because
the aspect ratings are put in units that are arguably comparable, namely respon-
dents’ judgment of what constitutes "slightly," "somewhat," or "much" more of
the aspect (but see Section 3.6.2 for discussion of how, with additional data, as-
pects could be compared in terms of predictive power for the index). Third,
our survey elicits few SP questions from each respondent, and in our marginal
utility estimates belowwe pool the data across respondents. Doing so keeps the
survey short–a crucial feature given our convenience sample–but theoretically
would only be justified if respondents not only use the scales the same way but
also have the same local slopes of indifference surfaces. We return to this last
point in Section 3.6.3.
3.4 Empirical Results: Marginal Utility Estimates
Our SP-survey respondents were recruited during December 2011 by Clear
Voice Research, a private firm that invites individuals to "start sharing their
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Table 3.1: Respondent Demographics
All Completes PrimarySample
Census
Etc.
(N = 7391) (N = 5397) (N = 4608)
Marital
Status
Married 59.3 58.9 59.8 48.8
Never Married 24.3 25.5 23.4 32.1
Other 16.4 15.6 16.8 19.1
Highest
Education
Level
Completed
High School Grad 23.2 21.9 21.4 42.9
Some College 40.7 39.8 41.0 28.9
Bachelor’s Degree 24.3 25.4 25.5 17.7
Graduate Degree 11.5 12.7 12.0 10.4
Age
20-29 19.7 21.1 18.0 18.9
30-39 18.3 19.5 18.4 17.8
40-49 19.3 20.0 20.0 19.3
50-64 20.8 20.4 22.0 26.1
65 and older 21.9 19.0 21.5 17.9
Income
less than $20,000 17.9 18.1 17.4 19.8
$20,000-39,999 27.9 27.0 27.9 21.7
$40,000-49,999 10.9 10.2 10.8 8.9
$50,000-74,999 19.8 20.0 20.5 17.7
$75,000-99,999 11.3 11.7 11.6 11.4
$100,000 and above 12.1 13.0 11.8 20.4
Region
Midwest 23.0 23.2 24.3 21.7
Northeast 19.8 20.0 19.3 17.9
South 34.0 33.4 33.8 37.1
West 23.2 23.4 22.6 23.3
Race
White 76.6 75.2 78.2 63.7
Black 9.8 10.1 9.6 12.2
Hispanic/Latino 7.7 8.2 6.4 15.4
Asian 3.7 4.2 3.5 4.7
Other 2.2 2.2 2.2 4.0
Household
Size
1 18.0 17.7 18.2 26.7
2 35.2 33.8 35.1 32.8
3 18.8 19.1 18.6 16.1
4 and above 27.8 29.2 27.9 24.4
Employment
Status
Employed 53.7 55.9 53.3 57.4
Unemployed 8.6 8.7 8.8 6.9
Not in labor force 37.6 35.4 37.8 35.6
Notes : All numbers are percentages. "All": respondents who began the survey. "Com-
pletes": respondents who completed all scenarios. "Primary Sample": respondents who
took at least 8 minutes to complete the survey. Sources: Authors’ survey, 2010 American
Community Survey, 2010 Census, 2011 Current Population Survey.
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voice" and "make a little money" by participating in online surveys. We aimed
at a sample that, although not a random sample, would resemble the adult (20+)
US population on the demographics listed in Table 3.1.
3.4.1 Respondent Demographics
Table 3.1 reports the demographic distribution of the 7,391 respondents who
began our survey (the "All" column); the 5,397 who completed it ("Completes");
and the 4,608 included in our main analysis below ("Primary Sample").20 This
primary sample excludes respondents who completed the survey in less than
eight minutes; our robustness analysis in Section 3.5 below suggests that includ-
ing them does not affect our results qualitatively but increases measurement
error. The table shows that the three groups are similar on observables.
The rightmost column reports figures from the 2010 American Community
Survey, 2010 Census, and 2011 Current Population Survey (see Table C.2 in the
Appendix). Relative to the US population, our respondents are more likely to
be married, college-educated, and white, and less likely to have very high in-
come, be Hispanic, and live alone. Our respondents may of course also differ
on unobservables.
3.4.2 Personal Choices: Benchmark Specification and Results
Our main results are reported in the "Personal" panel of Table 3.2. Recall from
Section 3.3 that each respondent faced 11 personal scenarios where the two
choice options differ on 2, 3, 4, or 6 of the 113 personal aspects. Pooling all
such scenarios across all respondents, we report results from the following OLS
20
Due to a programming error, the first 1,936 primary-sample respondents faced scenarios in
which aspects were unintentionally drawn from only 108 of the intended 113 personal and 131
policy aspects. As a result, we have more data–and tighter estimates–on some aspects. Exclud-
ing these 1,936 early respondents has very little effect on our main estimates.
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regression:
StatedPreferences =  +AspectRatings’s   + "s (3.3)
Each observation s captures the information from a single scenario faced by
a respondent, corresponding to a single survey screen like the example in the
Introduction. StatedPreferences encodes the response to the choice question.
AspectRatings’s, a 113-element vector, encodes the differences between the two
options; all of its entries are 0 except for the 26 entries representing the aspects
on which the options differ. We cluster standard errors at the respondent level.
To the six points on the choice scale ("Much prefer Option 1," etc.) we as-
sign the six numerical values (-1, -0.47, -0.14, +0.14, +0.47, +1), and to the seven
columns in the aspects table ("Option 1 much higher," etc.) we assign the values
(-1, -0.83, -0.75, 0, +0.75, +0.83, +1). As described in Section 3.5 below, these nu-
merical values were estimated from the data using a nonlinear ordered probit
model, constraining the scales to be symmetric (to economize on parameters)
and range from -1 to +1. While we prefer using these estimated scales, misspec-
ifying the scales should have little effect on the estimated aspect coefficients rel-
ative to each other. Indeed, for the personal scenarios, the correlation between
the coefficients reported in table 2 and those estimated with linear codings (i.e.,
choice scale: (-3, -2, -1, +1, +2, +3) and aspect ratings: (-3, -2, -1, 0, +1, +2, +3))
is 0.998. We find similarly high correlations (0.99) with coefficients estimated
from a probit or logit model where we collapse the choice scale to a binary vari-
able (prefer Option 1 vs. Option 2) and use the estimated scales for the aspect
columns.
Here we report OLS for maximum transparency, and for simplicity we as-
sume for now that respondents are identical in both their marginal rates of sub-
stitution and their use of the response scale. As reported in Section 3.5 below,
our results are essentially unaffected when we relax many of the restrictions im-
posed by this specification. We provide some evidence on heterogeneity across
respondent subpopulations later in this section.
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We interpret the regression 3.3 as estimating equation 3.2, where in our em-
pirical analysis, w is the difference in aspect ratings across the two options
in a scenario. The  vector estimates a vector proportional to Dwu(w), and "s
captures response error. We interpret , which we estimate to be 0.02 (s.e. =
0.003), as picking up a very small respondent bias in favor of "Option 1" despite
the fact that the content of the two options is randomly drawn from the same
distribution.
The Personal panel in Table 3.2 reports, for each of the 113 aspect regressors,
its coefficient and standard error. The "Rank" column orders the you-aspects by
coefficient size (1-108) and, additionally, places the 5 you-only-aspects relative
to these by assigning to them rank numbers with letter suffixes (e.g., "74a" lies
between 74 and 75).21 Since the independent and dependent variables are coded
over ranges of the same length (1 to +1), a coefficient of, for example, +0.46
means that on average, changing the relevant aspect from the extreme rating
"Option 1 much higher" to the other extreme of "Option 2 much higher" causes
choice to move 46 percent of the entire choice scale in the same direction.
Figure 3.3 summarizes the coefficient and rank information in Table 3.2
graphically, for the 113 personal aspects (x’s) and the 131 policy aspects (tri-
angles; we discuss these below), sorted by their respective within-panel rank.
Of the 113 personal aspects, all but two are positive, almost all statistically sig-
nificantly so. This confirms that, as intended by our wording of the aspects,
an option rating higher on an aspect is, ceteris paribus, generally considered
preferable. (We discuss the two coefficients that are negative below.) The table
and the figure show that the greatest variation in coefficient size across aspects
occurs among those at the top (for example, the top 10 coefficients range from
+0.46 to +0.32), and at the bottom (the bottom 10 range from +0.09 to 0.09); coef-
ficients vary more slowly among middle-ranking aspects. The standard errors
21
This ranking scheme facilitates comparing the 108 you-aspect ranks with their corresponding
108 everyone-aspect ranks in the "Policy" panel, accommodating the fact that the you-only-aspects
do not have counterparts in policy scenarios (and, similarly, that the public-aspects do not have
counterparts in the "Personal" panel).
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Figure 3.3: Relative Marginal Utility Estimates
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Notes: Aspect coefficients by rank, from benchmark OLS regressions (table 3.2), sepa-
rately for 113 personal-scenario aspects (x’s) and 131 policy-scenario aspects (triangles).
on the coefficients are typically below 0.017. These features of our estimates
should be borne in mind when reading our discussion below, which focuses on
ranks.
Looking at specific aspects, those involving family (well-being [rank 1], hap-
piness [2], and relationship quality [5]); health (general [3] and mental [7]);
security (financial [6], about life and the future [8], and physical [21]); values
(morality [4] and meaning [10]); and options (freedom of choice [9] and re-
sources [12]) are conspicuous in their predominance at the top of the table, along
with–reassuringly–some measures of happiness and life satisfaction (these are
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discussed below). In contrast, at the very bottom of the table, we find all four
you-only aspects that involve relative position–power over other people [108c],
social status [108b], high relative income [108a], and postmortem fame [106a]–
with coefficients that are either negative or close to zero.22 Since much evidence
seems to imply a highmarginal utility to status and relative position (see Heffetz
and Frank 2011, for a survey), we conjecture that the low ranks of these aspects
may reflect respondents’ answering our stated-preference question in terms of
their meta-preferences or laundered preferences.23
While as noted above we do not view the potential for meta- or laundered
preference elicitation as necessarily a disadvantage, our estimates may also be
sensitive to specific details of our survey design and the underlying respondent
population. Later in this and the next section, we compare estimates based on
alternative design details and on alternative subpopulations. Since our gen-
eral method is held fixed, however, we can only speculate on its effect on our
results. The deliberative frame of mind induced by our setup may make evalu-
ative SWB aspects easier for respondents to consider than affective aspects; the
double-negative framing of negative emotions may make them harder to think
about than positive emotions; and the instruction to hold other aspects constant
is almost certainly more difficult to follow when broader, combination aspects
are varied in a scenario than when only narrow, fundamental aspects are var-
ied. To the extent that our fixed design choices amplify estimated coefficients
on some categories of aspects relative to others, comparisons of aspects within
an aspect category may be more generalizable to alternative design choices than
comparisons across categories. These caveats should be borne in mind through-
22
The fifth you-only-aspect is non-positional: "the happiness of your friends" [74a]. At the same
time, two of the other aspects at the bottom–"your enjoyment of winning, competing, and facing
challenges" [108] and, to a lesser extent, a "ladder" aspect modeled after Cantril’s Self-Anchoring
Scale [103]–could have been interpreted by respondents as involving relative position, although
we did not perceive them that way when compiling our aspect list. Indeed, we expected the
ladder aspect to rank high, along with other evaluative SWBmeasures (see Section 3.4.3 below).
23
Another possibility is that the low rank of these aspects reflects experimenter-demand effects.
While we cannot rule out this concern, we believe it is less likely in an anonymous web-survey
like ours.
128
out our discussion below.
3.4.3 Personal Choices: Discussion
Evaluative and affective SWB.–Among happiness and life satisfaction measures,
the more evaluative ones–family happiness24 [2] and life satisfaction [11]–are
among the highest-ranking aspects, and rank higher than the more affective
ones–"how much of the time you feel happy" [31] and "how happy you feel"
[39]. Other measures that past work has classified as positive affect measures,
such as "how often you smile or laugh" [35] (e.g., Kahneman and Deaton, 2010),
rank similarly to these affective happiness measures.
Negative emotions.–Recently, Deaton et al. (2011) suggest that national SWB
surveys focus also on measuring negative emotions. In our data, the six mea-
sures they recommend (in their "rough order of preference") get the following
ranks: pain [49], stress [45], worry [52], anger [76], tired (not on our list, but
we have: feeling full of energy [42] and quality of sleep [77]), and sad [64].
This group of measures lies in the middle of our table, with coefficients in the
range 0.190.25. Other negative emotions, such as frustration [67], are also in
this range. Of particular interest because it is the only negative emotion among
the four U.K. questions from the Introduction, anxious [92] lies somewhat below
this range; its coefficient (0.13) is roughly half the coefficients of stress (0.25) and
pain (0.24).
Eudaimonic SWB.–While evaluative and affectivemeasures dominate the pol-
icy discourse on national SWB surveys, researchers increasingly recognize the
importance of eudaimonic dimensions of well-being. In our data, eudaimonic
24
If our respondents interpret our family happiness aspect [rank 2] as including self, then it
is more inclusive than typical happiness measures (that refer only to self). As a result, we do
not know if its place at the top of the table is due to it being a relatively evaluative happiness
measure or to its inclusion of family. (We view this aspect as a relatively evaluative measure
since reporting ones family happiness is likely to require more evaluative effort than reporting
about ones own emotions.)
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aspects such as being a good, moral person and living according to personal
values [4] (coefficient 0.40) and having a life that is meaningful and has value
[10] (coefficient 0.32) indeed rank among the highest aspects. The aspect mod-
eled after the only eudaimonic question in the U.K. four–feeling that the things
you do in your life are worthwhile [20]–has a reasonably high coefficient (0.28),
yet lower than the two above.
In summary, our agnostic, stated-preference-based approach yields high
marginal utility estimates on measures–such as life satisfaction–that have been
at the center of the discussion about well-being indices. At the same time, other
measures that have received recent attention–such as those of positive and neg-
ative affect, and certain eudaimonic measures–have coefficients that are not as
high as aspects that have received less attention in this context, in particular,
about family, health, security, values, and options. The two measures with the
largest coefficients–"the overall well-being of you and your family" and "the
happiness of your family"–are, as far as we know, survey questions we invented
that have not previously been asked in large-scale surveys. Our results suggest
they deserve attention in future data collection efforts.25
3.4.4 Policy Choices
The "Policy" panel of Table 3.2 reports estimates from a specification identical
to that used in the "Personal" panel but uses data from the five policy scenarios
each respondent faced. Recall that in such scenarios, respondents vote on pol-
icy, trading off 131 aspects that include everyone-aspects (personal aspects that
pertain to everyone in the nation) and public-aspects (public goods that pertain
to the entire nation or, when stated, to the entire world). To make the coeffi-
cient magnitudes comparable across the two panels, we use the same numer-
ical scales as in the personal regression (rather than reestimating them). As
25
For example, to capture our overall top-ranked aspect, surveys could ask: "On a scale from
zero to ten, how would you rate the overall well-being of you and your family?"
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mentioned above, to further facilitate such comparison between the you-aspects
and their corresponding everyone-aspects, the "Rank" column ranks the everyone-
aspects by coefficient size (1-108) and, in addition, places the 23 public-aspects
relative to these by assigning to them rank numbers with letter suffixes.
Since we collected less data in these policy scenarios than in personal scenar-
ios, standard errors are larger, typically in the 0.023-0.035 range. Nonetheless,
the correlation between the 108 you- and everyone-coefficient pairs is fairly high
(0.81).26 Figure 3.4 conveys the comparison graphically by replicating Figure 3.3
for only the 108 you- and 108 everyone-aspects, both sorted by the rank of the you-
aspects in the personal scenarios. The dashed curve reports a locally-weighted
linear regression of the everyone-coefficients (triangles). The figure suggests that
on average, everyone-coefficients in the policy scenarios are attenuated versions
of their counterpart you-coefficients in the personal scenarios. This may reflect
respondents’ greater uncertainty regarding others’ preferences, perhaps caus-
ing respondents to state preferences with weaker intensity in policy scenarios
(though remember that coefficient ratios are what matter for the index).
Consistent with the high correlation, some of the high-ranking you-aspects
retain their high rank as everyone-aspects. These include overall well-being of
you and your family [personal rank 1; policy rank 3], health [3; 6], personal
values [4; 2], and financial security [6; 8]. At the same time, aspects related to
freedom and to avoiding abuse seem to rank higher as policy aspects. These
include the freedom to choose [9; 1]; your ability to pursue your dreams [36;
14]; being treated with dignity [26; 11]; and, among double negatives, avoiding
deception [23; 5], pain [49; 10], and emotional abuse [68; 16].
Perhaps most importantly, several of the 23 public-aspects (included in the
policy but not the personal scenarios) have among the largest coefficients. These
include freedom from corruption, injustice, and abuse of power [0a] (coefficient
26
Here and later, we report the correlation between two vectors of estimated (sample) coef-
ficients. Due to sampling error, this reported correlation is a lower bound on the correlation
between the vectors of true (population) coefficients.
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Figure 3.4: Relative Marginal Utility Estimates: 108 you- and everyone-
aspects
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Notes: Aspect coefficients from benchmark OLS regressions (Table 3.2) for the 108 you-
aspects (from personal scenarios, x’s) and their corresponding 108 everyone-aspects
(from policy scenarios, triangles), by rank in the personal scenarios. Dashed curve:
local linear regression of everyone-coefficients (Epanechnikov kernel, bandwidth = 6).
0.39), society helping those who struggle [5a], the morality of other people [5b],
freedom of speech and of political participation [6a], and the well-being of the
people in your nation [6b].27 High coefficients on freedom from corruption
and freedom of speech seem consistent with the tendency for respondents to
27
Note that the public-aspect "the well-being of people in your nation" [6b] is quite similar to the
everyone-aspect "the well-being of people and their families" [3]. The higher rank of the latter is
consistent with the idea that highlighting "families" may raise the perceived importance of an
aspect.
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weight heavily, in a policy context, aspects that expand individuals’ choice sets–
reducing the need to choose specific outcomes for others. We interpret these
findings as providing empirical evidence that when making a policy choice, our
respondents put high value on capabilities (Sen 1985) and basic rights (Rawls
1971).
Finally, we discuss "objective" aspects, some of which are modeled after
widely-used indicators. As discussed above, some of these aspects have large
coefficients, including freedom from corruption, injustice, and abuse of power;
financial security; health; and freedom of speech and of political participation.
But among standard macroeconomic indicators, only low unemployment [18a]
has a relatively high rank. Others have lower ranks: low inflation [43a], GDP
growth [57a], GDP per capita [61a], and GDP [88a]. The tendency to prefer as-
pects that increase the choice set (rather than focusing exclusively on outcomes)
may help explain why, among the "objective" aspects, the coefficient on equality
of opportunity [19b] is relatively large (0.24), larger, for example, than that on
equality of income [66a] (0.16).
3.4.5 Cross-Group Heterogeneity
To provide some evidence on cross-group differences in marginal utilities, we
estimated equation 3.3 using subpopulations of our respondents: men and
women; those above and below an income of $50,000/year; liberals, moder-
ates and conservatives; those who do and do not attend religious services at
least monthly; and those younger and older than 45. Results of this analysis
are available through the authors. Here, we briefly summarize only some of the
main findings that emerge.
Overall, aspects in the personal scenarios rank similarly across the subpop-
ulations we examine. The sets of 113 coefficients are highly correlated across
pairs of disjoint groups, with correlations ranging from 0.86 (liberals vs. moder-
ates) to 0.91 (men vs. women). Moreover, there seems to be a broad consensus
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across the subpopulations that the highest-ranking aspects include those related
to family, health, and security.
To explore which aspects’ coefficients change most dramatically across
groups, we first normalize our marginal utility estimates to comparable units
across groups by dividing each groups set of 113 coefficients by its mean (ef-
fectively treating the "average aspect" as numeraire); we then examine, for each
aspect and each pair of disjoint groups, the ratio of the two normalized coeffi-
cients, dividing the smaller coefficient by the larger (so all ratios are  1). We
highlight here aspects that rank in the top ten in one group but drop sufficiently
in the complementary group to yield a ratio of less than 0.8. We caution that not
only our estimates in Table 3.2, but also these cross-group differences, may not
generalize to a more representative sample (cf., Heffetz and Rabin 2013).
Men rank higher: "your sense that your life is meaningful and has value"
[men rank 5, women rank 29, normalized coefficient ratio (cr) = 0.77]. Women
rank higher: "your mental health and emotional stability" [women 6, men 23,
cr = 0:71].
High-income rank higher: life satisfaction [high income 5, low income 41,
cr = 0:70], and having a meaningful life [high 7, low 24, cr = 0:75].
Liberals rank higher: having enough time and money [liberals 4, conserva-
tives 30, cr = 0:78]. Conservatives rank higher: being a good, moral person and
living according to personal values [co. 4, li. 6, cr = 0:75], family happiness [co.
1, li. 3, cr = 0:75], and family relationships [co. 5, li. 9, cr = 0:77].
More religious rank higher: sense of purpose [more religious 9, less reli-
gious 72, cr = 0:60], having people around you who share your values, be-
liefs and interests [more 10, less 60, cr = 0:69], feeling grateful [more 8, less 50,
cr = 0:74], being good and moral [more 2, less 7, cr = 0:74], and making a dif-
ference and making the world a better place [more 7, less 35, cr = 0:76]. Less
religious rank higher: life satisfaction [less 9, more 36, cr = 0:77].
Older rank higher: having many options and possibilities in life and the
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freedom to choose among them [older 5, younger 35, cr = 0:65].
In policy scenarios, correlations between pairs of sets of the 131 coefficients
are lower–although still reasonably high–and range from 0.60 (liberals versus
conservatives) to 0.81 (more versus less religious). All ratios are calculated using
the same method as above. Here we highlight aspects with normalized ratios
below 0.6. Women rank higher: "people being good, moral people" [women 1,
men 35, cr = 0:50]. Men rank higher: "people getting the rewards and punish-
ments they deserve" [men 5, women 75, cr = 0:58]. Liberals rank higher: the
condition of animals, nature, and the environment [li. 1, co. 113, cr = 0:27].
Conservatives rank higher: "people’s ability to have and raise children" [co. 8,
li. 111, cr = 0:33]. Older rank higher: being treated with dignity and respect
[older 6, younger 76, cr = 0:53].
3.5 Robustness and Additional Results
In the previous section we reported results: from (i) a simple OLS specification;
including (ii) our entire personal and policy aspect lists; and pooling responses
(iii) across scenarios with different numbers of aspects, (iv) across all but the
speediest-to-answer respondents, and (v) across scenarios faced earlier and later
in the survey. In this section, we briefly revisit these points, summarizing anal-
yses reported in more detail in tables available through the authors.
(i) Econometric Specification.–In our OLS specification we coded the verbal
scales of the independent and dependent variables as exogenously imposed nu-
meric scales. These were estimated from the following nonlinear ordered probit
specification:
StatedPreferences =
Options 
h
slightly1fslightlyg;s + somewhat1fsomewhatg;s + 1fmuchg;s
i0
  + "s
StatedPreferences is the latent dependent variable; Options, 1fslightlyg;s, 1fsomewhatg;s,
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and 1fmuchg;s are vectors (whose length is the number of aspects) that jointly
encode the differences between the two options; and  is the entry-wise vec-
tor product. Each entry of Options is equal to 1, +1, or 0, depending on
whether the aspect table rates that aspect higher on Option 1, Option 2, or nei-
ther. The entries of 1fslightlyg;s, 1fsomewhatg;s, and 1fmuchg;s are indicators of whether
the aspect is rated slightly, somewhat, or much higher. We assume that "s
is normally distributed and use maximum likelihood to estimate the parame-
ters: slightly , somewhat , the coefficient vector , and the five cutpoints that link
StatedPreferences to the observed choice, StatedPreferences.
Note that specification 3.4 normalizes "much" to be 1 or +1 depending on
whether it favors Option 1 or Option 2, and the numerical values for "slightly"
and "somewhat" used for the OLS specification in Section 3.4 are ˆslightly and
ˆsomewhat. The resulting aspects-rating scale (i.e., the values of ˆslightly and ˆsomewhat)
is determined by the extent to which the verbal labels affect choice differently,
which in turn depends on a combination of three factors: (i) respondents’ quan-
titative interpretations of the verbal labels (namely, themagnitudes on the x-axis
that correspond to "slightly" and "somewhat," given that "much" is normalized
to 1); (ii) higher derivatives of utility, averaged across the aspects (i.e., how util-
ity on the y-axis depends on the x-axis magnitudes); and (iii) any "focusing ef-
fect," that is, respondents paying less attention to an aspect’s rating than to its
direction in favor of one of the options.
To obtain values for the choice scale in the OLS specification, we use the
standard normal cdf to calculate the expected value of latent preference in-
tensity conditional on observed preference-intensity category; linearly rescale
these conditional expectations to lie in the (1, +1) interval; and symmetrize them
around zero by taking the average of the absolute value of each pair of corre-
sponding conditional expectations. The resulting choice scale captures respon-
dents quantitative interpretations of the verbal choice labels.
Not surprisingly, since the numerical scales in the OLS regressions reported
in Section 3.4 are estimated from the nonlinear ordered probit, the correlations
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between the 113 personal ’s estimated using equations 3.3 and 3.4, as well
as between the 131 policy ’s across specifications, are virtually 1. As an al-
ternative, re-estimating the OLS regressions in Table 3.2 using linear scales as
described in Section 3.4.2 yields personal and policy coefficients whose correla-
tions with those in Table 3.2 are above 0.99. As a variant that allows respondents
to differ in their interpretation of the choice intensities, we first normalize the
choice scale at the respondent level by stretching the linear scale so that the vari-
ance across each respondent’s 30 choices is 1, and only then estimate the OLS.
The correlations between the coefficients estimated with and without this nor-
malization are at least 0.98. Probit and logit models yield very similar results.
(ii) Fundamental and Combination Aspects.–If a combination and a fundamen-
tal aspect appear in the same scenario, then the presence of the combination
aspect might affect respondents’ interpretation of the fundamental aspect. For
example, if "the overall well-being of you and your family" is a function of "your
family’s happiness," then a respondent asked to trade them off might–contrary
to our intention–interpret the former as meaning overall well-being exclusive of
family happiness. Depending on the prevalence of such situations and on how
respondents interpret them, our estimated coefficients might be biased.
To probe the robustness of our results to this potential concern, we reestimate
our benchmark OLS model leaving out scenarios containing aspects that seem
most likely to be functions of other aspects on our list. For example, for per-
sonal choices we exclude all aspects that we view as evaluative SWBmeasures–
including both commonly used ones (e.g., life satisfaction) and our novel pro-
posals (e.g., how desirable your life is).28 The estimated coefficients on the 94
remaining aspects are broadly similar to those reported in Table 3.2 (correla-
tion 0.99). Results are similar in other specifications, for example, excluding the
macroeconomic indicators in policy vote scenarios.
(iii) Number of Aspects per Scenario.–As explained in Section 3.3.1, respon-
28
As our data and code are available on the journal’s and our websites, an interested reader can
readily re-estimate our model using her or his preferred subset of aspects.
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dents face two-, three-, four-, and six-aspect scenarios. Reestimating our OLS
model separately for each of these four scenario designs, we find that the range
of coefficient sizes roughly halves from two- to six-aspect scenarios. The cor-
relations between the four sets of 113 and of 131 coefficients range from 0.84
to 0.92 in personal and from 0.52 to 0.70 in policy scenarios (but note that the
latter are more attenuated because the policy coefficients estimation errors are
larger). We also examine, for each pair of coefficient sets, the intercept of the
SD line (the line going through the mean of the sets whose slope is the ratio of
standard deviations). If one set were identical to another up to a multiplicative
scalar–i.e., the two sets implied identical marginal rates of substitution–the in-
tercept would be zero. We find that the intercepts are close to zero, ranging from
0.04 to 0.15 in personal and from 0.10 to 0.10 in policy scenarios. Our general
conclusion is that while respondents allow each aspect to influence their stated
preference less intensely per aspectwhen the number of aspects is larger, relative
coefficient size remains rather stable in personal scenarios and somewhat stable
in policy scenarios.
(iv) Respondents’ Effort and Comprehension.–Respondents may exert little ef-
fort on unincentivized surveys. This may bias the estimated coefficients away
from the true marginal utilities, for example by "compressing" aspects’ coeffi-
cients toward each other if respondents pay less attention to each aspect’s iden-
tity, or by biasing coefficients toward zero if respondents answer randomly. Us-
ing amount of time to complete the survey as a proxy for effort level, and re-
estimating our main OLS specification separately by approximate sextiles, we
indeed find that the coefficients of the speediest sextile (less than eight min-
utes) are severely attenuated relative to other sextiles’ coefficients. Outside the
speediest sextile, coefficient sizes seem to increase with completion-time sextile
less steeply and then peak at the second-slowest sextile (2131 minutes). Further-
more, the correlations between the personal coefficients of the speediest sextile
and of other sextiles range from 0.23 to 0.32, much lower than the correlations
between pairs of other sextiles’ coefficient sets, which range from 0.76 to 0.89.
For these reasons, our benchmark OLS specification reported in Table 3.2 ex-
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cludes respondents who took less than eight minutes to complete the survey.29
Further excluding those who reported in the exit questionnaire that they did
"not really" understand what they were asked to do (see Section 3.3.2 above)
yields virtually identical estimates.
(v) Early vs. Late Scenarios.–Responses made later in the survey may be less
reliable due to tiredness or boredom. Alternatively, they may be more reliable
due to practice. Also, respondents’ interpretations of particular aspects may
change over the course of the survey. For example, respondents may interpret
life satisfaction as a broad SWBmeasure early on, but as they face new examples
of affective SWB measures, they may interpret it to exclude feelings.
To assess these possibilities, we estimate an augmented version of our OLS
specification by including a dummy for whether a scenario appeared in the ear-
lier half of the survey and interacting it with each aspect’s rating. We find no
evidence of systematic differences between estimates from scenarios in earlier
and later halves of the survey.
3.6 Pragmatics
We now return to the two practical issues we posed in the introduction:
which questions should a SWB survey ask, and how should the responses be
weighted? In theory, the well-being index formula,
PJ
j=1
@u(w)
@w j
w j, provides clear
solutions: ask about the levels of each of the J fundamental aspects compris-
ing w, and weight the responses by their marginal utilities. In practice, as we
have emphasized throughout, both our proposed list of fundamental aspects
and our marginal-utility estimates are only first-pass proofs-of-concept in need
29
As an additional respondent-effort sensitivity check, we examine respondents who, in at least
one three-aspect scenario where one option happens to rate higher on all three aspects, choose
the other option. The rankings of aspects in this sample are similar to our benchmark, but the
coefficients are greatly attenuated. We like this sensitivity check less because it may fail to drop
random responders (who choose the higher-rated option by chance) and, at the same time, may
unduly drop respondents who prefer less of certain aspects.
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of further development.
In conjunction with making progress on those fronts, governments that wish
to construct reliable well-being indices will have to overcome additional chal-
lenges that we have deferred until now. In this section we return to these chal-
lenges and outline directions for surmounting them.
3.6.1 Overlapping Questions
In our theory in Section 3.1, preferences are defined over a vector w of funda-
mental aspects. While further progress on extending our list of survey questions
may eventually result in an exhaustive list that includes all the components of
w (as required by the theory), it would likely also further increase the incidence
of conceptually overlapping questions (which the theory assumes away). Note
that conceptual overlap between questions is different from empirical covari-
ance (e.g., in the time series) between questions: while overlap exists when two
or more questions refer, by the meaning of the language they use, to some of
the same fundamental aspects (an extreme example: two questions that are per-
fectly synonymous), covariance between questions is a feature of the empirical
joint distribution of aspect levels (an extreme example: two conceptually dis-
tinct measures A and B that are perfectly correlated, say, due to A causing B).
Hence non-zero covariances are likely even in the absence of overlap, and infor-
mation regarding covariances across SWB survey waves (or across respondents)
is not sufficient for identifying overlap.
Intuitively, including overlapping questions in the well-being index would
lead to double-counting, a problem analogous to counting some components
of GDP more than once. Hence, before a reliable well-being index can be con-
structed, a strategy is needed for avoiding double-counting. One such strategy
is to find a list of SWB questions free from overlap by eliminating questions that
overlap with other questions on the list. Doing so requires a method for detect-
ing overlap between any given pair of SWB survey questions. This subsection
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briefly outlines the basic idea underlying one such method; we provide an ex-
tended discussion, a fully specified concrete example, and a formal treatment in
Appendix section C.4.
The idea behind our overlap-detection method is to use a variation on our
SP survey in order to compare the (relative) marginal utility of the joint increase
in two survey questions (appearing within a single scenario option) with the
sum of the (relative) marginal utilities of the separate increases of the two survey
questions (appearing in two separate scenarios). For example, consider two of
the UK questions from the introduction: life satisfaction and life worthwhile-
ness. If the two questions do not overlap–that is, if they elicit two fundamental
aspects or, more generally, two functions of disjoint sets of fundamental aspects–
then the sum of the marginal utility of life satisfaction plus the marginal util-
ity of life worthwhileness (both relative, say, to the marginal utility of health)
would equal the (relative to health) marginal utility of a joint increase in life
satisfaction and life worthwhileness. This equality holds approximately even if
the aspects measured by the two questions enter preferences as complements,
as long as the increases are small. On the other hand, if the two questions do
overlap, then the marginal utility of their joint increase would be smaller than
the sum of marginal utilities of their separate increases because part of the joint
increase is overlapping and is taken into account by survey respondents only
once.
Therefore, to identify overlap between, e.g., life satisfaction and life worth-
whileness, in the Appendix we propose to measure these (relative) marginal
utilities by collecting data from (i) two-aspect scenarios where respondents
choose between different increases in life satisfaction in Option 1 versus in-
creases in a third aspect in Option 2; (ii) two-aspect scenarios where respondents
choose between different increases in life worthwhileness in Option 1 versus in-
creases in that third aspect in Option 2; and (iii) three-aspect scenarios where re-
spondents choose between different increases in life satisfaction and life worth-
whileness in Option 1 versus increases in that third aspect in Option 2. Such a
data collection effort would effectively replicate our own SP survey, with three
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main differences: first, it would target pairs of questions where overlap is sus-
pected; second, it would involve only the relevant two- and three-aspect scenar-
ios described in (i), (ii), and (iii) above; and third, it would adjust and refine the
language in the scenarios’ preamble to encourage respondents to interpret joint
increases in pairs of questions in specific ways, a point that we briefly discuss
now.
While our SP-survey instructions may be sufficient when the SWB survey
questions under study are fundamental aspects, the formal theory we develop
in the Appendix highlights the importance of respondents’ interpretation of the
implied changes in fundamental aspects when the questions under study are
not themselves one-to-one measures of fundamental aspects. We present two
propositions, relying on two alternative sets of assumptions regarding respon-
dents’ interpretations, each of which formally substantiates the validity of our
overlap-detection method. However, as we discuss in the Appendix, develop-
ing the survey language that would encourage respondents to interpret scenar-
ios in one of the ways required by our theory would necessitate a process of
developing and testing survey instructions that goes beyond the scope of this
paper. Nevertheless, our appendix treatment suggests that the problem of po-
tential question overlap can be analyzed formally and addressed practically,
and takes some tentative steps in those directions.
3.6.2 Abridged Index
From a pragmatic point of view, identifying a sub-list of survey questions that
avoids overlap (while fully covering the fundamental aspects in w) has an ad-
ditional important consequence: it shortens the list of questions to elicit. In
what follows, we use the term "full index" to refer to the well-being index that is
based on such a shorter yet complete list, which we assume consists of exactly
J fundamental-aspect questions.30 Such a list may still however be longer than
30
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the list of questions a governments is able (or willing) to regularly include on
each wave of its SWB survey. It may hence be important to also consider the
two practical questions from the introduction with an added constraint: which
items should a government include on a SWB survey that is limited to only
N < J questions? And, conditional on asking N questions (not necessarily the
optimal ones), how should the responses be weighted?
Conditional on a SWB survey eliciting responses fr1; r2; : : : ; rNg to a given set
of N questions, a natural weighting approach is to seek weights, 1; 2; : : : ; N ,
such that the "abridged index"
PN
n=1 nrn is the best predictor of the full index in
an R2 sense. The optimal weights will generally no longer be proportional to the
estimated marginal utilities because included questions will proxy for excluded
aspects with which they covary in the time series.31 If, in addition, the N ques-
tions can be selected, then a natural selection approach is to select those that,
weighted optimally, best predict the time series of the full index. (Combination-
aspect questions that have been excluded from the full index due to overlapmay
be especially useful in this context.) Note that the optimal set of N questions
may not necessarily include the questions with the largest marginal-utility esti-
mates. For example, Deaton et al. (2011) argue that negative emotions (whose
coefficients we report in Section 3.4.3 above as ranking only in the middle of our
Table 3.2) are important to include on a government’s SWB survey due to their
relatively high variance and low covariance with other questions.
To construct an N-question abridged index that is optimal in the above
sense of best-predicting the full index, it would be necessary to first construct
and track the full index, at least for a few survey waves. In the theoretically
ideal world of an infinite sample and unlimited computing power, the opti-
With J fundamental aspects in w, a complete no-overlap list has at most J questions: exactly
J if they are all fundamental-aspect questions, or fewer if some are "composite-aspect" ques-
tions, meaning that they elicit non-fundamental aspects that are subutility functions (see the
Appendix for a formal definition and discussion). Such composite aspects can be substituted in
the theory and in the index for their underlying fundamental aspects.
31
Note that variants of our SP survey (including those referred to in Section 3.6.1) are not infor-
mative regarding covariances because the SP survey exogenously varies the aspect bundles to
be compared in a way unrelated to time-series covariances of responses to the SWB survey.
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mal abridged index would be found by regressing the full index on all possible
sets of N questions, finding the set that maximizes R2. In practice, with a finite
sample, more sophisticated methods are needed to avoid overfitting in both se-
lection of questions and estimation of their coefficients. Miller (2002) provides a
comprehensive discussion of such methods.
Two additional points regarding an abridged index are worth mentioning.
First, different abridged indices may be optimal for different intended uses of
the index. For example, if the abridged index is used mainly to track individ-
uals’ well-being over time, then the objective function to best-predict is a time-
series of the full index (as proposed above). Alternatively, if the index is used
to guide policy, then question selection and weighting should account for the
fact that some aspects may vary a great deal but be relatively immune to policy,
while others may move little unless changed by policy (for example, Deaton et
al. (2011) argue that stress may be particularly sensitive to policy).
Second, if the questions’ variance-covariance matrix shifts over time, then
an abridged index’s optimal questions and weights may change even when the
intended use is held fixed and even if the marginal utilities have not changed.
This point is related to the well-known Lucas critique from macroeconomics;
even if the underlying structural model is fixed, the best-fitting reduced-form
equation may be unstable as circumstances shift. For this reason, the full index
should be tracked at least periodically–e.g., by switching back, every few survey
waves, from the abridged survey to the full survey–and the optimal abridged
index should be periodically re-estimated.
3.6.3 Pooling Respondents
While abridged indices would reduce the number of questions to ask on reg-
ular SWB-survey waves, our discussion above makes it clear that at least peri-
odically, it is crucial to construct the full index. Hence, at least periodically, the
full list of SWB questions and a full set of marginal-utility estimates would be
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needed. Even if the full list of SWB questions is not by itself considered too long
to ask on a single SWB survey, multiple SP-survey questions are required for es-
timating each marginal utility, and therefore estimating the full set of marginal
utilities may require a long survey. While breaking a long survey into shorter
modules administered to the same respondent on successive occasions may be
feasible, a government might wish to divide the full set of required SP questions
across different respondents and pool their responses. Under what conditions
would doing so be justified?
Our theory in Section 3.1 is restricted to an individual agent. Estimating
marginal utilities from pooled data is therefore theoretically justified only when
the pooled respondents’ indifference surfaces have the same local slope. We re-
fer to such respondents as being of the same "type."32 In practice, while it is un-
likely that any two respondents are of exactly the same type, it may be possible
to partition a population of respondents into approximate types. To do so, one
would need to conduct a full SP survey (long enough for identifying each re-
spondents local marginal utilities) on at least a subsample of respondents. One
could then search for observables (such as sex, age, etc.) that may characterize
types.
In our ownmain specification in Section 3.4, we pooled data across all of our
respondents, effectively treating them all as a single type. Doing so is difficult
to justify theoretically, and as discussed above governments should not–and
would not have to–do so. That said, to the extent that some of our estimates by
several different demographic groups (summarized in Section 3.4.5) are viewed
as not that different from each other, it is possible that, as an empirical matter,
pooling may yield sensible estimates.
32
Thus, even if two respondents have the same preferences, if their interpretation and report-
ing of their w’s differ in a way that leads to indifference surfaces with different local slopes,
then the respondents should be considered of different types. On the other hand, even if two
respondents interpret an aspect differently–for example, "being a good, moral person" could
involve different behaviors that satisfy different moral values for different people–the two are
still of the same type as long as that aspects relative marginal utility is the same at their current
fundamental-aspect levels.
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3.7 Concluding Remarks
Our current system of national accounts has been continually refined over many
decades, and continues to be revised. Converging on how well-being should be
tracked is likely to be similarly arduous. Much work has already been done.
But that work, and our own contributions–the theory and methodology, aspect
list, and marginal-utility estimates–are only a bare beginning. We address only
a fraction of the issues in constructing well-being indices that we are aware of,
and there are surely many other issues we have not thought of.
Perhaps the most urgent unresolved theoretical issue is aggregation across
individuals. This issue is not specific to our approach. As a workaround, re-
searchers (say, using aggregate consumption or GDP as a welfare measure) of-
ten take the leap of assuming a representative agent. If one were willing to as-
sume a representative agent, a national well-being index could be constructed
from marginal-utility estimates like ours, together with average responses to a
SWB survey. Alternatively, including money in the SP survey as if it were an
"aspect" would enable scaling the marginal utilities in dollar units (see footnote
14). The change in the well-being index could then be measured in dollars for
each respondent and summed across respondents. As another alternative, the
same procedure could be followed with some other numeraire good; for exam-
ple, time might be an attractive numeraire. Other recent proposals regarding
aggregation in the context of SWB surveys include Fleurbaey, Schokkaert, and
Decancq (2009), Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2011), and Benjamin, Heffetz, Kim-
ball, and Szembrot (2013).
Another set of concerns, emphasized by Frey and Stutzer (2007, 2012), here-
after FS, is that if aggregated SWB responses were regularly used for policymak-
ing, both governments and individuals might have an incentive to manipulate
the survey-based index for their own benefit. One concern FS raise is that politi-
cians and public officials have many degrees of freedom that they may exploit
when selecting questions, weights, and the respondent population used for con-
structing an index. As FS observe, similar concerns also arise with traditional
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indicators such as GDP and the rate of unemployment. We believe that–as with
these traditional and widely-used indicators–having standardized procedures
for constructing the index, such as the procedures developed in this paper, can
eliminate many of these degrees of freedom. Another concern FS raise is that
individuals may have an incentive to deviate from truthfully responding to the
SWB survey. While we are not aware of evidence of such conscious attempts
by individuals or interest groups to manipulate existing survey-based indica-
tors such as the rate of unemployment, we explore in a companion paper (Ben-
jamin, Heffetz, Kimball, and Szembrot 2013) a mechanism for aggregating SWB
responses and guiding policy that reduces incentives for non-truthful respond-
ing.
Yet another set of concerns relates to measurement. While we have assumed
throughout that aspects of well-being can be meaningfully measured with a
SWB survey, such measurement still faces major challenges that we have not
addressed. For example, traditional SWB measures may be over-sensitive to
immediate context, under-sensitive to lasting changes in life circumstances, and
subject to recalibration of the response scale (see Adler, 2013, for a comprehen-
sive critical review of these and other challenges). And of course all survey
measures are subject to measurement error.
We have focused on constructing a well-being index based on combining a
SWB survey with a SP survey. But the framework and method we have devel-
oped could be applied in three additional directions. First, as mentioned above,
one could use a SP survey to obtain weights for existing indices of objective
measures, such as the Human Development Index (HDI), that currently use ad
hoc weights. In that case, the objective measures–for the HDI: longevity, educa-
tion, and GDP per capita–would replace the aspects in the SP survey.
Second, one could extend market-price-based indices, such as GDP, to incor-
porate other factors using "price" imputations. Rather than a function of funda-
mental aspects, utility would be modeled as a function of market goods as well
as non-market goods such as leisure, social relationships, and the environment.
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These goods would replace the aspects in the SP survey.
Third, while our SP survey and analysis are based on the assumption that
respondents’ stated preferences can be used to assess welfare–an approach we
find attractive on liberalist grounds–our methodology could be adapted to ac-
commodate alternative assumptions. For example, if one assumed that life satis-
faction equaled welfare, then one would replace our stated choice question with
a predicted-life-satisfaction question. Alternatively, one might replace "you"
with "someone like you" in the stated-choice question if one believed that the
latter would yield more reliable responses.
While we view this paper primarily as proposing a long-term agenda, our
findings also point to a few readily actionable steps. First, our results suggest
prioritizing the measurement of aspects related to family, health, and security;
eudaimonic and especially evaluative SWBmeasures; and, especially in the pol-
icy context, freedoms and capabilities. Second, as discussed in Section 3.6, for
the purpose of selecting specific questions for regular inclusion on SWB surveys,
we highlight the value of gathering data on as many aspects as possible–at least
initially (cf. Deaton et al. 2011) and at regular intervals. Third, along with
conducting SWB surveys, we call for governments and researchers to devote
resources to estimating aspects’ marginal utilities; our SP survey illustrates one
method for doing so.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 1
A.1 Proofs for Theoretical Results
A.1.1 Announcement Game
Lemma 1. Suppose that in equilibrium, only candidates who prefer A/E choose
to take no position. Then,
1. A Bayesian voter believes the following about a candidate who takes no
position:
Aj; =
A
1    (1   A)
Bj; =
(1   ) B
1    (1   A)
Cj; =
(1   ) C
1    (1   A)
In the limit as  ! 1:
Aj; = 1
Bj; = 0
Cj; = 0
2. A cursed voter believes the following about a candidate who takes no po-
sition:
˜Aj; =
A

1    (1   A)
1    (1   A)
˜Bj; =
B

1    (1   A)
1    (1   A)
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˜Cj; =
C

1    (1   A)
1    (1   A)
In the limit as  ! 1:
˜Aj; = 1    (1   A)
˜Bj; = B
˜Cj; = C
Proof. Given the candidates’ equilibrium strategies, Bayes’ Rule implies that
Aj; =
A
A + (1   ) (1   A)
Bj; =
(1   ) B
A + (1   ) (1   A)
Cj; =
(1   ) C
A + (1   ) (1   A)
By definition of cursed equilibrium,
˜Aj; = A +
(1   ) A
A + (1   ) (1   A)
˜Bj; = B +
(1   ) (1   ) B
A + (1   ) (1   A)
˜Cj; = C +
(1   ) (1   ) C
A + (1   ) (1   A)
Simplification gives the beliefs listed in the statement of the Lemma.
Proposition 1. In the limit as  ! 1, the near-revelation equilibrium exists
as a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. Proposition 2. As  ! 1, the near-revelation
equilibrium exists as a cursed equilibrium if and only if
  NR  u2   u3(1   A) (u2   u3) + C (u1   u2) (A.1)
Proof. Suppose that the near-revelation equilibrium exists. Since candidates
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who prefer A/E and C can do no better than following their equilibrium strate-
gies, consider the decision of a candidate who prefers B/D. If he could de-
feat a opponent who revealed B/D by taking no position, then he would de-
viate, as doing so would improve his chance of beating A/E candidates and
B/D candidates while not affecting his chances against C candidates. On the
other hand, no candidate would deviate if voters supported a candidate who
revealed B/D over one who took no position. The voter would vote for a
candidate who revealed B/D if the opponent took no position if and only if
u2  ˜Aj;u3 + ˜Bj;u2 + ˜Cj;u1.
Substituting the beliefs derived in Lemma 1 into the inequality above gives
u2  A

1    (1   A)
1    (1   A) u3 +
B

1    (1   A)
1    (1   A) u2 +
C

1    (1   A)
1    (1   A) u1
, 0   A 1    (1   A) + C 1    (1   A) u2   A 1    (1   A) u3
 C 1    (1   A) u1
, 0  A 1    (1   A) (u2   u3)   C 1    (1   A) (u1   u2)
,  (1   A) A (u2   u3) + CA (u1   u2)  A (u2   u3)   C 1    (u1   u2)
,   A (u2   u3)   C

1    (u1   u2)
A [(1   A) (u2   u3) + C (u1   u2)]
In the limit as  ! 1:
  u2   u3
(1   A) (u2   u3) + C (u1   u2)
Since the right-hand side is positive, this condition always holds for  = 0.
Therefore, the near-revelation equilibrium always exists as a Bayes-Nash equi-
librium in the limit as  ! 1.
Lemma 2. Suppose that in equilibrium, only candidates who prefer C reveal
their preferred policies. Then,
1. A Bayesian voter believes the following about a candidate who takes no
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position:
Aj; =
A
1   C
Bj; =
B
1   C
Cj; =
(1   ) C
1   C
In the limit as  ! 1:
Aj; =
A
1   C
Bj; =
B
1   C
Cj; = 0
2. A cursed voter believes the following about a candidate who takes no po-
sition:
˜Aj; =
A

1   C
1   C
˜Bj; =
B

1   C
1   C
˜Cj; =
C

1    +  (1   C)
1   C
In the limit as  ! 1:
˜Aj; =
A

1   C
1   C
˜Bj; =
B

1   C
1   C
˜Cj; =
C (1   C)
1   C
Proof. Given the equilibrium strategies chosen by candidates, Bayes’ Rule im-
152
plies that
Aj; =
A
1   C + (1   ) C
Bj; =
B
1   C + (1   ) C
Cj; =
(1   ) C
1   C + (1   ) C
From the definition of cursed equilibrium, the beliefs of a cursed voter are
˜Aj; = A +
(1   ) A
1   C + (1   ) C
˜Bj; = B +
(1   ) B
1   C + (1   ) C
˜Cj; = C +
(1   ) (1   ) C
1   C + (1   ) C
Simplification of these equations yields those given in the statement of the
Lemma.
Proposition 3. In the limit as  ! 1, the ambiguity equilibrium does not
exist as a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. Proposition 4. In the limit as  ! 1, the
ambiguity equilibrium exists as a cursed equilibrium if and only if
  A  A (u2   u3)
C [A (u2   u3) + (1   C) (u1   u2)] (A.2)
Proof. Suppose first that the median voter prefers a candidate who reveals B/D
to a candidate who takes no position. Then, a candidate who prefers B/Dwould
improve his probably of winning by deviating to revealing his preferred policy.
Therefore, it must be the case that the median voter prefers a candidate who
takes no position to one who reveals B/D. This is the case if and only if u2 
˜Aj;u3 + ˜Bj;u2 + ˜Cj;u1.
Substituting the beliefs from Lemma 2 into the inequality above gives
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u2  A (1   C)1   C u3 +
B (1   C)
1   C u2 +
C (1    +  (1   C))
1   C u1
, 0  A (1   C) u3 + C (1    +  (1   C)) u1
  (A (1   C) + C (1    +  (1   C))) u2
, 0  C (1    +  (1   C)) (u1   u2)   A (1   C) (u2   u3)
, 0  C (1   ) (u1   u2)   A (u2   u3)
+

C (1   C) (u1   u2) + AC (u2   u3)
,   A (u2   u3)   C (1   ) (u1   u2)
C [(1   C) (u1   u2) + A (u2   u3)]
In the limit as  ! 1:
  A (u2   u3)
C [A (u2   u3) + (1   C) (u1   u2)]
Since the right-hand side is positive, the condition cannot hold for  = 0. There-
fore, the ambiguity equilibrium does not exist as a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in
the limit as  ! 1.
Proposition 5. In the limit as  ! 1:
1. If A
C
< u1 u2u2 u3 , then:
(a) 0<A < NR < 1
(b) The near-revelation equilibrium is unique if and only if
 < A  A [u2   u3]
C (A [u2   u3] + (1   C) [u1   u2]) (A.3)
(c) The ambiguity equilibrium is unique if and only if
 > NR  A (u2   u3)
A [(1   A) (u2   u3) + C (u1   u2)] (A.4)
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(d) The near-revelation and ambiguity equilibria both exist (and no other
equilibria exist) if and only if A    NR
2. If A
C
= u1 u2u2 u3 , then the near-revelation equilibrium is unique if  < 1, and
both the near-revelation equilibrium and the ambiguity equilibrium exist
if  = 1.
3. If A
C
> u1 u2u2 u3 , then the near-revelation equilibrium is unique, for all values
of .
Proof. The only possibility that has not been considered is an equilibrium in
which only candidates who prefer B/D take no position. Suppose this equilib-
rium exists. Since a candidate who takes no position is a lottery that dominates
A/E for certain, a candidate who prefers A/E could improve his winning prob-
ability by deviating to taking no position; therefore, this cannot be an equilib-
rium.
NR =
u2 u3
(1 A)(u2 u3)+C(u1 u2) is clearly positive.
NR  1
, u2   u3  (1   A) (u2   u3) + C (u1   u2)
, A (u2   u3)  C (u1   u2)
, A
C
 u1   u2
u2   u3
A =
A(u2 u3)
C[A(u2 u3)+(1 C)(u1 u2)] is also clearly positive.
A  1
, A (u2   u3)
C [A (u2   u3) + (1   C) (u1   u2)]  1
, A (u2   u3)  AC (u2   u3) + C (1   C) (u1   u2)
, A (u2   u3)  C (u1   u2)
, A
C
 u1   u2
u2   u3
155
Next, A  NR is equivalent to
A (u2   u3)
C [A (u2   u3) + (1   C) (u1   u2)] 
u2   u3
(1   A) (u2   u3) + C (u1   u2)
, A [(1   A) (u2   u3) + C (u1   u2)]  C [A (u2   u3) + (1   C) (u1   u2)]
, A [1   A   C] (u2   u3)  C [1   C   A] (u1   u2)
, A
C
 u1   u2
u2   u3
To sum up, if A
C
< u1 u2u2 u3 , then 0 < A < NR < 1. If
A
C
= u1 u2u2 u3 , then A =
NR = 1. Otherwise, both thresholds are above 1, implying that the Bayes-Nash
equilibrium is unique.
Proposition 6. Suppose that A increases by ", while B decreases by " and
C decreases by (1   ) " for  2 [0; 1]. Then, NR and A increase.
Proof. 1. NR increases with this change if and only if
(A+")(u2 u3) (C (1 )")[1 ](u1 u2)
(A+")[(1 (A+"))(u2 u3)+(C (1 )")(u1 u2)] >
A(u2 u3) C[1 ](u1 u2)
A[(1 A)(u2 u3)+C(u1 u2)]
Cross-multiplication gives
(A + ") (u2   u3) [A (1   A) (u2   u3)]
(A + ") (u2   u3) [AC (u1   u2)]
  (C   (1   ) ") 1    (u1   u2) [AC (u1   u2)]
  (C   (1   ) ") 1    (u1   u2) [A (1   A) (u2   u3)] >
A (u2   u3) [(A + ") (1   (A + ")) (u2   u3)]
A (u2   u3) [(A + ") (C   (1   ) ") (u1   u2)]
 C 1    (u1   u2) [(A + ") (C   (1   ) ") (u1   u2)]
 C 1    (u1   u2) [(A + ") (1   (A + ")) (u2   u3)]
Distributing terms gives
A (1   A) (A + ") (u2   u3)2
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+AC (A + ") (u2   u3) (u1   u2)
  (1   ) A (1   A) (C   (1   ) ") (u1   u2) (u2   u3)
  (1   ) AC (C   (1   ) ") (u1   u2)2
 A (A + ") (1   (A + ")) (u2   u3)2
 A (A + ") (C   (1   ) ") (u2   u3) (u1   u2)
+C

1    (A + ") (1   (A + ")) (u1   u2) (u2   u3)
+C

1    (A + ") (C   (1   ) ") (u1   u2)2 > 0
Suppose that u2   u3 > u1   u2. Then this condition holds if
A (1   A) (A + ") + AC (A + ")
  (1   ) A (1   A) (C   (1   ) ")   (1   ) AC (C   (1   ) ")
 A (A + ") (1   (A + "))   A (A + ") (C   (1   ) ")
+C

1    (A + ") (1   (A + ")) + C 1    (A + ") (C   (1   ) ") > 0
Note that the same condition would result if the opposite assumption had
been made. This is equivalent to
(A + ") (2   ) A   C (1   ) + (1   ) [C + A (1   )] [1   A + C] > 0
Since only the first term in brackets could be negative, this must hold if
A  C. The equation is also equivalent to
(1   ) C (C   A   " (2   ))
+ (A + ") (2   ) A + (1   ) [C + A (1   )] (1   A) > 0
This must hold if C > A, for sufficiently small ". Therefore, it must hold
for any initial values.
2. A increases with this change if and only if
(A+")[u(x2) u(x3)] (C "(1 ))(1 )[u(x1) u(x2)]
(C "(1 ))((A+")[u(x2) u(x3)]+(1 (C "(1 )))[u(x1) u(x2)]) >
A[u(x2) u(x3)] C(1 )[u(x1) u(x2)]
C(A[u(x2) u(x3)]+(1 C)[u(x1) u(x2)])
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Cross-multiplying gives
CA (A + ") [u (x2)   u (x3)]2
 CA (C   " (1   )) (1   ) [u (x1)   u (x2)] [u (x2)   u (x3)]
+ (A + ") C (1   C) [u (x1)   u (x2)] [u (x2)   u (x3)]
  (C   " (1   )) (1   ) C (1   C) [u (x1)   u (x2)]2
 A (C   " (1   )) (A + ") [u (x2)   u (x3)]2
+ (C   " (1   )) (A + ") C (1   ) [u (x1)   u (x2)] [u (x2)   u (x3)]
 A (C   " (1   )) (1   (C   " (1   ))) [u (x1)   u (x2)] [u (x2)   u (x3)]
+ (C   " (1   )) (1   (C   " (1   ))) C (1   ) [u (x1)   u (x2)]2 > 0
Suppose that u (x2)   u (x3) > u (x1)   u (x2). Then this condition holds if
CA (A + ")    (1   ) CA (C   " (1   ))
+ (A + ") C (1   C)   (C   " (1   )) (1   ) C (1   C)
 A (C   " (1   )) (A + ") +  (C   " (1   )) (A + ") C (1   )
 A (C   " (1   )) (1   (C   " (1   )))
+ (C   " (1   )) (1   (C   " (1   ))) C (1   ) > 0
Note that the same condition would result if the opposite assumption had
been made. This is equivalent to
(A (1   ) + C) 1   C
(1   ) A   C (1   ) (A   C + " (2   )) > 0
For sufficiently small ", this must hold if A > C. This equation is also
equivalent to
(1   ) A [1 + A   C + " (2   )] + C (1   C   A (1   ))
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+ (1   ) C (1   ) [C   A   " (2   )] > 0
It holds for sufficiently small " if C > A. Therefore, it must hold for any
initial values.
Proposition 7. Suppose that utility function u represents more risk-averse
preferences than utility function v. Then NR and A are higher under u than
under v.
Proof. Take two increasing functions, u and v, and consider preferences over
three outcomes, z1, z2, and z3.u (z2)   u (z3) =  (v (z2)   v (z3)) for some positive
constant ; since both differences are simply positive scalars, there must exist a
positive constant that makes this equation hold. In addition, there exists ' such
that u (z2) = v (z2) + '. Let w (z) = v (z) + '. Since Bernoulli utility functions are
unique up to a linear transformation, w (z) represents the same preferences as
v (z). w (z2)   w (z3) = v (z2) + '   v (z3)   ' =  (v (z2)   v (z3)) = u (z2)   u (z3): u (z)
and w (z) have the same slope between z2 and z3. Also, w (z2) = v (z2)+' = u (z2).
Let x be the certainty equivalent of Z under u (): u (x) = p1u (z1) + p2u (z2) +
p3u (z3). Rearranging, we have
p1u (z1) + p2u (z2) + p3u (z3)
= p1u (z1) + (1   p1   p3) u (z2) + p3u (z3)
= p1 (u (z1)   u (z2)) + u (z2) + p3 (u (z3)   u (z2))
Applying the same algebraic steps,
w (Z) = p1 (w (z1)   w (z2)) + w (z2) + p3 (w (z3)   w (z2)) :
From above, directly from the construction of w (z), we have w (z2) = u (z2) and
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w (z2)   w (z3) = u (z2)   u (z3). This implies that
w (Z) = p1 (w (z1)   w (z2)) + u (z2) + p3 (u (z3)   u (z2)) :
Add p1 (u (z1)   u (z2)) to both sides:
w (Z) + p1 (u (z1)   u (z2)) =
p1 (w (z1)   w (z2)) + p1 (u (z1)   u (z2)) + p3 (u (z3)   u (z2))
Substitute in u (Z) and rearrange:
w (Z)   u (Z)+ = p1 [(w (z1)   w (z2))   (u (z1)   u (z2))]
w (Z) > u (Z) if and only if (w (z1)   w (z2)) > (u (z1)   u (z2)). Under this condition,
if x is indifferent to Z under u (), then Z is strictly preferred to x (and therefore,
there exists some y > x such that w (Z) = y). Since w represents the same pref-
erences as v, this is also true for v. Therefore, u has a lower certainty equivalent
for lottery Z than v if and only if w (z1)   w (z2) > u (z1)   u (z2).
The first part of this proof established that one can analyze the effects of
differences in risk preferences by appropriately normalizing the utility func-
tions (equivalently, redefining utility functions by taking affine transforma-
tions). Next, apply these transformations to the threshold conditions. Recall
that
NR  A (u2   u3)
A [(1   A) (u2   u3) + C (u1   u2)] :
and
A  A [u2   u3]
C (A [u2   u3] + (1   C) [u1   u2]) :
Replacing u() with w() only increases the second term in the denominator of
each equation. Therefore, NR and A are higher under u() (more risk-averse)
than v().
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Proposition 8. Suppose that the near-revelation equilibrium exists as a
Bayes-Nash equilibrium and the ambiguity equilibrium exists as a cursed equi-
librium. Then, as  ! 1,
 The expected utility for players that prefer C and B/D is higher in the
Bayes-Nash equilibrium than in the cursed equilibrium.
 The expected utility for players that prefer A/E is higher in the Bayes-
Nash equilibrium than in the cursed equilibrium if and only if
u2 + u4 > u1
Proof.  The expected utility of an agent that prefers C if the near-revelation
equilibrium is played is
2Au3 + 
2
Cu1 + 2AB
"
u2 + (1   )
 
1
2
u2 +
1
2
u3
!#
+2AC
"
u1 + (1   )
 
1
2
u1 +
1
2
u3
!#
+ 2Bu2
+2BC
"
u1 +  (1   ) u2 + (1   )2
 
1
2
u1 +
1
2
u2
!#
The expected utility of an agent that prefers C if the ambiguity equilibrium
is played is
2Au3 + 
2
Cu1 + 2AB
"
1
2
u2 +
1
2
u3
#
+2AC
"
u1 + (1   )
 
1
2
u1 +
1
2
u3
!#
+ 2Bu2
+2BC
"
u1 + (1   )
 
1
2
u1 +
1
2
u2
!#
Her expected utility is higher in the near-revelation equilibrium than in
the ambiguity equilibrium if and only if
A
(1   ) C 
u1   u2
u2   u3
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This is the same condition that must hold for the near-revelation equilib-
rium to exist as a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. Therefore, if the parameters are
such that the Bayes-Nash equilibrium is the near-revelation equilibrium
and the cursed equilibrium is the ambiguity equilibrium, then cursedness
makes the median voter and candidates that prefer C worse off.
 The expected utility of an agent who prefers B/D if the near-revelation
equilibrium is played is
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The expected utility of an agent who prefers B/D if the ambiguity equilib-
rium is played is
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His expected utility is higher in the near-revelation equilibrium than in the
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ambiguity equilibrium if and only if
A
C (1   ) >
2u2   u1   u3
u1   u2 + u3   u4
As  ! 1, the left-hand side approaches infinity; therefore, this condition
must hold.
 The expected utility of an agent that prefers A/E if the near-revelation
equilibrium is played is
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The expected utility of an agent that prefers A/E if the ambiguity equilib-
rium is played is
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His expected utility is higher in the near-revelation equilibrium than in the
ambiguity equilibrium if and only if
A
C (1   ) [u2 + u4   u1] > 2u3   u2   u4
As  ! 1, the left-hand side goes to infinity if u2 + u4 > u1 and goes to
negative infinity otherwise. Thus, the condition holds if and only if u2 +
u4 > u1.
A.1.2 Commitment Game
Proposition 9. In the limit as  ! 1, the near-revelation equilibrium exists if
and only if the following conditions hold:
  NR  u2   u3(1   A) (u2   u3) + C (u1   u2) (A.5)
2u2   u1   u3
u1   u3 
A
A + B
(A.6)
1
2u1   u4
u3   u4 
A + B
A
(A.7)
u1   u2   u4
u2   u4 
A + B
A
(A.8)
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that this equilibrium does not exist. Then, a can-
didate who prefers B/D could profitably deviate by committing to C, a candi-
date who prefers B/D could profitably deviate by taking no position, a candi-
date who prefers A/E could profitably deviate by committing to B/D, and/or a
candidate who prefers A/E could profitably deviate by committing to C. Con-
sider each case in turn.
The median voter prefers a candidate commits to B/D to a candidate who
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takes no position; this is true if and only if equation A.5 (derived in the proof of
Proposition 2) holds. Given this, a candidate who prefers B/D has an equilib-
rium payoff of
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If he deviated by committing to C, his payoff would be:
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He would choose not to make this deviation if and only if
A (u1   u2) + B
" 
1   1
2
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#
+C (1   ) [u1   u2]  0
As  ! 1 :
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#
 0
, A
A + B
>
2u2   u1   u3
u1   u3
Next, consider the possibility that this candidate instead deviates to taking no
position. Since we have assumed that voters prefer a candidate who commits to
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B/D, by deviating, he would reduce his probability of winning without chang-
ing his payoff conditional on winning. Thus, he would not make this deviation.
The equilibrium payoff of a candidate who prefers A/E is:
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If he deviates by committing to C, his payoff would be:
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He would choose not to make this deviation if and only if
A [u1   2u3] + B (1   ) u1 + (1 + ) u4   2u3
+C (1   ) [u1   u3]  0
As  ! 1:
A [u1   2u2] + B [u4   u2]  0
, A [u1   u2   u4]   (1   C) [u2   u4]  0
, u1   u2   u4
u2   u4 
A + B
A
If instead he deviates by committing to B/D, his payoff would be:
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He would choose not to make this deviation if and only if
A [u1   2u2] + B u4 + (1   ) u1   (2   ) u2
+ (1   ) C [u1 + u3   2u2]  0
As  ! 1:
A [u1   2u2] + B [u4   u2]  0
, A [u1   u2   u4]   (1   C) [u2   u4]  0
, u1   u2   u4
u2   u4 
A + B
A
Proposition 10. In the limit as  ! 1, the ambiguity equilibrium exists if and
only if the following conditions hold:
  A  A (u2   u3)
C [A (u2   u3) + (1   C) (u1   u2)] (A.9)
u1 + u3   2u2
u3   u4 
A
A + B
(A.10)
u1 + u4   2u3
u4
 A
A + B
(A.11)
Proof. To establish this, we must consider the following possible deviations: a
candidate who prefers B/D deviates to B/D, a candidate who prefers B/D de-
viates to C, a candidate who prefers A/E deviates to B/D, and a candidate who
prefers A/E deviates to C. The median voter prefers a candidate who takes no
position to a candidate who commits to B/D; this is true if and only if equation
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A.9 (derived in the proof of Proposition 4) holds. Given this, no candidate could
profitably deviate by committing to B/D, since a candidate who did this could
only win the election by being randomly prevented from making this commit-
ment.
The equilibrium payoff of a candidate who prefers B/D is
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If he deviates and commits to C, his payoff would be
A
"
u2 + (1   )
 
1
2
u1 +
1
2
u4
!#
+B
"
u2 + (1   )
 
1
2
u1 +
1
2
u3
!#
+C
"
2u2 + 2 (1   ) u2 + (1   )2
 
1
2
u1 +
1
2
u2
!#
He would not choose to deviate if and only if
A [u1 + u4   2u2] + B [u1 + u3   2u2]
+C (1   ) [u1   u2]  0
As  ! 1:
A [u1 + u4   2u2] + B [u1 + u3   2u2]  0
, (1   C) [u1 + u3   2u2]   A [u3   u4]  0
, u1 + u3   2u2
u3   u4 
A
A + B
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The equilibrium payoff of a candidate who prefers A/E is
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If he deviates and commits to C, his payoff would be
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He would not choose to deviate if and only if
A [u1   2u3] + B [u1 + u4   2u3] + C (1   ) [u1   u3]  0
As  ! 1:
A [u1   2u3] + B [u1 + u4   2u3]  0
, (1   C) [u1 + u4   2u3]   Au4  0
, u1 + u4   2u3
u4
 A
A + B
Proposition 11. In the limit as  ! 1:
1. The near-centrist equilibrium exists if and only if the following conditions
hold:
2u2   u1   u4  0 (A.12)
u1   2u3  0 (A.13)
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  NR  u2   u3(1   A) (u2   u3) + C (u1   u2) (A.14)
2. The centrist equilibrium exists if and only if
u2  Au3 + Bu2 + Cu1 (A.15)
3. The centrist-B equilibrium exists if and only if
u2  Au3 + Bu2 + Cu1 (A.16)
4. The commitment I equilibrium exists if and only if the following condi-
tions hold:
2u2   u1   u3
u1   u3 
A
A + B
(A.17)
1
2
u2 +
1
2
u4   u3  0 (A.18)
u2  Au3 + Bu2 + Cu1 (A.19)
Proof. 1. Near-centrist equilibrium: The median voter prefers a candidate
who takes no position to one who commits to B/D. This implies that we
need not consider deviations to B/D, since the expected payoff from tak-
ing no position is higher. The equilibrium payoff for a candidate who
prefers B/D is
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If he deviated to taking no position, his payoff would be
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He would not choose to deviate if and only if
A [2u2   u1   u4] + B (1   ) [2u2   u1   u3]
+C (1   ) [u2   u1]  0
As  ! 1:
2u2   u1   u4  0
The equilibrium payoff for a candidate who prefers A/E is
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If he deviated to committing to C, his payoff would be
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He would not choose to deviate if and only if
A [u1   2u3] + B (1   ) [u1 + u4   2u3]
+C (1   ) [u1   u3]  0
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As  ! 1:
u1   2u3  0
We also require that the median voter prefers a candidate who takes
no position to one who commits to B/D, which holds if and only if
˜Ajnu3 + ˜Bjnu2 + ˜Cjnu1 > u2, where
˜Ajn =
A ( (C (1   ) + B (1   ) + A) + (1   ))
C (1   ) + B (1   ) + A
˜Bjn =
B ( (C (1   ) + B (1   ) + A) + (1   ) (1   ))
C (1   ) + B (1   ) + A
˜Cjn =
C ( (C (1   ) + B (1   ) + A) + (1   ) (1   ))
C (1   ) + B (1   ) + A
This is true if and only if equation A.14 holds.
2. Centrist equilibrium: To show that this equilibrium exists, we must show
that candidates would not make the following deviations: a candidate
who prefers B/D would not deviate to committing to B/D or taking no
position, and a candidate who prefers A/E would not deviate to commit-
ting to B/D or taking no position. The median voter prefers a candidate
who takes no position to one that commits to B/D. Since candidates only
take no position if they are prevented from committing, beliefs about a
candidate who take no position are simply the prior beliefs and do not
depend on . This holds if
u2  Au3 + Bu2 + Cu1
The equilibrium payoff of a candidate that prefers B/D is
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If he deviates to taking no position, his payoff is
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He would not choose to deviate if and only if
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) [2u2   u1   u3 + A (u3   u4)   C (u2   u3)]  0
In the limit as  ! 1, his incentive to deviate disappears. The equilibrium
payoff of a candidate that prefers A/E is
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If he deviated to taking no position, his payoff would be
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He would not choose to deviate if and only if
(1   )
"
u3   12u1  
1
2
Bu4   12Cu3
#
 0
, (1   ) [2u3   u1   u4 + Au4   C (u3   u4)]  0
In the limit as  ! 1, his incentive to deviate disappears. No candidate
would deviate to committing to B/D, because the payoff from doing so
would be less than that from deviating to taking no position.
3. Centrist-B equilibrium: The median voter prefers a candidate that com-
mits to B/D to a candidate that takes no position. Since no candidate com-
mits to B/D in equilibrium, this alternative assumption does not affect
equilibrium payoffs, compared to those in the centrist equilibrium.
If a candidate who prefers B/D deviated to committing to B/D, his ex-
pected payoff would be
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He would not choose to deviate if and only if
 (1   ) [u2   u1]  0
This will be violated if  < 1. However, in the limit as  ! 1, the incentive
to deviate still disappears. If a candidate that prefers A/E deviated to
committing to B/D, his expected payoff would be
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He would not deviate if and only if
(1   ) [u3   u2]  0
This will also be violated if  < 1. However, in the limit as  ! 1, the
incentive to deviate still disappears. If instead a candidate that prefers
A/E deviates to taking no position, his expected payoff would be
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He would not deviate if and only if
(1   )
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u4A   12C (u3   u4)
#
 0
In the limit as  ! 1, the incentive to deviate disappears.
Therefore, in the limit as  ! 1, there exists an equilibrium in which all
candidates commit to C, regardless of the median voter’s risk preferences
(either the centrist or centrist-B equilibrium). However, if  < 1, the me-
dian voter must prefer a random draw to a candidate that commits to B/D
(centrist equilibrium).
4. Commitment I equilibrium: Now, suppose that voters prefer a candidate
who commits to B/D to one who takes no position. In this case, a candi-
date who prefers B/D would not deviate to taking no position, since this
would only lose him votes. The equilibrium payoff for a candidate who
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prefers B/D is
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 (1   )

u2 +  (1   ) u1 + (1   )2
 
1
2
u1 +
1
2
u2
!#
If he deviated and committed to C, his payoff would be
A
"
2u2 +  (1   ) u2 +  (1   ) u2 + (1   )2
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2
u1 +
1
2
u4
!#
+B
"
2u2 +  (1   ) u2 +  (1   ) u3 + (1   )2
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1
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u3
!#
+C
"
2u2 +  (1   ) u2 +  (1   ) u2 + (1   )2
 
1
2
u1 +
1
2
u2
!#
He would not deviate if and only if
A [u1   u2] + B
" 
1   1
2

!
u1 +
1
2
u3   u2
#
+C (1   ) (u1   u2)  0
As  ! 1:
A [u1   u2] + B
"
1
2
u1 +
1
2
u3   u2
#
 0
, 1
2
A [u1   u3] + (1   C)
"
1
2
u1 +
1
2
u3   u2
#
 0
, 2u2   u1   u3
u1   u3 
A
A + B
The equilibrium payoff for a candidate who prefers A/E is
A
" 
1
2
2 +  (1   )
!
(u2 + u4) + (1   )2
 
1
2
u1 +
1
2
u5
!#
176
+B
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u1 +
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If he deviated to committing to C, his payoff would be
A
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2u3 +  (1   ) u3 +  (1   ) u4 + (1   )2
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2u3 +  (1   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!#
+C
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2u3 +  (1   ) u3 + 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)2
 
1
2
u1 +
1
2
u3
!#
He would not deviate if and only if
(A + B)
" 
1   1
2

!
u2 +
1
2
u4   u3
#
+ C

(1   ) (u2   u3)  0
As  ! 1:
1
2
u2 +
1
2
u4   u3  0
If he deviated to taking no position, his payoff would be
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"
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)
 
1
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u1 +
1
2
u5
!#
+B
"
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)
 
1
2
u1 +
1
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u4
!#
+C
"
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)
 
1
2
u1 +
1
2
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!#
He would not deviate if and only if
A
" 
1   1
2

!
u2   12u4  
1
2
(1   ) u1
#
+B
" 
1   1
2

!
u2   12 (1   ) u1  
1
2
u4
#
+C (1   )
"
u2   12u1  
1
2
u3
#
 0
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As  ! 1:
u2  u4
This holds by definition of the utility function.
Definition 6. Commitment II equilibrium: Candidates who prefer B/D or C com-
mit to C and candidates who prefer A/E commit to B/D. The median voter votes for a
candidate who commits to B/D over a candidate who takes no position.
Proposition 13. In the limit as  ! 1, the commitment II equilibrium exists if and
only if the following conditions hold:
u2   12u1  
1
2
u3  0 (A.20)
1
2
u2 +
1
2
u4   u3  0 (A.21)
u2 > Au3 + Bu2 + Cu1 (A.22)
Proof. The median voter prefers a candidate who commits to B/D to one who
takes no position; this is true if and only if equation A.22 holds. The equilibrium
payoff for a candidate who prefers B/D is
A
"
2u2 +  (1   ) u2 +  (1   ) u3 + (1   )2
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!#
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2u2 +  (1   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) u2 + (1   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1
2
u3
!#
+C
"
2u2 +  (1   ) u2 +  (1   ) u2 + (1   )2
 
1
2
u1 +
1
2
u2
!#
If he deviated and committed to B/D, his payoff would be
A
" 
1
2
2 +  (1   )
!
(u1 + u3) + (1   )2
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1
2
u4
!#
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2u2 + 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) u1 +  (1   ) u2 + (1   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u1 +
1
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u3
!#
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+C
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2u2 +  (1   ) u1 +  (1   ) u2 + (1   )2
 
1
2
u1 +
1
2
u2
!#
He would not choose to deviate if and only if
A
"
u2  
 
1   1
2

!
u1   12u3
#
+ (B + C) (1   ) [u2   u1]  0
As  ! 1:
u2   12u1  
1
2
u3  0
By definition, this implies that candidates are risk-loving between distances 0
and 2. The equilibrium payoff for a candidate who prefers A/E is
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(u2 + u4) + (1   )2
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2u3 + 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) u2 + 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2u3 + 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)2
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1
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!#
If he deviated and committed to C, his payoff would be
A
"
2u3 +  (1   ) u3 +  (1   ) u4 + (1   )2
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1
2
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!#
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2u3 +  (1   ) u3 +  (1   ) u3 + (1   )2
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2
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!#
+C
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2u3 +  (1   ) u3 + 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)2
 
1
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u1 +
1
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He would not deviate if and only if
A
" 
1   1
2

!
u2 +
1
2
u4   u3
#
+ (B + C) (1   ) [u2   u3]  0
As  ! 1:
1
2
u2 +
1
2
u4   u3  0
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This implies that hemust be risk-averse between distances of 1 and 3. Therefore,
if one assumes that the candidates must be have consistent risk preferences over
policies across the entire policy space, then this equilibrium does not exist. If he
deviated and took no position, his payoff would be
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He would not deviate if and only if
A
" 
1   1
2

!
u2   12u4  
1
2
(1   ) u1
#
+B (1   )
"
u2   12u1  
1
2
u4
#
+C (1   )
"
u2   12u1  
1
2
u3
#
 0
As  ! 1:
u2  u4
This must hold by the defintion of the utility function.
Definition 7. Reverse commitment equilibrium: Candidates who prefer C commit
to C, candidates who prefer B/D commit to B/D, and candidates who prefer A/E commit
to C. The median voter votes for a candidate who commits to B/D over a candidate who
takes no position.
Proposition 14. In the limit as  ! 1, the reverse commitment equilibrium exists if
and only if the following conditions hold:
u3   12u2  
1
2
u4  0 (A.23)
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1
2
u1 +
1
2
u3   u2  0 (A.24)
u2  Au3 + Bu2 + Cu1 (A.25)
Proof. The median voter prefers a candidate who commits to B/D over a candi-
date who takes no position; this is true if and only if equation A.25 holds. The
equilibrium payoff of a candidate who prefers A/E is
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2u3 + 2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If he deviates to committing to B/D, his payoff is
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He would not deviate if and only if
(1   ) (u3   u2) + B
"
u3   12u2  
1
2
u4
#
 0
As  ! 1:
u3   12u2  
1
2
u4  0
This implies that the candidate must be risk-loving over policies in this range.
If instead he deviates to taking no position, his payoff is
A
"
u3 + (1   )
 
1
2
u1 +
1
2
u5
!#
181
+B
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He would not deviate if and only if
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#
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2
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) C [u3   u1]  0
As  ! 1:
u3  u4
This holds by definition of the utility function. The equilibrium payoff of a
candidate who prefers B/D is
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If he deviates to committing to C, his payoff is
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He would not deviate if and only if
(1   ) [u1   u2] + B
"
1
2
u1 +
1
2
u3   u2
#
 0
As  ! 1:
1
2
u1 +
1
2
u3   u2  0
This implies that the candidate must be risk-averse over policies in this range.
Therefore, the reverse commitment equilibrium does not exist if candidates
have consistent risk preferences over policies.
Proposition 12. Suppose that candidates are risk-averse over policies. Then,
in the limit as  ! 1:
1. The centrist equilibrium is the unique pure-strategies equilibrium if and
only if
u2  Au3 + Bu2 + Cu1
2. The centrist-B equilibrium is the unique pure-strategies equilibrium if and
only if
u2  Au3 + Bu2 + Cu1
Proof. First, one must show that equilibria other than those discussed above do
not exist. Suppose that an equilibrium exists in which candidates who prefer
C commit to C, those who prefer B/D commit to B/D, those who prefer A/E
take no position, and voters prefer a candidate who takes no position over one
who commits to B/D. Suppose a candidate who prefers B/D deviates to taking
no position. The policy implemented if elected doesn’t change. His probability
of winning against a candidate who prefers C is higher because he would now
win if the centrist couldn’t commit. Against a candidate who prefers B/D, he
now wins when the other candidate is able to commit, and they split otherwise.
Against a candidate who prefers A/E, he now splits, instead of losing when
he was able to commit. Thus, the policy when he wins doesn’t change and
183
his probability of winning increases; this is a profitable deviation. Thus, this
equilibrium does not exist.
Suppose instead that an equilibrium exists in which candidates who prefer
C commit to C, all other types take no position, and the median voter prefers a
candidate who commits to B/D to one who takes no position. A candidate who
prefers B/D would deviate to committing to B/D. By doing so, he would in-
crease his probability of winning while implementing his most preferred policy
if he wins. Therefore, this equilibrium does not exist.
Suppose that an equilibrium exists in which candidates who prefer C and
B/D commit to C, candidates who prefer A/E take no position, and the median
voter prefers a candidate who commits to B/D to one who takes no position. If
a candidate who prefers B/D deviates to B/D, his expected payoff is
A
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u1 + (1   )
 
1
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1
2
u4
!#
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2u2 +  (1   ) u1 + 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) u2 + (1   )2
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2
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1
2
u3
!#
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2u2 + 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) u1 +  (1   ) u2 + (1   )2
 
1
2
u1 +
1
2
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!#
He would not choose to deviate if and only if

A + B (1   ) + C (1   ) [u2   u1] > 0
This does not hold, so this equilibrium cannot exist.
Suppose that there exists an equilibrium in which candidates who prefer C
commit to C, all other candidates commit to B/D, and themedian voter prefers a
candidate who takes no position to onewho commits to B/D. If a candidate who
preferred A/E deviated to taking no position, he would increase his winning
probability, and he would be able to implement his preferred policy. Thus, he
would deviate and this could not be an equilibrium.
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Suppose that there exists an equilibrium in which candidates who prefer
B/D or C commit to C, candidates who prefer A/E commit to B/D, and the
median voter prefers a candidate who takes no position to one who commits to
B/D. This implies that candidates who prefer A/E only win if they are unable to
commit. They would improve their winning chances and implement the same
policy if elected by simply taking no position. Thus, these candidates would
deviate to taking no position and this cannot be an equilibrium.
Suppose that candidates who prefer C and A/E commit to C, candidates
who prefer B/D commit to B/D, and the median voter prefers a candidate who
takes no position to one who commits to B/D. A candidate who prefers B/D
can deviate to taking no position. His payoff if his opponent commits to C
would remain the same, but he would be able to have a chance of winning if his
opponent is unable to commit or he faces an opponent who commits to B/D.
Thus, this equilibrium does not exist.
Suppose that candidates are risk-averse. Equation A.8 requires that for
the near-revelation equilibrium, u1 u2 u4u2 u4  A+BA . Risk aversion implies that
u1   u2 < u2   u3, which further implies that u1 u2 u4u2 u4 < u2 u4 u3u2 u4 = 1   u3u2 u4 . Since
the right-hand side of equation A.8 is larger than 1, it cannot hold if the candi-
dates are risk-averse. Equation A.10 requires u1+u3 2u2u3 u4  AA+B for the ambiguity
equilibrium. u1+u3 2u2u3 u4 =
u1 u2 (u2 u3)
u3 u4 < 0. Therefore, the ambiguity equilibrium
does not exist. Equation A.13 requires that for the near-centrist equilibrium,
u1   2u3  0. Risk aversion implies that u3 > 12u1 + 12u5 = u3 > 12u1 , 2u3 > u1. The
near-centrist equilibrium also cannot exist. The commitment I equilibrium does
not exist, since equation A.18 implies that by definition, the candidate must be
risk-loving. As was established above, the commitment II and reverse commit-
ment equilibria require that candidates be risk-loving over part of the policy
space. Since these are all of the remaining possible equilibria in pure strategies,
the centrist or centrist-B equilibrium is unique in the limit as  ! 1.
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APPENDIX B
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2
B.1 Experiment Materials
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Instructions: Subject-Candidates, No Beliefs Treatment 
 
 In the main part of this experiment, you will play 3 sets of 5 rounds of an election game. 
Your payment depends on your decisions, so it is important that you understand the instructions 
and think carefully before you make your choices. If you have any questions after reading the 
instructions or during the experiment, please raise your hand. 
 In each round, the computer will randomly select two participants to be candidates, and 
the rest of the participants will be voters. The purpose of the election in each round is to elect a 
candidate who will select one of five policies: A, B, C, D, or E.  
 ,QHDFKURXQGHDFKSOD\HUZLOOEHWROGKLVKHU³SUHIHUUHGSROLF\´All voters prefer policy 
C. If you are chosen to be a candidate, you will be told your preferred policy, but only you will 
see that information. Neither the other candidate nor the voters will see this; however, everyone 
will be told how likely it is that the computer draws each possible preferred policy. These 
probabilities will vary across sets of URXQGVEXW&DQGLGDWH¶VSUHIHUUHGSROLF\LVDOZD\VHLWKHU
$%RU&DQG&DQGLGDWH¶VSUHIHUUHGSROLF\LVHLWKHU&'RU( 
 
 Each player earns points depending on how close the policy implemented by the elected 
candidate is to his/her preferred policy. The payoff table (separate page) shows the points that a 
player would earn in a round, depending on his/her preferred policy and the policy chosen by the 
winning candidate. Please study this table carefully and keep it handy in case you need to refer 
back to it. One round will be selected randomly at the end of the experiment, and you will be 
paid in dollars the number of points that you earned in that round. All rounds are equally likely 
to be chosen, so you should play each round as if it determines your payment. 
 If you are a candidate, you are paid only based on the policy implemented; there is no 
bonus for winning the election. However, since you can only implement the policy you want and 
prevent the other candidate from choosing a different policy by winning the election, you also 
A B C D E 
All voters 
Candidate 1 Candidate 2 
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Instructions: Subject-Candidates, No Beliefs Treatment 
 
have an incentive to try to win the election. As a candidate, you must choose whether you would 
like to try to commit to a policy or take no position. 
 Next, the computer randomly determines whether each candidate who would like to 
commit to a policy is able to. In two sets of rounds, there is a 90% chance that a candidate will 
be able to successfully commit; in the other set, there is a 75% chance that each candidate can 
commit. You will be told what the chance is for each round.  
 If a candidate successfully commits to a policy, that policy is implemented if the 
candidate wins the election. If a candidate does not commit (either because he/she chose not to 
commit or because the computer determined that he/she was not able to commit), his/her 
preferred policy is implemented if he/she wins the election. 
 If you are a voter, you will be asked how you wish to vote, depending on which platforms 
DUHFKRVHQE\WKHFDQGLGDWHV1RWHWKDWZKHQ\RXDUHDVNHGDERXWDFDQGLGDWHZKRWRRN³QR
SRVLWLRQ´WKLVFRXOGEHHLWKHU EHFDXVHWKHFDQGLGDWHFKRVH³QRSRVLWLRQ´RUEHFDXVHWKHFRPSXWHU
randomly determined that he/she could not commit when he/she wanted to. If you like both 
candidates equally, you may choose to abstain, which means that you do not cast a vote for either 
candidate. 
 When everyone has voted, the votes will be counted and the candidate with the most 
votes wins the election. If both candidates receive the same number of votes, a winner is chosen 
UDQGRPO\7KHUHVXOWVVFUHHQZLOOVKRZHDFKFDQGLGDWH¶VSODWIRUPthe number of votes for each 
candidate, the winner, the policy implemented, and the number of points you earned in that 
round. 
 To understand how this works, consider the following example. Suppose that Candidate 1 
commits to policy B and Candidate 2 takes no position. If Candidate 1 wins, the voters each 
receive 4 points. If Candidate 2 is elected, the number of points earned is uncertain: voters earn 
10 points if Candidate 2 prefers C, 4 points if he/she prefers B or D, and 2 points if he/she prefers 
A or E.  
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Instructions: Subject-Candidates, No Beliefs Treatment 
 
The figure below summarizes what will happen in each round: 
 
 
 
 You will now play 5 practice rounds, to help you understand how the experiment works. 
Your payment will not depend on your play in these rounds. You will have 3 minutes to make a 
decision on each screen. The amount of time remaining (in seconds) will be displayed in the 
upper right corner of your screen. When you have made your decision, click the button in the 
lower right corner of the screen to submit your choice and continue. 
 Note that there is a box at the top of the screen that tells you how likely it is that a 
candidate has each preferred policy and how likely it is that the computer will prevent a 
candidate from committing to a policy when he/she wants to. In the actual experiment, this 
information will change after each set of 5 rounds, so it is very important that you read this box 
before making your decisions. 
 On decision screens, a calculator icon will appear at the bottom of the screen. If you 
would like to use the calculator, just click on the icon. Note that the calculator does not use the 
order of operations automatically, so you must use parentheses to make sure that it does 
calculations that require more than one operation correctly. 
 
If the winning candidate committed, the policy he/she committed to is implemented. 
If the winning candidate took no position (including if forced to by the computer), his/her 
preferred policy is implemented.  
Voters see campaign platforms and vote. If the computer did not let a candidate commit, 
his/her platform will be "no position," no matter what strategy he/she chose.  
The computer randomly determines whether each candidate is able to commit to a policy. 
Candidates learn their preferred policies and choose their strategies. 
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Instructions: Subject-Candidates, No Beliefs Treatment 
 
 In the practice rounds, you were told which campaign platforms were taken by each 
candidate before you cast your votes. In the actual experiment, if you are a voter, you will be 
asked about which candidate you would vote for in all possible situations. Since each candidate 
has four possible campaign platforms, there are 16 possible combinations. For example, you will 
be asked who you would vote for if Candidate 1 commits to A and Candidate 2 commits to E; if 
Candidate 1 commits to A and Candidate 2 commits to D; and so on. The computer will then use 
the choices that correspond to the strategies that are actually chosen by the candidates in that 
round when it counts the votes. If you do not make all 16 voting decisions, you will earn zero 
points for the round and your vote will not be counted. 
 If one candidate does not make a choice before time is up, he/she forfeits the election and 
his/her opponent wins. If both candidates do not make a choice before time is up, the computer 
will randomly choose a winner. If you do not make a decision as a candidate, you will earn zero 
points for the round. 
 The election rounds will now begin. You will receive additional instructions after the 
election game. 
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Instructions: Subject-Candidates, With Beliefs Treatment 
 
 In the main part of this experiment, you will play 3 sets of 5 rounds of an election game. 
Your payment depends on your decisions, so it is important that you understand the instructions 
and think carefully before you make your choices. If you have any questions after reading the 
instructions or during the experiment, please raise your hand. 
 In each round, the computer will randomly select two participants to be candidates, and 
the rest of the participants will be voters. The purpose of the election in each round is to elect a 
candidate who will select one of five policies: A, B, C, D, or E.  
 ,QHDFKURXQGHDFKSOD\HUZLOOEHWROGKLVKHU³SUHIHUUHGSROLF\´All voters prefer policy 
C. If you are chosen to be a candidate, you will be told your preferred policy, but only you will 
see that information. Neither the other candidate nor the voters will see this; however, everyone 
will be told how likely it is that the computer draws each possible preferred policy. These 
probabilities will vary across sets of URXQGVEXW&DQGLGDWH¶VSUHIHUUHGSROLF\LVDOZD\VHLWKHU
$%RU&DQG&DQGLGDWH¶VSUHIHUUHGSROLF\LVHLWKHU&'RU( 
 
 Each player earns points depending on how close the policy implemented by the elected 
candidate is to his/her preferred policy. The payoff table (separate page) shows the points that a 
player would earn in a round, depending on his/her preferred policy and the policy chosen by the 
winning candidate. Please study this table carefully and keep it handy in case you need to refer 
back to it. One round will be selected randomly at the end of the experiment, and you will be 
paid in dollars the number of points that you earned in that round. All rounds are equally likely 
to be chosen, so you should play each round as if it determines your payment. 
 If you are a candidate, you are paid only based on the policy implemented; there is no 
bonus for winning the election. However, since you can only implement the policy you want and 
prevent the other candidate from choosing a different policy by winning the election, you also 
A B C D E 
All voters 
Candidate 1 Candidate 2 
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have an incentive to try to win the election. As a candidate, you must choose whether you would 
like to try to commit to a policy or take no position. 
 Next, the computer randomly determines whether each candidate who would like to 
commit to a policy is able to. In two sets of rounds, there is a 90% chance that a candidate will 
be able to successfully commit; in the other set, there is a 75% chance that each candidate can 
commit. You will be told what the chance is for each round.  
 If a candidate successfully commits to a policy, that policy is implemented if the 
candidate wins the election. If a candidate does not commit (either because he/she chose not to 
commit or because the computer determined that he/she was not able to commit), his/her 
preferred policy is implemented if he/she wins the election. 
 If you are a voter, you will be asked how you wish to vote, depending on which platforms 
DUHFKRVHQE\WKHFDQGLGDWHV1RWHWKDWZKHQ\RXDUHDVNHGDERXWDFDQGLGDWHZKRWRRN³QR
SRVLWLRQ´WKLVFRXOGEHHLWKHU EHFDXVHWKHFDQGLGDWHFKRVH³QRSRVLWLRQ´RUEHFDXVHWKHFRPSXWHU
randomly determined that he/she could not commit when he/she wanted to. If you like both 
candidates equally, you may choose to abstain, which means that you do not cast a vote for either 
candidate. 
 When everyone has voted, the votes will be counted and the candidate with the most 
votes wins the election. If both candidates receive the same number of votes, a winner is chosen 
UDQGRPO\7KHUHVXOWVVFUHHQZLOOVKRZHDFKFDQGLGDWH¶VSODWIRUPthe number of votes for each 
candidate, the winner, the policy implemented, and the number of points you earned in that 
round. 
 To understand how this works, consider the following example. Suppose that Candidate 1 
commits to policy B and Candidate 2 takes no position. If Candidate 1 wins, the voters each 
receive 4 points. If Candidate 2 is elected, the number of points earned is uncertain: voters earn 
10 points if Candidate 2 prefers C, 4 points if he/she prefers B or D, and 2 points if he/she prefers 
A or E.  
 
  
192
Instructions: Subject-Candidates, With Beliefs Treatment 
 
The figure below summarizes what will happen in each round: 
 
 
 
 You will now play 5 practice rounds, to help you understand how the experiment works. 
Your payment will not depend on your play in these rounds. You will have 3 minutes to make a 
decision on each screen. The amount of time remaining (in seconds) will be displayed in the 
upper right corner of your screen. When you have made your decision, click the button in the 
lower right corner of the screen to submit your choice and continue. 
 Note that there is a box at the top of the screen that tells you how likely it is that a 
candidate has each preferred policy and how likely it is that the computer will prevent a 
candidate from committing to a policy when he/she wants to. In the actual experiment, this 
information will change after each set of 5 rounds, so it is very important that you read this box 
before making your decisions. 
 On decision screens, a calculator icon will appear at the bottom of the screen. If you 
would like to use the calculator, just click on the icon. Note that the calculator does not use the 
order of operations automatically, so you must use parentheses to make sure that it does 
calculations that require more than one operation correctly. 
 
If the winning candidate committed, the policy he/she committed to is implemented. 
If the winning candidate took no position (including if forced to by the computer), his/her 
preferred policy is implemented.  
Voters see campaign platforms and vote. If the computer did not let a candidate commit, 
his/her platform will be "no position," no matter what strategy he/she chose.  
The computer randomly determines whether each candidate is able to commit to a policy. 
Candidates learn their preferred policies and choose their strategies. 
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 In the practice rounds, you were told which campaign platforms were taken by each 
candidate before you cast your votes. In the actual experiment, if you are a voter, you will be 
asked about which candidate you would vote for in all possible situations. Since each candidate 
has four possible campaign platforms, there are 16 possible combinations. For example, you will 
be asked who you would vote for if Candidate 1 commits to A and Candidate 2 commits to E; if 
Candidate 1 commits to A and Candidate 2 commits to D; and so on. The computer will then use 
the choices that correspond to the strategies that are actually chosen by the candidates in that 
round when it counts the votes. If you do not make all 16 voting decisions, you will earn zero 
points for the round and your vote will not be counted. 
 If one candidate does not make a choice before time is up, he/she forfeits the election and 
his/her opponent wins. If both candidates do not make a choice before time is up, the computer 
will randomly choose a winner. If you do not make a decision as a candidate, you will earn zero 
points for the round. 
 Finally, before each round in which you are a voter, you will be asked two sets of belief 
questions. First, you will be asked which strategy you think each candidate will choose, 
depending on his/her preferred policy. Recall that the strategy is what the candidate chooses to 
do. If a candidate chooses to commit to C and the computer randomly does not allow him/her to, 
his/her strategy was still to commit to C. Using the radio buttons at the top of the screen, you 
may choose to answer these questions in one of two ways. You may answer the questions by 
moving 4 sliders, one for each possible campaign strategy. The more likely you think it is that 
the candidate will choose that strategy, given his/her preferred policy, the further to the right you 
should place the slider. Based on where you place the sliders relative to each other, the computer 
will calculate probabilities, which are updated as you move the sliders. You may also choose to 
enter probabilities directly. If you choose this option, you must enter probabilities that add up to 
100.  
 Next, you will be asked about what you think of candidates who do not take a position. 
You will answer the questions by moving 3 sliders (or entering 3 probabilities), one for each 
possible preferred policy. You will have 3 minutes to complete each screen, and you must click 
the button in order to record your answers. 
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 In each round, you will be entered into up to 4 lotteries. The first two correspond to the 
first set of belief questions. Your chance of winning the first lottery depends on your answers 
DERXW&DQGLGDWH¶VVWUDWHJ\JLYHQWKHSUHIHUUHGSROLF\&DQGLGDWHKDGDQG\RXUFKDQFHRI
winning the second lottery depends on your answers about &DQGLGDWH¶VVWUDWHJ\JLYHQWKH
preferred policy Candidate 2 had. The second two correspond to the second set of belief 
questions. Your chance of winning the third lottery depends on your answers about Candidate 
¶VSUHIHUUHGSROLF\JLYHQWKDWKHVKHWRok no position, and your chance of winning the fourth 
ORWWHU\GHSHQGVRQ\RXUDQVZHUVDERXW&DQGLGDWH¶VSUHIHUUHGSROLF\JLYHQWKDWKHVKHWRRNQR
SRVLWLRQ<RXZLOOEHHQWHUHGLQWRWKHWKLUGORWWHU\RQO\LI&DQGLGDWH¶VSODWIRUPZDV³QR
SRVLWLRQ´DQG\RXZLOOEHHQWHUHGLQWRWKHIRXUWKORWWHU\RQO\LI&DQGLGDWH¶VSODWIRUPZDV³QR
SRVLWLRQ´The more accurate your beliefs are, the higher your chance of winning the lottery will 
be. Your payment for this task will be the percentage of entered lotteries that you won multiplied 
by $3.  
 The equations at the end of these instructions tell you exactly how your probability of 
winning is calculated for each lottery, though all you need to know is that the best way to earn as 
much as possible is to truthfully report what you think. 
 Before you begin the election game, there will be a screen that gives you an opportunity 
to practice answering questions about probabilities. The election game will begin after everyone 
has completed this practice screen. You will receive additional instructions after the election 
game. 
 
)RUWKHTXHVWLRQVDERXW&DQGLGDWH¶VVWUDWHJ\LIKLVKHUSUHIHUUHGSROLF\LV$OHWݏ௞ be equal to 
1 if Candidate 1 chooses campaign strategy k and 0 otherwise. Let ݌௞  be the answer you gave for 
the probability that Candidate 1 chose campaign strategy k given that his/her preferred policy 
was A. Your probability of winning the lottery is:  ? െ  ? ?ሺݏ஺ െ ݌஺ሻଶ െ  ? ?ሺݏ஻ െ ݌஻ሻଶ െ  ? ?ሺݏ஼ െ ݌஼ሻଶ െ  ? ?൫ݏ௡௢௣௢௦௜௧௜௢௡ െ ݌௡௢௣௢௦௜௧௜௢௡൯ଶ 
 
7KHIRUPXODVIRUEHOLHIVDERXW&DQGLGDWH¶VVWUDWHJ\JLYHQRWKHUSUHIHUUHGSROLFLHVDQGDERXW
&DQGLGDWH¶VVWUDWHJLHVDUHFRQVWUXFWHGLQWKHVDPHZD\ 
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For the second set of questions, let  ߨ௝ EHHTXDOWRLI&DQGLGDWH¶VSUHIHUUHGSROLF\is j and 0 
otherwise. Let ݎ௝ EHWKHDQVZHU\RXJDYHIRUWKHSUREDELOLW\WKDW&DQGLGDWH¶VSUHIHUUHGSROLF\LV
j. Your probability of winning the lottery is:  ? െ  ? ?ሺߨ஺ െ ݎ஺ሻଶ െ  ? ?ሺߨ஻ െ ݎ஻ሻଶ െ  ? ?ሺߨ஼ െ ݎ஼ሻଶ 
 
The formula for beliefs about Candidate 2 is constructed in the same way. 
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 In the main part of this experiment, you will play 3 sets of 5 rounds of an election game. 
Your payment depends on your decisions, so it is important that you understand the instructions 
and think carefully before you make your choices. If you have any questions after reading the 
instructions or during the experiment, please raise your hand. 
 In each round, the computer will play the roles of two candidates, and each participant 
will be a voter. The purpose of the election in each round is to elect a candidate who will select 
one of five policies: A, B, C, D, or E.  
 All voters prefer policy C. Voters do not know the preferred policy of each candidate, but 
they will be told how likely it is that the computer draws each possible preferred policy. These 
probabilities will vary across sets of rounds, but &DQGLGDWH¶VSUHIHUUHGSROLF\LVDOZD\VHLWKHU
$%RU&DQG&DQGLGDWH¶VSUHIHUUHGSROLF\LVHLWKHU&'RU( 
 
 Each player earns points depending on how close the policy implemented by the elected 
candidate is to his/her preferred policy. The payoff table (separate page) shows the points that a 
player would earn in a round, depending on his/her preferred policy and the policy chosen by the 
winning candidate. Please study this table carefully and keep it handy in case you need to refer 
back to it. One round will be selected randomly at the end of the experiment, and you will be 
paid in dollars the number of points that you earned in that round. All rounds are equally likely 
to be chosen, so you should play each round as if it determines your payment. 
 Each candidate is programmed to choose the campaign strategies that would maximize its 
expected payoff, assuming everyone else is also maximizing their own expected payoffs. When 
thinking about what the candidates will do, you should understand that each candidate behaves 
as if it is paid only based on the policy implemented; there is no bonus for winning the election. 
However, since a candidate can only implement the policy it wants and prevent the other 
candidate from choosing a different policy by winning the election, it also has an incentive to try 
A B C D E 
All voters 
Candidate 1 Candidate 2 
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to win the election. Each candidate must choose whether it would like to try to commit to a 
policy or take no position. 
 Next, the computer randomly determines whether each candidate who would like to 
commit to a policy is able to. In two sets of rounds, there is a 90% chance that a candidate will 
be able to successfully commit; in the other set, there is a 75% chance that each candidate can 
commit. You will be told what the chance is for each round.  
 If a candidate successfully commits to a policy, that policy is implemented if the 
candidate wins the election. If a candidate does not commit (either because he/she chose not to 
commit or because the computer determined that he/she was not able to commit), his/her 
preferred policy is implemented if he/she wins the election. 
 You will be asked how you wish to vote, depending on which platforms are chosen by 
WKHFDQGLGDWHV1RWHWKDWZKHQ\RXDUHDVNHGDERXWDFDQGLGDWHZKRWRRN³QRSRVLWLRQ´WKLV
could be either because the candidate FKRVH³QRSRVLWLRQ´RUEHFDXVHWKHFRPSXWHUUDQGRPO\
determined that he/she could not commit when he/she wanted to. If you like both candidates 
equally, you may choose to abstain, which means that you do not cast a vote for either candidate.  
 When everyone has voted, the votes will be counted and the candidate with the most 
votes wins the election. If both candidates receive the same number of votes, a winner is chosen 
randomly. The results screen will show HDFKFDQGLGDWH¶VSODWIRUPWKHQXPEHURIYRWHVIRr each 
candidate, the winner, the policy implemented, and the number of points you earned in that 
round.  
 To understand how this works, consider the following example. Suppose that Candidate 1 
commits to policy B and Candidate 2 takes no position. If Candidate 1 wins, the voters each 
receive 4 points. If Candidate 2 is elected, the number of points earned is uncertain: voters earn 
10 points if Candidate 2 prefers C, 4 points if he/she prefers B or D, and 2 points if he/she prefers 
A or E.  
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The figure below summarizes what will happen in each round: 
 
 
 
 You will now play 5 practice rounds, to help you understand how the experiment works. 
Your payment will not depend on your play in these rounds. You will have 3 minutes to make a 
decision on each screen. The amount of time remaining (in seconds) will be displayed in the 
upper right corner of your screen. When you have made your decision, click the button in the 
lower right corner of the screen to submit your choice and continue. 
 Note that there is a box at the top of the screen that tells you how likely it is that a 
candidate has each preferred policy and how likely it is that the computer will prevent a 
candidate from committing to a policy when he/she wants to. In the actual experiment, this 
information will change after each set of 5 rounds, so it is very important that you read this box 
before making your decisions. 
 On decision screens, a calculator icon will appear at the bottom of the screen. If you 
would like to use the calculator, just click on the icon. Note that the calculator does not use the 
order of operations automatically, so you must use parentheses to make sure that it does 
calculations that require more than one operation correctly. 
 
If the winning candidate committed, the policy he/she committed to is implemented. 
If the winning candidate took no position (including if forced to by the computer), his/her 
preferred policy is implemented.  
Voters see campaign platforms and vote. If the computer did not let a candidate commit, 
his/her platform will be "no position," no matter what strategy he/she chose.  
The computer randomly determines whether each candidate is able to commit to a policy. 
Candidates learn their preferred policies and choose their strategies. 
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 In the practice rounds, you were told which campaign platforms were taken by each 
candidate before you cast your votes. In the actual experiment, you will be asked about which 
candidate you would vote for in all possible situations. Since each candidate has four possible 
campaign platforms, there are 16 possible combinations. For example, you will be asked who 
you would vote for if Candidate 1 commits to A and Candidate 2 commits to E; if Candidate 1 
commits to A and Candidate 2 commits to D; and so on. The computer will then use the choices 
that correspond to the strategies that are actually chosen by the candidates in that round when it 
counts the votes. If you do not make all 16 voting decisions, you will earn zero points for the 
round and your vote will not be counted. 
 Finally, before each round, you will be asked two sets of belief questions. First, you will 
be asked which strategy you think each candidate will choose, depending on his/her preferred 
policy. Recall that the strategy is what the candidate chooses to do. If a candidate chooses to 
commit to C and the computer randomly does not allow him/her to, his/her strategy was still to 
commit to C. Using the radio buttons at the top of the screen, you may choose to answer these 
questions in one of two ways. You may answer the questions by moving 4 sliders, one for each 
possible campaign strategy. The more likely you think it is that the candidate will choose that 
strategy, given his/her preferred policy, the further to the right you should place the slider. Based 
on where you place the sliders relative to each other, the computer will calculate probabilities, 
which are updated as you move the sliders. You may also choose to enter probabilities directly. 
If you choose this option, you must enter probabilities that add up to 100.  
 Next, you will be asked about what you think of candidates who do not take a position. 
You will answer the questions by moving 3 sliders (or entering 3 probabilities), one for each 
possible preferred policy. You will have 3 minutes to complete each screen, and you must click 
the button in order to record your answers. 
 In each round, you will be entered into up to 4 lotteries. The first two correspond to the 
first set of belief questions. Your chance of winning the first lottery depends on your answers 
about CDQGLGDWH¶VVWUDWHJ\, given the preferred policy Candidate 1 had, and your chance of 
winning the second lottery depends on your answers about CDQGLGDWH¶VVWUDWHJ\given the 
preferred policy Candidate 2 had. The second two correspond to the second set of belief 
questions. Your chance of winning the third lottery depends on your answers about Candidate 
¶VSUHIHUUHGSROLF\JLYHQWKDWKHVKHWRRNQRSRVLWLRQDQG\RXUFKDQFHRIZLQQLQJWKHIRXUWK
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lottery depends on your answers about CandiGDWH¶VSUHIHUUHGSROLF\JLYHQWKDWKHVKHWRRNQR
SRVLWLRQ<RXZLOOEHHQWHUHGLQWRWKHWKLUGORWWHU\RQO\LI&DQGLGDWH¶VSODWIRUPZDV³QR
SRVLWLRQ´DQG\RXZLOOEHHQWHUHGLQWRWKHIRXUWKORWWHU\RQO\LI&DQGLGDWH¶VSODWIRUPZDV³QR
SRVLWLRQ´ The more accurate your beliefs are, the higher your chance of winning the lottery will 
be. Your payment for this task will be the percentage of entered lotteries that you won multiplied 
by $3.  
 The equations at the end of these instructions tell you exactly how your probability of 
winning is calculated for each lottery, though all you need to know is that the best way to earn as 
much as possible is to truthfully report what you think. 
 Before you begin the election game, there will be a screen that gives you an opportunity 
to practice answering questions about probabilities. The election game will begin after everyone 
has completed this practice screen. You will receive additional instructions after the election 
game. 
 
)RUWKHTXHVWLRQVDERXW&DQGLGDWH¶VVWUDWHJ\LIKLVKHUSUHIHUUHGSROLF\LV$OHWݏ௞ be equal to 
1 if Candidate 1 chooses campaign strategy k and 0 otherwise. Let ݌௞  be the answer you gave for 
the probability that Candidate 1 chose campaign strategy k given that his/her preferred policy 
was A. Your probability of winning the lottery is:  ? െ  ? ?ሺݏ஺ െ ݌஺ሻଶ െ  ? ?ሺݏ஻ െ ݌஻ሻଶ െ  ? ?ሺݏ஼ െ ݌஼ሻଶ െ  ? ?൫ݏ௡௢௣௢௦௜௧௜௢௡ െ ݌௡௢௣௢௦௜௧௜௢௡൯ଶ 
 
The formulas for beliefs about Candidate ¶VVWUDWHJ\JLYHQRWKHUSUHIHUUHGSROLFLHVDQGDERXW
&DQGLGDWH¶VVWUDWHJLHVDUHFRQVWUXFWHGLQWKHVDPHZD\ 
 
For the second set of questions, let  ߨ௝ EHHTXDOWRLI&DQGLGDWH¶VSUHIHUUHGSROLF\LVj and 0 
otherwise. Let ݎ௝ be the answer you gaYHIRUWKHSUREDELOLW\WKDW&DQGLGDWH¶VSUHIHUUHGSROLF\LV
j. Your probability of winning the lottery is:  ? െ  ? ?ሺߨ஺ െ ݎ஺ሻଶ െ  ? ?ሺߨ஻ െ ݎ஻ሻଶ െ  ? ?ሺߨ஼ െ ݎ஼ሻଶ 
 
The formula for beliefs about Candidate 2 is constructed in the same way. 
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Payoff table, included with instructions for all treatments 
 
   
Policy chosen by the winner of the election 
 
 
 A B C D E 
Preferred 
 
 Policy 
A 10 4 2 1 0 
B 4 10 4 2 1 
C 2 4 10 4 2 
D 1 2 4 10 4 
E 0 1 2 4 10 
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 This task is designed to test your understanding of probabilities. It is based on the 
election game that you just played. As before, there will be a box at the top of the screen that 
tells you how likely it is that the candidates will have each possible preferred policy and how 
likely it is that the computer will prevent a candidate from making a policy commitment. On 
each of the following screens, you will see a table on the left side of the screen that tells you 
what Candidate 1 has decided to do, depending on what his/her preferred policy is. Now, 
suppose that Candidate 1 takes no positionDVEHIRUHWKLVFRXOGEHEHFDXVHKHVKHFKRVH³QR
SRVLWLRQ´RUEHFDXVHWKHFRPSXWHUGLGQRWDOORZKLPKHUWRFRPPLW%DVHGRQWKLVLQIRUPDWLon, 
your job is to determine how likely it is that his/her preferred policy is A, B, or C. 
 Using the radio buttons at the top of the screen, you may choose to answer these 
questions in one of two ways. You may answer the questions by moving 3 sliders, one for each 
possible preferred policy. The more likely you think it is that Candidate 1 has that preferred 
policy, the further to the right you should place the slider. Based on where you place the sliders 
relative to each other, the computer will calculate probabilities, which are updated as you move 
the sliders. You may also choose to enter probabilities directly. If you choose this option, you 
must enter probabilities that add up to 100. You will have 3 minutes on each screen, and you 
must click the button in order to record your answers.  
 There will be a total of 6 screens for this task. There is a lottery associated with each 
screen. The better you do on this task, the higher your chance of winning the lottery will be. If 
you do not answer the questions on a screen, you will lose the lottery for that screen. Your 
payment for this task will be your winning percentage in these lotteries multiplied by $2. 
 The equation at the end of these instructions tells you exactly how your probability of 
winning is calculated for each screen, though all you need to know is that the best way to earn as 
much as possible is to truthfully report what you think.  
 Before this task begins, there will be a screen that gives you an opportunity to practice 
answering questions about probabilities. 
 After you have answered the questions described above, you will complete two short 
tasks. The instructions for these will appear on the screen. Please read them carefully. When 
everyone is finished, there will be a short demographic questionnaire to end the experiment. 
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Let ߨ௝ be the actual probability that Candidate 1¶VSUHIHUUHGSROLF\LVj, given that he/she has 
taken no position. Let ݎ௝ be the answer you gave about what you think ߨ௝ is. Your probability of 
winning the lottery is:  ? െ  ? ?ሺߨ஺ െ ݎ஺ሻଶ െ  ? ?ሺߨ஻ െ ݎ஻ሻଶ െ  ? ?ሺߨ஼ െ ݎ஼ሻଶ 
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 This task is designed to test your understanding of probabilities. It is based on the 
election game that you just played. As before, there will be a box at the top of the screen that 
tells you how likely it is that the candidates will have each possible preferred policy and how 
likely it is that the computer will prevent a candidate from making a policy commitment. On 
each of the following screens, you will see a table on the left side of the screen that tells you 
what Candidate 1 has decided to do, depending on what his/her preferred policy is. Now, 
suppose that Candidate 1 takes no positionDVEHIRUHWKLVFRXOGEHEHFDXVHKHVKHFKRVH³QR
SRVLWLRQ´RUEHFDXVHWKHFRPSXWHUGLGQRWDOORZKLPKHUWRFRPPLW%DVHGRQWKLVLQIRUPDWLon, 
your job is to determine how likely it is that his/her preferred policy is A, B, or C. 
 Using the radio buttons at the top of the screen, you may choose to answer these 
questions in one of two ways. You may answer the questions by moving 3 sliders, one for each 
possible preferred policy. The more likely you think it is that Candidate 1 has that preferred 
policy, the further to the right you should place the slider. Based on where you place the sliders 
relative to each other, the computer will calculate probabilities, which are updated as you move 
the sliders. You may also choose to enter probabilities directly. If you choose this option, you 
must enter probabilities that add up to 100. You will have 3 minutes on each screen, and you 
must click the button in order to record your answers.  
 There will be a total of 6 screens for this task. There is a lottery associated with each 
screen. The better you do on this task, the higher your chance of winning the lottery will be. If 
you do not answer the questions on a screen, you will lose the lottery for that screen. Your 
payment for this task will be your winning percentage in these lotteries multiplied by $2. 
 The equation at the end of these instructions tells you exactly how your probability of 
winning is calculated for each screen, though all you need to know is that the best way to earn as 
much as possible is to truthfully report what you think.  
 After you have answered the questions described above, you will complete two short 
tasks. The instructions for these will appear on the screen. Please read them carefully. When 
everyone is finished, there will be a short demographic questionnaire to end the experiment. 
 
Let ߨ௝ be the actual probability that Candidate 1¶VSUHIHUUHGSROLF\LVj, given that he/she has 
taken no position. Let ݎ௝ be the answer you gave about what you think ߨ௝ is. Your probability of 
winning the lottery is: 
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  ? െ  ? ?ሺߨ஺ െ ݎ஺ሻଶ െ  ? ?ሺߨ஻ െ ݎ஻ሻଶ െ  ? ?ሺߨ஼ െ ݎ஼ሻଶ 
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Experiment Screenshots 
 
Treatment with No Beliefs  
 
First screen voters see in each practice period:  
 
 
 
First screen a candidate sees in each practice period: 
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Experiment Screenshots 
 
Second screen voters see in each practice period: 
 
 
 
Second screen candidates see in each practice period: 
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Experiment Screenshots 
 
Third and last screen in each practice period: 
 
 
 
After 5 practice periods, additional instructions are read (beginning with ³In the practice 
rounds«´. 
 
Next, the real election periods start. First screen for a voter in each period: 
 
 
209
Experiment Screenshots 
 
 
First screen for a candidate in each period: 
 
 
 
 
Decision screen seen by each candidate: 
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Experiment Screenshots 
 
Voting screen: 
 
 
 
Results screen, which is the last screen for each period: 
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Experiment Screenshots 
 
Treatment with Subject-Candidates with Beliefs 
 
First screen voters see in each practice period:  
 
 
 
First screen a candidate sees in each practice period: 
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Experiment Screenshots 
 
Second screen voters see in each practice period: 
 
 
 
Second screen candidates see in each practice period: 
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Experiment Screenshots 
 
Third and last screen in each practice period: 
 
 
 
After 5 practice periods, there is a screen for practicing answering belief questions. Here is what 
it looks like if the subject chooses to use the sliders: 
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Experiment Screenshots 
 
Here is that same screen if he/she chooses to enter probabilities directly: 
 
 
 
Next, the actual election periods start. First screen for a voter in each period: 
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Experiment Screenshots 
 
First screen for a candidate in each period: 
 
 
 
 
Decision screen seen by each candidate: 
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Experiment Screenshots 
 
Screen from the first belief task (done by voters), with the slider option selected: 
 
 
 
Another screen from the first belief task (done by voters)ZLWKWKH³HQWHUQXPEHUV´RSWLRQ
selected. 
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Experiment Screenshots 
 
 
 
Third and final screen for the first belief task (done by voters). 
 
 
 
Screen for the second belief task (done by voters). This shows the slider option. 
 
 
 
218
Experiment Screenshots 
 
 
 
Voting screen: 
 
 
 
Results screen, which is the last screen for each period. 
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Experiment Screenshots 
 
Treatment with Programmed Candidates 
 
First screen subjects see in each practice period:  
 
 
 
This is the second screen subjects see in each practice period: 
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Experiment Screenshots 
 
This is the third and last screen in each practice period: 
 
 
 
After 5 practice rounds, there is a screen for practicing answering belief questions. Here is what 
it looks like if the subject chooses to use the sliders: 
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Experiment Screenshots 
 
Here is that same screen if he/she chooses to enter probabilities directly: 
 
 
 
Next, the actual election periods start. First screen in each period: 
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Experiment Screenshots 
 
Screen from the first belief task, with the slider option selected: 
 
 
 
AQRWKHUVFUHHQIURPWKHILUVWEHOLHIWDVNZLWKWKH³HQWHUQXPEHUV´RSWLRQVHOHFWHG 
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Experiment Screenshots 
 
Third and final screen for the first belief task: 
 
 
 
Screen for the second belief task. This shows the slider option. 
 
 
 
 
 
224
Experiment Screenshots 
 
Voting screen: 
 
 
 
Results screen, which is the last screen for each period. 
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Experiment Screenshots 
 
Subjects complete 5 periods in each condition. Next, in the treatment with no beliefs only, there 
is a screen for practicing answering belief questions, shown after the instructions for that task are 
given. Here is what it looks like if the subject chooses to use the sliders: 
 
 
 
 
Same screen if he/she chooses to enter probabilities directly: 
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Experiment Screenshots 
 
This is an example of a question (there are 6 like it) from the task that tests how well people 
understand how to use probabilities, with the slider option selected. 
 
 
 
This is another questiRQIURPWKLVWDVNZLWKWKH³HQWHUQXPEHUV´RSWLRQVHOHFWHG 
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Experiment Screenshots 
 
These are the on-screen instructions for the task that measures risk aversion using binary choices: 
 
 
 
This is that task: 
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On-screen instructions for the task that measures risk aversion using a BDM mechanism: 
 
 
 
BDM Task 
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Experiment Screenshots 
 
 
BDM Task Results 
 
 
 
Binary Choice Task Results 
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Experiment Screenshots 
 
This screen summarizes earnings at the end in the treatment with no beliefs: 
 
 
 
This screen summarizes earnings at the end in the treatments with beliefs: 
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Experiment Screenshots 
 
On this screen, subjects enter the number that identifies them in the experiment. 
 
 
 
 
 
This is the questionnaire: 
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Experiment Screenshots 
 
7KHVFUHHQFXWRIIDELWEXWLW¶VMXVWWKHUHVWRIWKHFRPPHQWER[DQGDEXWWRQWKDWsubjects click 
to continue. 
 
This is the last screen the subjects see: 
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B.2 Belief Incentivization Procedure
The belief report incentivization procedure is based on that developed by McK-
elvey and Page (1990). If a subject is asked for her beliefs about the preferred
position of a candidate who takes no position and that candidate actually takes
no position, the subject takes part in a lottery. Consider the case for Candidate
1; the procedure is the same if Candidate 2 takes no position. Let p j be equal to
1 if the candidate’s preferred policy is j and 0 otherwise. Let r j be the subject’s
reported probability that the candidate’s preferred policy is j. Her probability
of winning the lottery is 1   12 (pA   rA)2   12 (pB   rB)2   12 (pC   rC)2. Given beliefs
˜, a subject chooses her report to maximize
"
1   1
2
(˜A   rA)2   12 (˜B   rB)
2   1
2
(˜C   rC)2
#
u (win)
+
"
1
2
(˜A   rA)2 + 12 (˜B   rB)
2 +
1
2
(˜C   rC)2
#
u (loss) =
u (win)   1
2
(˜A   rA)2 u (win)   u (loss)
 1
2
(˜B   rB)2 u (win)   u (loss)   12 (˜C   rC)2 u (win)   u (loss)
The subject maximizes her expected payoff by reporting truthfully as long as
she prefers winning the lottery to losing it; no risk neutrality assumption is
needed. In order to ensure that simply entering more lotteries (because candi-
dates took no position more often) doesn’t increase payoffs, subjects are paid
the proportion of the lotteries that they win multiplied by $3.
A similar procedure is used to incentivize responses in the Bayes’ rule task.
Each subject is entered into a lottery for each of the six questions. Her proba-
bility of winning each lottery is the same as in the procedure above; thus, the
same result of truth-telling being incentive-compatible goes through. However,
for this task, p j is the true probability that a candidate who took no position has
preferred policy j, calculated using the values for  and  and the strategies for
candidates given to the subjects in the question. Subjects are paid the percentage
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of these lotteries that they win multiplied by $2.
B.3 Equilibria in Mixed Strategies
Because this analysis accompanies the experiment, it uses the notion intro-
ducted in that chapter of having monetary payoffs associated with outcomes
and having preferences over those monetary payoffs. Let xi+1 be the monetary
payoff associated with distance i between preferred policy and implemented
policy, for i = 0; 1; 2; 3; 4. This is analogous to the notation used in the theory
chapter; x1 is the monetary payoff associated with the most preferred policy, x2
is the monetary payoff associated with the second-best policy, and so on. In
the numerical calculations done in this section, the monetary payoffs from the
experiment are used: x1 = 10; x2 = 4; x3 = 2; x4 = 1; x5 = 0.
Let qi j be the probability that a candidate of type i chooses strategy j. Con-
sider only symmetric equilibria. This implies that notation can be simplified,
using the notation that corresponds to the strategies and types of Candidate 1.
Lemma 3. Suppose that there exists an equilibrium in mixed strategies in which voters
support a candidate who takes no position over a candidate who commits to B/D. Then,
candidates who prefer B/D will not put positive probability on committing to B/D.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that qBB 2 (0; 1]. Then, the payoff for a candidate
who prefers B/D when he commits to B/D is greater than or equal to the payoff
when he takes no position. The payoff when he commits to B/D is
AqAC
h
2uc (x2) +  (1   ) uc (x4) +  (1   ) uc (x2)
i
+AqAB
"
2
 
1
2
uc (x1) +
1
2
uc (x3)
!
+  (1   ) uc (x4) +  (1   ) uc (x1)
#
+AqAn

uc (x4)

+ A (1   )
 
1
2
uc (x1) +
1
2
uc (x4)
! 
qAC (1   ) + qAB (1   ) + qAn
+BqBC
h
2uc (x2) +  (1   ) uc (x3) +  (1   ) uc (x2)
i
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+BqBB
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uc (x1) +
1
2
uc (x3)
!
+  (1   ) uc (x3) +  (1   ) uc (x1)
#
+BqBn

uc (x3)

+ B (1   )
 
1
2
uc (x1) +
1
2
uc (x3)
! 
qBC (1   ) + qBB (1   ) + qBn
+C
"
2uc (x2) +  (1   ) uc (x2) +  (1   ) uc (x2) + (1   )2
 
1
2
uc (x1) +
1
2
uc (x2)
!#
The payoff when he takes no position is
A

qACuc (x2) + qABuc (x1)

+A (qAC (1   ) + qAB (1   ) + qAn)
"
1
2
uc (x1) +
1
2
uc (x4)
#
+B

qBCuc (x2) + qBBuc (x1)

+B (qBC (1   ) + qBB (1   ) + qBn)
"
1
2
uc (x1) +
1
2
uc (x3)
#
+C
"
uc (x2) + (1   )
 
1
2
uc (x1) +
1
2
uc (x2)
!#
Then it must be the case that
qACA [uc (x1)   uc (x4)]   A [uc (x1)   uc (x4)] + qABA [uc (x3)   uc (x4)]
(qBC   1) B [uc (x1)   uc (x3)] + (1   ) C [uc (x2)   uc (x1)]  0
To show that this inequality cannot hold regardless of what strategy is chosen
by candidates who prefer A/E, choose values for the q’s to make the left hand
side as high as positive. This means making qAC = 1 and qBC = 1. Since the LHS
is still negative with these values, and it would be even smaller with any other
set of values, this condition must not hold. Therefore, this is a contradiction,
and candidates who prefer B/D cannot choose to commit to B/D with positive
probability.
Lemma 4. If there exists a mixed strategy equilibrium in which voters prefer a candi-
date who takes no position over a candidate who commits to B/D, then candidates who
prefer A/E do not put positive probability on committing to B/D.
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Proof. Suppose to the contrary that qAB 2 (0; 1]. The payoff of a candidate who
prefers A/E from committing to B/D is:
AqAC
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) uc (x5) +  (1   ) uc (x3)
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+AqAB
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(qAC (1   ) + qAB (1   ) + qAn)
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His payoff from taking no position is:
+A (qAC (1   ) + qAB (1   ) + qAn)
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u (x1) +
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u (x5)
!
A

qACu (x3) + qABu (x1)

+ B

qBCu (x3) + qBBu (x1)

+B (qBC (1   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!
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)
 
1
2
u (x1) +
1
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Then, his payoff from committing to B/D must be at least as high as his payoff
from taking no position:
+AqAB

 (u (x2) + u (x4))   (1 + ) u (x1)
  (1   ) AqACu (x1)   AqAn [u (x1)]
+ (1   ) BqBC [u (x4)   u (x1)]
+BqBB

u (x2) + u (x4)   (1 + ) u (x1)
+BqBn [u (x4)   u (x1)] + (1   ) C [u (x3)   u (x1)]  0
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Using Lemma 3, substitute qBB = 0:
(qAC   1) Au (x1) + AqAB [u (x2) + u (x4)   u (x1)]
+ (qBC   1) B [u (x1)   u (x4)] + (1   ) C [u (x3)   u (x1)]  0
Choose values tomake the left hand side as high as positive. Thismeans qBC = 1.
Depending on c, either qABor qAC should be 1. In either case, the left hand side
is negative. Since these values were chosen to maximize the left hand side, this
equation cannot hold for any values. Thus, there is a contradiction.
Proposition 15. Suppose that
(A; B; C; ) =
 
1
2
;
1
4
;
1
4
;
9
10
!
; c < 0:18;
(A; B; C; ) =
 
1
3
;
1
3
;
1
3
;
9
10
!
; c < 0:19;
or
(A; B; C; ) =
 
1
3
;
1
3
;
1
3
;
3
4
!
; c < 0:23
Then, there does not exist an equilibrium in mixed strategies in which voters vote for
the candidate who took no position over one who commits to B/D.
Proof. By Lemmas 3 and 4, we know that qAB = qBB = 0. The remaining possi-
bilities are that one type of candidate commits to C or takes no position and the
othermixes between those two strategies, or bothmix. Consider each possibility
in turn. Suppose that candidates who prefer B/D commit to C and candidates
who prefer A/E mix. The payoff for a candidate who prefers A/E if he takes no
position is
AqAC
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+C
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Substituting qAn = 1   qAC, we have
AqAC
"
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The payoff for a candidate who prefers A/E if he commits to C is
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Substituting qAn = 1   qAC, we have
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2
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Since the candidates who prefers A/E is mixing, he must be indifferent between
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these two strategies:
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Simplified, this becomes
qAC =
1

+
(1   )
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i
Numerical calculations show that qAC 2 [0; 1] if and only if c 2 [0:35; 0:486] if
(A; B; C; ) =

1
2 ;
1
4 ;
1
4 ;
9
10

, c 2 [0:37; 0:579] if (A; B; C; ) =

1
3 ;
1
3 ;
1
3 ;
9
10

, and
c 2 [0:421; 0:579] if (A; B; C; ) =

1
3 ;
1
3 ;
1
3 ;
3
4

.
Next, suppose that candidates who prefer B/D take no position, and candi-
dates who prefer A/E mix. If the candidate who prefers A/E commits to C, his
payoff is
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If we substitute qAn = 1   qAC, we have
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If the candidates who prefers A/E takes no position, his payoff is
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If we substitute qAn = 1   qAC, we have
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Since the candidate who prefers A/E mixes, he must be indifferent between
choosing these two strategies:
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This simplifies to
qAC =
1

+
1

B
A
h
1
2uc (x1) +
1
2uc (x4)   uc (x3)
ih
1
2uc (x1)   uc (x3)
i + (1   )

C
A
h
1
2uc (x1)   12uc (x3)
ih
1
2uc (x1)   uc (x3)
i
Numerical calculations show that qAC 2 [0; 1] if and only if c 2 [0:404; 0:601] if
(A; B; C; 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
.
Next, suppose that a candidate who prefers A/E commits to C and a candi-
date who prefers B/D mixes. The payoff for a candidate who prefers B/D if she
takes no position is
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Replacing qAn = 1   qAC and qBn = 1   qBC, this becomes
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The payoff for a candidate who prefers B/D if she commits to C is
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The candidate who prefers B/D is indifferent between choosing these strategies
if and only if
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Numerical calculations show that qBC 2 [0; 1] if and only if c 2 [0:270; 0:292] if
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Suppose that a candidate who prefers A/E takes no position and a candidate
who prefers B/D mixes between committing to C and taking no position.
The payoff for a candidate who prefers B/D if she takes no position is
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The payoff for a candidate who prefers B/D if she commits to C is
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The candidate who prefers B/D is willing to mix if and only if
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By numerical calculation, qBC 2 [0; 1] if and only if c 2 [0:177; 0:203] if
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Finally, suppose that both candidates are mixing. The payoff of a candidate
who prefers A/E if he commits to C is
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If he takes no position, his payoff is
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Since he must be indifferent, it must be the case that
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The payoff for this candidate if he takes no position is
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From above, we have
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Numerical calculations confirm that this does not lie between 0 and1 for the
parameter values considered. Since none of those possibilities can exist, there
cannot exist an equilibrium in mixed strategies in which voters support a can-
didate who took no position over a candidate who committed to B/D for the
parameter values stated in this result.
B.4 Additional Results
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Table B.1: Sample Size
Main
Candidates
Who
Prefer
A/E
Candidates
Who
Prefer
B/D
Candidates
Who
Prefer C
Subject
Candidates,
No Beliefs
Low-Noise Skewed 162 12 4 8
(37) (12) (3) (7)
Low-Noise Uniform 330 11 14 15
(41) (10) (13) (14)
High-Noise Uniform 330 9 11 20
(41) (8) (9) (19)
Subject
Candidates,
With Beliefs
Low-Noise Skewed 338 26 22 12
(46) (21) (16) (11)
Low-Noise Uniform 434 16 26 26
(59) (14) (23) (23)
High-Noise Uniform 436 21 22 25
(59) (17) (18) (22)
Programmed
Candidates,
With Beliefs
Low-Noise Skewed 470
(60)
Low-Noise Uniform 498
(60)
High-Noise Uniform 496
(60)
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Table B.2: Proportion of Votes That Violated Monotonicity
A/E A/E B/D
vs. vs. vs.
C B/D C
Subject
Candidates,
No Beliefs
Low-Noise Skewed 0.124*** 0.212*** 0.075**
(0.052) (0.073) (0.031)
Low-Noise Uniform 0.034* 0.068** 0.031**
(0.018) (0.028) (0.015)
High-Noise Uniform 0.037 0.126*** 0.052*
(0.024) (0.040) (0.029)
Subject
Candidates,
With Beliefs
Low-Noise Skewed 0.053* 0.161*** 0.009*
(0.030) (0.054) (0.005)
Low-Noise Uniform 0.003 0.110*** 0.005
(0.005) (0.038) (0.004)
High-Noise Uniform -0.003 0.104*** 0.001
(0.004) (0.037) (0.002)
Programmed
Candidates,
With Beliefs
Low-Noise Skewed 0.116*** 0.282*** 0.043**
(0.033) (0.056) (0.018)
Low-Noise Uniform 0.030 0.188*** 0.045**
(0.021) (0.044) (0.020)
High-Noise Uniform 0.031 0.197*** 0.029
(0.020) (0.044) (0.019)
Candidate 1 0.011** 0.057*** -0.001
(0.005) (0.017) (0.004)
R-Squared 0.08 0.22 0.04
N 3494 3494 3494
(# of subjects) (160) (160) (160)
Marginal Effects
Subject Candidates, No Beliefs 0.045* 0.007 0.046**
(0.024) (0.055) (0.018)
Programmed Candidates, With Beliefs 0.039* 0.096 0.034**
(0.023) (0.059) (0.018)
Low-Noise Skewed 0.074*** 0.091*** 0.011
(0.018) (0.026) (0.009)
High-Noise Uniform -0.002 0.015 -0.003
(0.006) (0.011) (0.007)
Notes: Estimates produced by regressing a dummy for either voting for the first candi-
date listed or abstaining on dummies for each treatment-condition cell and a dummy
for whether the candidate who took no position was labeled "Candidate 1." Standard
errors clustered at the subject level. *, **, and *** indicate that a coefficient is statistically
different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. For A/E vs C, LS and
LU are different in the no beliefs treatment (p=0.08) and the programmed candidates
treatment (p=0.000). The two treatments with beliefs are different in HU (p=0.09). For
A/E vs B/D, LS and LU (p=0.03) and LU and HU (p=0.02) are different in the no be-
liefs treatment, and LS and LU are different in the programmed candidates treatment
(p=0.02). For B/D vs C, the two treatments with subject-candidates are different in
LS (p=0.04) and HU (p=0.08), and the two treatments with beliefs are different in LS
(p=0.07) and LU (p=0.05). Marginal effects are relative to the omitted category, which is
"Subject Candidates, With Beliefs" for treatment and LU for condition.
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Table B.3: Proportion of Votes That Were For A Candidate Who Took No
Position Over A Candidate Who Committed To B/D: Low Re-
sponse Error
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Subject
Candidates,
No Beliefs
Low-Noise Skewed 0.098** 0.098** 0.122** 0.122**
(0.043) (0.043) (0.052) (0.052)
Low-Noise Uniform 0.150** 0.150** 0.163** 0.163**
(0.068) (0.068) (0.081) (0.081)
High-Noise Uniform 0.230*** 0.230*** 0.268*** 0.268***
(0.078) (0.078) (0.091) (0.091)
Subject
Candidates,
With Beliefs
Low-Noise Skewed 0.027** 0.027** 0.028** 0.029**
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014)
Low-Noise Uniform 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.062*** 0.062***
(0.020) (0.019) (0.021) (0.019)
High-Noise Uniform 0.214*** 0.214*** 0.203*** 0.203***
(0.049) (0.049) (0.047) (0.047)
Programmed
Candidates,
With Beliefs
Low-Noise Skewed 0.304*** 0.304*** 0.315*** 0.315***
(0.081) (0.081) (0.083) (0.083)
Low-Noise Uniform 0.293*** 0.293*** 0.296*** 0.296***
(0.079) (0.079) (0.081) (0.081)
High-Noise Uniform 0.324*** 0.324*** 0.332*** 0.332***
(0.078) (0.078) (0.080) (0.080)
Candidate 1 -0.000 -0.001
(0.011) (0.011)
R-Squared 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.26
N 2076 2076 1916 1916
(# of subjects) (96) (96) (88) (88)
Marginal Effects
Subject Candidates, No Beliefs 0.056 0.056 0.086 0.086
(0.061) (0.061) (0.070) (0.070)
Programmed Candidates, With Beliefs 0.199*** 0.199*** 0.211*** 0.211***
(0.075) (0.075) (0.076) (0.076)
Low-Noise Skewed -0.024 -0.024 -0.016 -0.016
(0.031) (0.031) (0.033) (0.033)
High-Noise Uniform 0.091*** 0.091*** 0.094*** 0.094***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026)
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy for voting for the candidate who took no
position when the opponent committed to B or D. Models estimated using OLS. The
sample is restricted to subjects who violated monotonicity at most once. Subjects who
made choices in the binary risky decision task consistent with   0:305 are excluded
from the sample in models 3 and 4. Standard errors clustered at the subject level. *, **,
and *** indicate that a coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and
1% level, respectively. Differences between LU and HU are significant in the subject-
candidates with beliefs treatment (p<0.002). The difference between the treatments with
subject-candidates in LS is significant in (3) and (4) only (p<0.09) .Differences between
the two treatments with beliefs are significant within LS and LU (p<0.01). Marginal
effects are relative to the omitted category. For effects of treatment, the omitted category
is "Subject Candidates, With Beliefs"; for effects of condition, the omitted category is
"Low-Noise Uniform." 252
Table B.4: Individual Voter Choices Between A Candidate Who Took No
Position and A Candidate Who Committed to B/D: 70 Percent
Cutoff
Vote Pattern Subject- Subject-, Programmed Cumulative
Candidates, Candidates Candidates, Probability
LS LU HU No Beliefs With Beliefs With Beliefs
B/D or - B/D B/D 24 35 21 66.1
B/D or - B/D ~ 2 6 3 75.2
B/D or - B/D n.p. 3 1 3 81.0
B/D ~ n.p. 0 0 1 81.8
B/D n.p. n.p. 0 0 3 84.3
~ n.p. n.p. 1 0 1 86.0
- n.p. n.p. 5 0 0 90.1
n.p. n.p. n.p. 0 1 11 100
Not categorized 1 12 13
Notes: LS, LU, and HU denote the low-noise skewed, low-noise uniform, and high-
noise uniform conditions, respectively. Within each condition, a subject is said to vote
for a candidate if she cast at least 70 percent of her votes during those periods for that
candidate. Subjects who made choices in the binary risky decision task consistent with
a coefficient of absolute risk aversion   0:305 are classified as too risk-averse and not
included here. "-" indicates missing data for that condition due to the programming
error.
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Table B.5: Beliefs About The Strategy Chosen By ACandidateWho Prefers
A/E
Commit Commit Commit No
To A/E To B/D To C Position
Programmed
Candidates,
With Beliefs
Low-Noise Skewed 0.678*** 0.080*** 0.132*** 0.110***
(0.034) (0.012) (0.019) (0.023)
Low-Noise Uniform 0.586*** 0.097*** 0.184*** 0.133***
(0.039) (0.013) (0.027) (0.029)
High-Noise Uniform 0.562*** 0.080*** 0.167*** 0.191***
(0.038) (0.011) (0.027) (0.027)
Subject
Candidates,
With Beliefs
Low-Noise Skewed 0.390*** 0.194*** 0.199*** 0.218***
(0.049) (0.030) (0.032) (0.037)
Low-Noise Uniform 0.338*** 0.180*** 0.237*** 0.245***
(0.042) (0.028) (0.033) (0.036)
High-Noise Uniform 0.327*** 0.141*** 0.247*** 0.284***
(0.039) (0.022) (0.032) (0.033)
R-squared 0.73 0.43 0.44 0.43
N 2676 2676 2676 2676
(# of subjects) (119) (119) (119) (119)
Actual
Subject-
Candidate
Strategies
Low-Noise Skewed 0.421*** 0.368*** 0.105** 0.105**
(0.081) (0.083) (0.047) (0.052)
Low-Noise Uniform 0.444*** 0.370*** 0.074 0.111*
(0.101) (0.095) (0.050) (0.060)
High-Noise Uniform 0.333*** 0.333*** 0.167** 0.167**
(0.082) (0.086) (0.077) (0.067)
Average Marginal Effects
Programmed Candidates, With Beliefs 0.255*** -0.085*** -0.066* -0.104***
(0.052) (0.026) (0.037) (0.040)
Low-Noise Skewed 0.074*** -0.003 -0.046*** -0.025
(0.022) (0.011) (0.016) (0.017)
High-Noise Uniform -0.018 -0.027*** -0.004 0.049***
(0.013) (0.007) (0.010) (0.014)
Notes: Top panel: estimates produced by regressing subjects’ stated beliefs that a can-
didate who prefers A/E chooses each possible campaign strategy on dummies for each
treatment cell. Second panel: estimates produced by regressing dummies for whether
a subject-candidate chose each possible campaign strategy on dummies for each condi-
tion. Standard errors clustered at the subject level. *, **, and *** indicate that a coefficient
is statistically different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Marginal
effects are relative to the omitted category. For effects of treatment, the omitted cate-
gory is "Subject Candidates, With Beliefs"; for effects of condition, the omitted category
is "Low-Noise Uniform."
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Table B.6: Beliefs About The Strategy Chosen By ACandidateWho Prefers
B/D
Commit Commit Commit No
To A/E To B/D To C Position
Programmed
Candidates,
With Beliefs
Low-Noise Skewed 0.113*** 0.638*** 0.146*** 0.103***
(0.018) (0.036) (0.020) (0.022)
Low-Noise Uniform 0.090*** 0.617*** 0.184*** 0.109***
(0.014) (0.036) (0.026) (0.023)
High-Noise Uniform 0.080*** 0.585*** 0.171*** 0.163***
(0.012) (0.035) (0.027) (0.022)
Subject
Candidates,
With Beliefs
Low-Noise Skewed 0.064*** 0.615*** 0.258*** 0.063***
(0.020) (0.038) (0.033) (0.009)
Low-Noise Uniform 0.028*** 0.592*** 0.294*** 0.085***
(0.007) (0.033) (0.031) (0.015)
High-Noise Uniform 0.025*** 0.537*** 0.307*** 0.131***
(0.006) (0.032) (0.030) (0.016)
R-squared 0.31 0.83 0.53 0.37
N 2684 2684 2684 2684
(# of subjects) (119) (119) (119) (119)
Actual
Subject-
Candidate
Strategies
Low-Noise Skewed 0 0.769*** 0.231*** 0
(-) (0.078) (0.078) (-)
Low-Noise Uniform 0 0.675*** 0.275*** 0.050
(-) (0.074) (0.070) (0.035)
High-Noise Uniform 0 0.697*** 0.242*** 0.061
(-) (0.090) (0.087) (0.043)
Average Marginal Effects
Programmed Candidates, With Beliefs 0.055*** 0.033 -0.120*** 0.032
(0.016) (0.045) (0.036) (0.023)
Low-Noise Skewed 0.029*** 0.022 -0.037** -0.013
(0.010) (0.020) (0.030) (0.010)
High-Noise Uniform -0.007 -0.043*** -0.001 0.050***
(0.005) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010)
Notes: Top panel: estimates produced by regressing subjects’ stated beliefs that a can-
didate who prefers B/D chooses each possible campaign strategy on dummies for each
treatment cell. Second panel: estimates produced by regressing dummies for whether
a subject-candidate chose each possible campaign strategy on dummies for each condi-
tion.Standard errors clustered at the subject level. *, **, and *** indicate that a coefficient
is statistically different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Marginal
effects are relative to the omitted category. For effects of treatment, the omitted cate-
gory is "Subject Candidates, With Beliefs"; for effects of condition, the omitted category
is "Low-Noise Uniform."
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Table B.7: Beliefs About The Strategy Chosen By A Candidate Who
Prefers C
Commit Commit Commit No
To A/E To B/D To C Position
Programmed
Candidates,
With Beliefs
Low-Noise Skewed 0.107*** 0.064*** 0.783*** 0.045***
(0.019) (0.012) (0.033) (0.006)
Low-Noise Uniform 0.081*** 0.077*** 0.787*** 0.056***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.030) (0.008)
High-Noise Uniform 0.068*** 0.067*** 0.742*** 0.123***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.031) (0.015)
Subject
Candidates,
With Beliefs
Low-Noise Skewed 0.045** 0.020*** 0.897*** 0.037***
(0.019) (0.008) (0.026) (0.008)
Low-Noise Uniform 0.016*** 0.024*** 0.934*** 0.026***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.016) (0.006)
High-Noise Uniform 0.014*** 0.018*** 0.896*** 0.072***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.018) (0.014)
R-Squared 0.28 0.29 0.94 0.41
N 2676 2676 2676 2676
(119) (119) (119) (119)
Actual
Subject-
Candidate
Strategies
Low-Noise Skewed 0 0 1.000*** 0
(-) (-) (0.000) (-)
Low-Noise Uniform 0 0.024 0.951*** 0.024
(-) (0.025) (0.034) (0.025)
High-Noise Uniform 0 0 0.956*** 0.044
(-) (-) (0.044) (0.044)
Average Marginal Effects
Programmed Candidates, With Beliefs 0.060*** 0.049*** -0.139*** 0.030***
(0.016) (0.013) (0.034) (0.012)
Low-Noise Skewed 0.028*** -0.009 -0.018 -0.001
(0.011) (0.005) (0.015) (0.005)
High-Noise Uniform -0.008** -0.008** -0.041*** 0.058***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.008)
Notes: Top panel: estimates produced by regressing subjects’ stated beliefs that a can-
didate who prefers C chooses each possible campaign strategy on dummies for each
treatment cell. Second panel: estimates produced by regressing dummies for whether
a subject-candidate chose each possible campaign strategy on dummies for each condi-
tion. Standard errors clustered at the subject level. *, **, and *** indicate that a coefficient
is statistically different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Marginal
effects are relative to the omitted category. For effects of treatment, the omitted cate-
gory is "Subject Candidates, With Beliefs"; for effects of condition, the omitted category
is "Low-Noise Uniform."
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Table B.8: Actual Behavior of Subject-Candidates
Preferred Condition Commit Commit Commit No
Policy To A/E To B/D To C Position
Subject-Candidates, No Beliefs
A
Low-Noise Skewed 0.417*** 0.333** 0.083 0.167
(0.147) (0.141) (0.083) (0.111)
Low-Noise Uniform 0.455*** 0.364** 0.091 0.091
(0.141) (0.158) (0.081) (0.091)
High-Noise Uniform 0.333** 0.222 0.222* 0.222
(0.143) (0.148) (0.127) (0.148)
B
Low-Noise Skewed 0 1 0 0
(-) (-) (-) (-)
Low-Noise Uniform 0 0.714*** 0.286** 0
(-) (0.116) (0.116) (-)
High-Noise Uniform 0 0.364** 0.545*** 0.091
(-) (0.165) (0.177) (0.091)
C
Low-Noise Skewed 0 0 1*** 0
(-) (-) (0.000) (-)
Low-Noise Uniform 0 0.067 0.867*** 0.067
(-) (0.067) (0.092) (0.067)
High-Noise Uniform 0 0 0.900*** 0.100
(-) (-) (0.096) (0.096)
Subject-Candidates, With Beliefs
A
Low-Noise Skewed 0.423*** 0.385*** 0.115** 0.077
(0.100) (0.104) (0.058) (0.055)
Low-Noise Uniform 0.438*** 0.375*** 0.063 0.125
(0.144) (0.122) (0.063) (0.081)
High-Noise Uniform 0.333*** 0.381*** 0.143 0.143*
(0.101) (0.106) (0.097) (0.077)
B
Low-Noise Skewed 0 0.727*** 0.273*** 0
(-) (0.090) (0.090) (-)
Low-Noise Uniform 0 0.654*** 0.269*** 0.077
(-) (0.097) (0.089) (0.055)
High-Noise Uniform 0 0.864*** 0.091 0.045
(-) (0.070) (0.058) (0.046)
C
Low-Noise Skewed 0 0 1*** 0
(-) (-) (0.000) (-)
Low-Noise Uniform 0 0 1*** 0
(-) (-) (0.000) (-)
High-Noise Uniform 0 0 1*** 0
(-) (-) (-) (-)
Average Marginal Effects
Policy Preference A/E 0.398*** 0.344*** -0.851*** 0.109**
(0.066) (0.063) (0.043) (0.048)
Policy Preference B/D 0 0.704*** -0.723*** 0.018
(-) (0.049) (0.054) (0.030)
Subject Candidates, With Beliefs -0.001 0.038 -0.002 -0.035
(0.041) (0.055) (0.052) (0.040)
Low-Noise Skewed -0.007 0.034 0.003 -0.030
(0.038) (0.046) (0.038) (0.027)
High-Noise Uniform -0.035 -0.008 0.019 0.024
(0.035) (0.051) (0.037) (0.035)
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Table B.8 – continued from previous page
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the candidate chose to com-
mit to A/E, commit to B/D, commit to C, and take no position and zero otherwise
in columns 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. This is regressed on triple interactions of can-
didate type with treatment and condition. *, **, and *** indicate that a coefficient is
statistically different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The R2
is 0.41, 0.61, 0.78, and 0.12 when the dependent variable is whether the candidate
chose A/E, B/D, C, and no position, respectively. Standard errors clustered at the
subject level. N=300 with 91 subjects. Marginal effects are relative to the omitted
category. The omitted candidate policy preference is C. For effects of treatment, the
omitted category is "Subject Candidates, No Beliefs"; for effects of condition, the
omitted category is "Low-Noise Uniform." Pooling all treatments and conditions
together, candidates who prefer A/E and those who prefer B/D differ in terms of
the probability of choosing to commit to A/E (p=0.000), choosing to commit to B/D
(p=0.000), and choosing to commit to C (p=0.017), and taking no position (p=0.048).
Table B.9: Beliefs About A Candidate Who Took No Position
Probability He Probability He Probability He
Prefers A/E Prefers B/D Prefers C
Subject
Candidates,
With Beliefs
Low-Noise 0.576*** 0.187*** 0.237***
Skewed (0.041) (0.020) (0.038)
Low-Noise 0.546*** 0.228*** 0.225***
Uniform (0.038) (0.019) (0.034)
High-Noise 0.487*** 0.253*** 0.258***
Uniform (0.032) (0.016) (0.034)
Programmed
Candidates,
With Beliefs
Low-Noise 0.486*** 0.236*** 0.277***
Skewed (0.019) (0.012) (0.021)
Low-Noise 0.346*** 0.297*** 0.355***
Uniform (0.021) (0.014) (0.028)
High-Noise 0.337*** 0.303*** 0.357***
Uniform (0.019) (0.013) (0.024)
R-Squared 0.81 0.80 0.61
N 2680 2680 2680
(119) (119) (119)
Based on
Actual
Behavior of
Subject-
Candidates
Low-Noise 0.661 0.169 0.170
Skewed
Low-Noise 0.428 0.311 0.261
Uniform
High-Noise 0.393 0.309 0.297
Uniform
Based on
Actual
Behavior of
Programmed
Candidates
Low-Noise 0.909 0.045 0.045
Skewed
Low-Noise 0.833 0.083 0.083
Uniform
High-Noise 0.667 0.167 0.167
Uniform
Marginal Effects
Programmed Candidates, -0.149*** 0.056*** 0.092**
With Beliefs (0.038) (0.020) (0.040)
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Table B.9 – continued from previous page
Probability He Probability He Probability He
Prefers A/E Prefers B/D Prefers C
Low-Noise Skewed 0.090*** -0.052*** -0.037**
(0.016) (0.010) (0.015)
High-Noise Uniform -0.031*** 0.015** 0.016*
(0.009) (0.007) (0.010)
Notes: The dependent variable in each column is the probability that the subject
assigned to a candidate who took no position having preferred policy A/E, B/D,
and C, respectively. This is regressed using OLS on dummies for each treatment-
condition cell. Standard errors clustered at the subject level. *, **, and *** indicate
that a coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively. Mean ˜Ajn is statistically different between LU and HU in the subject-
candidates treatment (p=0.002) and between LS and LU in the programmed candi-
dates treatment (p=0.000), between the two treatments in LS (p=0.05) and LU and
HU (p=0.000). Mean ˜Bjn is statistically different between LS and LU (p=0.042) and
between LU andHU (p=0.053) in the subject-candidates treatment, between LS and
LU in the programmed candidates treatment (p=0.000), and between treatments in
LS (p=0.036), LU (p=0.004), and HU (p=0.015). Mean ˜Cjn is statistically different
between LU andHU in the subject-candidates treatment (p=0.051), between LS and
LU in the programmed candidates treatment (p=0.000), and between treatments in
LU (p=0.004) and HU (p=0.020). Marginal effects are relative to the omitted cat-
egory. For effects of treatment, the omitted category is "Subject Candidates, With
Beliefs"; for effects of condition, the omitted category is "Low-Noise Uniform."
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Table B.10: Proportion of Votes That Were For A Candidate Who Commit-
ted to A/E Over a Candidate Who Took No Position: Low Re-
sponse Error
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Subject
Candidates,
No Beliefs
Low-Noise Skewed 0.235** 0.237** 0.268** 0.271**
(0.094) (0.094) (0.110) (0.110)
Low-Noise Uniform 0.265*** 0.266*** 0.259*** 0.262***
(0.083) (0.083) (0.092) (0.091)
High-Noise Uniform 0.245*** 0.246*** 0.238*** 0.241***
(0.081) (0.081) (0.089) (0.089)
Subject
Candidates,
With Beliefs
Low-Noise Skewed 0.237*** 0.238*** 0.245*** 0.248***
(0.073) (0.073) (0.077) (0.077)
Low-Noise Uniform 0.199*** 0.200*** 0.209*** 0.212***
(0.059) (0.059) (0.063) (0.063)
High-Noise Uniform 0.162*** 0.164*** 0.175*** 0.178***
(0.057) (0.057) (0.061) (0.061)
Programmed
Candidates,
With Beliefs
Low-Noise Skewed 0.088* 0.089* 0.091* 0.094*
(0.047) (0.047) (0.049) (0.049)
Low-Noise Uniform 0.089* 0.091* 0.092* 0.095*
(0.051) (0.051) (0.053) (0.053)
High-Noise Uniform 0.143** 0.145** 0.147** 0.150**
(0.059) (0.059) (0.060) (0.060)
Candidate 1 -0.003 -0.006
(0.007) (0.007)
R-Squared 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20
N 2076 2076 1916 1916
(# of subjects) (96) (96) (88) (88)
Marginal Effects
Subject Candidates, No Beliefs 0.054 0.054 0.047 0.047
(0.096) (0.096) (0.104) (0.104)
Programmed Candidates, With Beliefs -0.087 -0.087 -0.095 -0.095
(0.076) (0.076) (0.080) (0.080)
Low-Noise Skewed 0.008 0.008 0.017 0.017
(0.027) (0.027) (0.029) (0.029)
High-Noise Uniform -0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023)
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy for voting for the candidate who commit-
ted to A/E or abstaining when the opponent took no position. Models estimated using
OLS. The sample is restricted to subjects who violated monotonicity at most once. Sub-
jects who made choices in the binary risky decision task consistent with   0:305 are
excluded from the sample in models 3 and 4. Standard errors clustered at the subject
level. *, **, and *** indicate that a coefficient is statistically different from zero at the
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The treatment with subject-candidates with be-
liefs and the programmed candidates treatment are statistically different in LS in all
specifications (p<0.10). Marginal effects are relative to the omitted category. For effects
of treatment, the omitted category is "Subject Candidates, With Beliefs"; for effects of
condition, the omitted category is "Low-Noise Uniform."
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Table B.11: Proportion of Votes That Were For A Candidate Who Commit-
ted To A/E Over A Candidate Who Took No Position : Control
for Last Period
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Subject
Candidates,
No Beliefs
Low-Noise Skewed 0.472*** 0.482*** 0.532*** 0.543***
(0.094) (0.094) (0.100) (0.100)
Low-Noise Uniform 0.394*** 0.404*** 0.417*** 0.428***
(0.070) (0.071) (0.076) (0.076)
High-Noise Uniform 0.347*** 0.357*** 0.361*** 0.372***
(0.067) (0.067) (0.073) (0.073)
Subject
Candidates,
With Beliefs
Low-Noise Skewed 0.418*** 0.428*** 0.436*** 0.446***
(0.072) (0.072) (0.075) (0.075)
Low-Noise Uniform 0.312*** 0.322*** 0.330*** 0.341***
(0.058) (0.058) (0.061) (0.061)
High-Noise Uniform 0.297*** 0.307*** 0.316*** 0.326***
(0.059) (0.060) (0.062) (0.063)
Programmed
Candidates,
With Beliefs
Low-Noise Skewed 0.320*** 0.330*** 0.318*** 0.329***
(0.055) (0.056) (0.057) (0.058)
Low-Noise Uniform 0.253*** 0.263*** 0.251*** 0.262***
(0.055) (0.056) (0.056) (0.057)
High-Noise Uniform 0.245*** 0.255*** 0.246*** 0.257***
(0.049) (0.050) (0.050) (0.051)
Last Period of Experiment -0.037 -0.037 -0.036 -0.036
(0.044) (0.044) (0.045) (0.045)
Candidate 1 -0.021* -0.022*
(0.011) (0.011)
R-Squared 0.33 0.33 0.35 0.35
N 3494 3494 3222 3222
(# of subjects) (160) (160) (147) (147)
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy for voting for the candidate who committed
to A/E or abstaining when the opponent took no position. Models estimated using
OLS. The dummy for "last period of experiment" is equal to 1 if the vote occurred during
the 5th period of the last condition. Subjects who made choices in the binary risky
decision task consistent with   0:305 are excluded from the sample in models 3 and
4. Standard errors clustered at the subject level. *, **, and *** indicate that a coefficient
is statistically different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. LS and
LU are different in the subject-candidates with beliefs treatment (p<0.05) and in the
programmed candidates treatment (p<0.10).
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APPENDIX C
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3
C.1 Aspects of Well-Being
Here we describe the process of compiling our initial master list of 136 "aspect
of well-being" survey measures; the measures are listed below, together with
references to the literature. We then describe howwe created two additional list
versions from the first 108 aspect measures.
Subsection C.1.1 lists the six broad classes from which our 136 aspects
were generated; subsection C.1.2 lists the considerations that affected how we
phrased the aspects; subsection C.1.3 provides a legend to the abbreviated refer-
ences that accompany the aspect list; and subsection C.1.4 provides the master
list itself.
Subsection C.1.5 then explains howwe divided our master list of 136 aspects
into 108 you-, 5 you-only-, and 23 public-aspects, and how we modified the you-
aspects (the first 108 aspects on the master list) to create 108 everyone-aspects
that apply to everyone in the nation and 108 others-aspects that apply to others
in the nation (as explained in the main text, others-aspects appear in scenarios
that are not analyzed in the paper). Finally, these latter two modified lists are
reported in subsections C.1.6 and C.1.7, respectively.
C.1.1 Classes of Measures of Aspects of Well-Being
There are six classes of survey measures that we include:
1. Single-question survey measures of SWB. Since most of the evidence in the
happiness literature to date is based on single-question SWB measures, it
is important that our list, which explicitly looks beyond traditional SWB
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measures, also include an extensive set of versions of such traditional mea-
sures. We hence include measures modeled after the SWB questions most
commonly used in large-scale social surveys. These include, for example,
those asked in or proposed for the U.K. survey discussed in the Introduc-
tion.1 We include both cognitive, evaluative SWB measures (e.g., life sat-
isfaction) and affective, hedonic ones (including an array of positive and
negative emotions).
2. Multi-question survey measures of SWB. While empirical work in economics
relies heavily on single-question survey measures, much research in psy-
chology uses multi-question scales, such as the PANAS (Positive And
Negative Affect Scale) and the GHQ (General Health Questionnaire, a
measure of mental health). In addition to measures modeled after ques-
tions comprising these scales, we also included measures based on ques-
tions comprising the Scale of Positive and Negative Experience (SPANE),
the Affect Balance Scale (ABS), and the Health and Retirement Study’s
Psychosocial Leave-Behind.
3. Aspects of well-being proposed by prominent economists, psychologists, and
philosophers. This class comprises by far the largest subset of our list. To
the best of our knowledge, our effort reflects the most systematic attempt
to date to gather aspects from prominent works–all of which explicitly
compose lists of specific factors that are proposed to be important deter-
minants of well-being–and compile them all into one list. While the past
work we consulted is but a sample of a much broader body of research,
we hope it is a sample chosen carefully enough to make the resulting list
relatively comprehensive.
We started with the list proposed by the Stiglitz Commission (officially,
"the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and So-
cial Progress"). The French government convened the commission at the
1
Hence, we draw from documents that propose questions for the U.K. survey beyond the four
questions that were ultimately selected. These are Dolan, Layard, and Metcalfe’s (2011) Office
for National Statistics (ONS) publication and Deaton, Kahneman, Krueger, Schkade, Schwarz,
and Stone’s (2011) memo to the ONS’s Advisory Group on Subjective Well-Being.
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beginning of 2008 with official aims that included "to identify the lim-
its of GDP as an indicator of economic performance and social progress"
and "to consider additional information required for the production of a
more relevant picture." The commission’s final report (Stiglitz, Sen, and Fi-
toussi, 2009) emphasizes the view that "well-being is multi-dimensional"
and details what its members–among whom are prominent well-being re-
searchers, mostly from economics but also from other disciplines such as
psychology and political science–view as well-being’s most important di-
mensions.2 We compiled an initial list that included the dimensions sug-
gested in the report, and then broke them down into sub-dimensions spe-
cific enough that we could fit them into our survey as "aspect of well-
being" questions. In this zooming-in process we consulted specific works
by members of the commission (e.g., Kahneman and Deaton, 2010) to ver-
ify that our aspects use language that is as close as possible to the language
used in past survey research.
Another candidate set of factors that matter for well-being, also an in-
put into the commission’s composition and conclusions, was Sen’s (1985)
and Nussbaum’s (2000) lists of "functionings" and "capabilities," which we
used to expand our list of aspects, and to create new aspects if they were
not previously on our list.
A third candidate was Maslow’s (1946) theory of human motivation,
which includes the famous pyramid of needs and a list of what he views
as motivating "desires."
We also consulted recent work in the psychology literature that attempts
2
For example, the commission’s report states (Stiglitz et al., 2009, pp. 14-15): "To define what
well-being means, a multidimensional definition has to be used. Based on academic research
and a number of concrete initiatives developed around the world, the Commission has iden-
tified the following key dimensions that should be taken into account. At least in principle,
these dimensions should be considered simultaneously: i. Material living standards (income,
consumption and wealth); ii. Health; iii. Education; iv. Personal activities including work[;]
v. Political voice and governance; vi. Social connections and relationships; vii. Environment
(present and future conditions); viii. Insecurity, of an economic as well as a physical nature. All
these dimensions shape people’s well-being, and yet many of them are missed by conventional
income measures."
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to look beyond happiness when breaking down the notion of psychologi-
cal well-being into more basic components (e.g., Ryff, 1989). We paid spe-
cial attention to Seligman’s enumeration of what constitutes well-being
("authentic happiness"). We especially focused on Seligman’s work that
is aimed at informing policy (e.g., Diener and Seligman, 2004). We also
checked that our resulting list did not miss aspects proposed by other re-
cent enumerations of factors by confirming, for example, that it covered
the main factors in Loewenstein and Ubel’s (2008) public policy recom-
mendations.
Finally, to verify that our list covers the recent academic literature rel-
atively comprehensively, we trained eleven research assistants (RAs) to
carefully read through papers and books, highlighting passages that ex-
plicitly or implicitly identified key aspects of well-being and recording
those aspects of well-being in a spreadsheet. Initially, we instructed two
RAs about how to do this. The instruction process included several meet-
ings in which we went over a few papers together; demonstrated to the
RAs what wewanted them to do; then gave them a few days to do it them-
selves; and then met again to go over what they did, answer questions,
and provide feedback. The RA training process consisted, first, of three
initial training hours of the two RAs by the authors of this paper. Second,
these two RAs wrote a training document (available upon request) that
very briefly summarizes what they did, and which they used in training
the nine additional RAs. Third, the authors then met twice with the entire
set of eleven RAs to go over examples of work that had been done in the
early weeks of the project and answer questions.
Overall, over the course of June-September, 2011, the eleven RAs covered
34 articles and four books, which are listed, along with the other works
we drew on, in subsection C.1.3 below. We started with an initial set of
papers and books that we were aware of (e.g., Alkire, 2002) as well as
work referenced in the initial set, work referenced in the referenced work,
etc. The resulting RAs’ spreadsheet of proposed aspects and highlighted
articles are available as Supplementary Materials to this paper. From this
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spreadsheet, we culled many additional aspects.
Finally, we trained two new RAs to read through John Rawls’s Theory
of Justice, a major work we had omitted earlier (and subsequently read).
While we did not add new aspects on the basis of this book, we verified
that we had not missed important ones.
4. Our own introspection and discussion. We further extended and refined the
list both by drawing on our own previous research (Benjamin, Heffetz,
Kimball, and Rees-Jones, 2012), which aimed to empirically identify as-
pects in addition to own happiness that help predict survey respondents’
hypothetical choices; and by drawing on our own introspection regard-
ing the factors that enter preferences, inspired in part by our reading
of nonacademic writers and by extensive conversations among ourselves
and with colleagues.
In many cases, seemingly-similar but differently-worded aspects coming
from these four classes were both candidates for inclusion in the list. To
determine whether two candidate aspects, A and B, were distinct, we at-
tempted to formulate examples where a person might want something
that is an example of B but which cannot be considered an example of A
(or at least in the spirit of A), and vice versa, switching A and B. If we
could formulate such examples, we considered A and B to be distinct.
In other cases, we judged that valuable things proposed by researchers
(from class 3 above) were not "fundamental." We then attempted to come
up with the fundamental aspects that explain why someone would want
that thing. For example, it is often claimed that religion contributes to
happiness and well-being. We refined "religion" into several aspects of
well-being that may help explain the value of religion but which are also
valued by many non-religious people, such as aspects 91-96 and 101-108,
including "you having people around you who share your values, beliefs
and interests," "your opportunities to participate in ceremonies, cultural
events, and celebrations that are meaningful to you" and "your sense of
connection with the universe or the power behind the universe."
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5. New combination aspects that might be "summary measures" of well-being. In
addition to trying to compile a list of fundamental things that many peo-
ple want, we also sought to come up with a single measure that, all by it-
self, would be as highly correlated as possible with stated preference. We
conceptualize such a "summary measure" not as a fundamentally-valued
aspect of well-being (i.e., not as an element of the w vector in the theory),
but rather as a particular survey question that might cause respondents,
when responding to it, to take into account the great variety of aspects
they consider when making choices. In terms of the theory, we think of a
summarymeasure as eliciting an especially broad combination aspect, i.e.,
the answer to a single question that yields a function of many of the ele-
ments of w and that might have an especially high correlation with choice.
We consider some of the existing SWB measures, such as "how happy you
feel during your life," "how satisfied you are with your life," and "how
close your life is to being ideal" to be candidate summary measures. We
also formulated summary measures that, as far as we know, have not been
used previously in surveys, e.g., "how much you like your life" and "the
overall well-being of you and your family." Since we took the view that our
ability to predict a priori which measure would have the highest correla-
tion with choice is severely limited, this class accounts for a large number
of questions.
6. Subjective versions of "objective" measures of well-being. We additionally
sought to include a few "objective" measures that–while not considered by
us or others to be fundamentally-valued aspects of life–are often used by
economists and policymakers as proxies for well-being. For this purpose,
we included questions about total GDP, GDP per capita, GDP growth,
the unemployment rate, the inflation rate, income equality, longevity, and
health. Of course, our survey questions refer to subjective perceptions of
these quantities, rather than their objective levels. Nonetheless, by includ-
ing them, we can assess how people weight these objective measures com-
pared with the subjective measures we include.
At the boundary of this class are subjective evaluations of an individual’s
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constraints and feasible choice set, such as "feeling that you have enough
time and money for the things that are most important to you" and "hav-
ing many options and possibilities in your life and the freedom to choose
among them." We felt that such measures might point to fundamental de-
sirable perceptions–i.e., perceptions that people would like to have regard-
less of whether they take advantage of the perceived choices and even re-
gardless of whether they objectively have these choices–as well as indicate
how much of other aspects seem obtainable. (The aspect "having many
options and possibilities" also belongs to class 3 above, as it has been pro-
posed by Sen, Nussbaum, and others.)
A primary criterion for not including an aspect on our list, even if we felt it
was fundamental, was if experiencing that aspect would require either super-
natural power or technology that is currently unavailable. For example, we ex-
cluded "your freedom from death" even though it seems to be a fundamentally-
desired thing and, arguably, a motivating factor in some people’s behavior. Sim-
ilarly, we excluded all afterlife aspects.
C.1.2 Aspects of Well-Being: Phrasing
We had a number of considerations when deciding how to phrase an aspect. We
tried to:
 Phrase in the context of specific choices. Doing so enables us to compare as-
pects with each other as consequences of, as affected by, and as motivating
choices (i.e., as relevant arguments in the utility function).
 Phrase in a way that allows for a limited-time-frame interpretation. Doing so
enables us to elicit the "single period" effects of stated choices, thereby
alleviating concerns that would result, e.g., from cross-respondent differ-
ences in time integration. Thus, for example, we avoided phrases such as
"during your lifetime."
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 Orient so that rating higher would conventionally be considered desirable. Doing
so likely reduces respondent confusion and thereby reduces errors and
shortens survey time. For example, instead of asking about "how anxious
you feel," we ask about "you not feeling anxious."
 Write in language that would be understandable by most survey respondents in
a national sample. In some cases, we put several different phrases in the
same question that were not synonymous, but which we thought were
closely enough associated that they would clarify each other’s meaning
and clarify the spirit of what we were asking.
 For aspects 1-108: phrase in a way that minimizes changes to text when switching
between "you," "others," and "people." Doing so allows us to easily incorpo-
rate other-regarding preferences, for example, to replace "how happy you
feel" with "how happy others feel" or with "how happy people feel." (See
subsection C.1.5 below.)
 For closely-related aspects: combine into a single question. While ideally we
would include each distinct aspect as a separate survey question, we felt
that combining closely-related aspects was a reasonable compromise that
allowed us to cover more ground in our constrained amount of survey
time.
 For existing survey questions: word as closely as possible to the original question.
Doing so makes the analysis of our question as informative as possible
regarding the existing question.
In some cases we were forced to trade off between these goals. For example,
we phrased the aspect modeled after the U.K. survey question "Overall, how
anxious did you feel yesterday?" as "you not feeling anxious."
C.1.3 Aspects of Well-Being Origin: Legend
To facilitate tracking the origin of each aspect on our list, we indicate relevant
references in the parentheses next to each aspect. In some cases–e.g., "your free-
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dom from pain," "your material standard of living," or "you being a good, moral
person and living according to your personal values"–where the importance of
the aspect is highlighted by virtually an entire body of literature, the references
we list are merely examples.
Corresponding to aspect classes 1-6 (see C.1.1 above), we use the following
abbreviations:
Aspect Class 1.
SWB We use this abbreviation to indicate aspects modeled after SWBmea-
sures used in large-scale surveys, including: the Euro-Barometer
Survey; the European Social Survey; the German Socioeconomic
Panel; the Japanese Life in Nation survey; the U.S.-based Gallup-
HealthwaysWell-Being Index, General Social Survey, Health and Re-
tirement Study, National Survey of Families and Households, and
Survey of Consumers; and the World Values Survey.
Aspect Classes 2., 3., and 4. We use the following abbreviations:
AHC Anand, Paul et al. 2009. "The Development of Capability Indica-
tors." Journal of Human Development and Capabilities, 10(1): 125-152.
BMP Bauer, Jack J., Dan P. McAdams, and Jennifer L. Pals. 2008. "Narra-
tive Identity and Eudaimonic Well-Being." Journal of Happiness Stud-
ies, 9: 81-104.
BHKR Benjamin, Daniel J., Ori Heffetz, Miles S. Kimball, and Alex Rees-
Jones. 2012. "What Do You Think Would Make You Happier?
What Do You Think You Would Choose?" American Economic Review,
102(5): 20832110.
BC Bliss, Christopher. 1993. "Life Style and the Standard of Living." The
Quality of Life. Ed. Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen. New York:
Oxford University Press.
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ABS Bradburn, Norman M. 1969. Structure of Psychological Well-Being.
Chicago: Aldine Pub. Co.
Note: The aspects that cite Bradburn (1969) are part of the Affect
Balance Scale (ABS) developed in that work.
BBM Bronsteen, John, Christopher J. Buccafusco, and Jonathan S. Ma-
sur. 2010. "Welfare as Happiness." Georgetown Law Journal, 98: 1583.
BD Brooks, David. 2011. The Social Animal: the hidden sources of love,
character, and achievement. New York: Random House.
CR Cummins, Robert A. 1996. "The Domains of Life Satisfaction: An
Attempt to Order Chaos." Social Indicators Research, 38(3): 303-328.
DKS Deaton, Angus, Daniel Kahneman, Alan Krueger, David Schkade,
Norbert Schwarz, and Arthur Stone. 2011. Memo to the Office of
National Statistics Advisory Group on Subjective Well-Being. Pub-
lished in the Supporting Documents for the Meeting to Provide
Guidance to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and De-
velopment on its Plans to Measure Self- Reported Well-Being held
on July 8, 2011.
DCG Devine, Joseph, Laura Camfield, and Ian Gough. 2008. "Autonomy
or Dependence–Or Both?: Perspectives from Bangladesh." Journal of
Happiness Studies, 9:105-138.
DE Diener, Ed. 2000. "Subjective Well-Being: The Science of Happiness
and a Proposal for a National Index." American Psychologist, 55(1):
34-43.
or
Diener, Ed, Richard Lucas, Ulrich Schimmack, and John Helliwell.
2009. Well-Being for Public Policy. New York: Oxford University
Press.
or
Diener, Ed, Derrick Wirtz, William Tov, Chu Kim-Prieto, Dong-
wonChoi, ShigehiroOishi, and Robert Biswas-Diener. 2010. "New
Well-BeingMeasures: Short Scales to Assess Flourishing and Positive
and Negative Feelings." Social Indicators Research, 97(2): 143-156.
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Note: Some of the aspects that cite Diener and co-authors are from
the Flourishing Scale and the SPANE Scale, and that is indicated.
DS Diener, Ed and Martin E.P. Seligman. 2004. "Beyond Money: To-
ward an Economy of Well- Being." Psychological Science in the Public
Interest, 5(1): 1-31.
DBD Diener, Ed and Robert Biswas-Diener. 2000. "New Directions in
Subjective Well-Being Research: The Cutting Edge." Indian Journal of
Clinical Psychology, 27: 21-33.
DLM Dolan, Paul, Richard Layard, and Robert Metcalfe. 2011. "Measur-
ing Subjective Wellbeing for Public Policy." Published by the Office
for National Statistics in the UK.
DG Doyal, Len, and Ian Gough. 1992. "Need Satisfaction as a Measure
of Human Welfare." In Mixed Economies in Europe: An Evolutionary
Perspective on their Emergence, Transition, and Regulation. Ed. Wolf-
gang Blaas and John Foster.
GHQ Goldberg, David and Paul Williams. 1988. A Users Guide to the
General Health Questionnaire. Windsor, UK: NFER-Nelson.
G Graham, Carol. 2011. The Pursuit of Happiness: An Economy of Well-
Being. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
GBF Grisez, Germain, Joseph Boyle, and John Finnis. 1987. "Practical
Principles, Moral Truth and Ultimate Ends." American Journal of Ju-
risprudence, 32: 99-151.
KD Kahneman, Daniel, and Angus S. Deaton. 2010. "High Income Im-
proves Evaluation of Life but not Emotional Well-Being." Proceedings
of the National Academy of Sciences, 107(38): 16489-16493.
KSS Kapteyn, Arie, James P. Smith, and Arthur van Soest. 2009. "Com-
paring Life Satisfaction." Rand Working Paper WR-623-1
KN King, Laura A. and Christie K. Napa. 1998. "What Makes a Life
Good?" Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75(1): 156-165.
KR Kraut, Richard. 1979. "Two Conceptions of Happiness." The Philo-
sophical Review, 88(2): 167-197.
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LU Loewenstein, George, and Peter A. Ubel. 2008. "Hedonic Adapta-
tion and the Role of Decision and Experience Utility in Public Policy."
Journal of Public Economics, 92(8-9): 1795-1810.
M(#) Maslow, Abraham. 1946. "Theory of Human Motivation." In Twen-
tieth century psychology: recent developments in psychology, By Philip
Lawrence Harriman. (When it appears below, the # refers to the as-
pect’s place in Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, as follows: 1. Physio-
logical; 2. Safety; 3. Love; 4. Esteem; and 5. Self-actualization.)
MS Melo, Santiago. 2011. "Eudaimonia and the Economics of Happi-
ness." Documentos CEDE.
SN Nussbaum, Martha. 2011. Creating Capabilities: The Human Develop-
ment Approach. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
or
Nussbaum, Martha. 2000. Women and Human Development: The Ca-
pabilities Approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Q Qizilbash, Mozaffar. 1996. "Capabilities, Well-Being and Human
Development: A Survey." The Journal of Development Studies, 33(2),
143-162.
or
Qizilbash, Mozaffar. 1996. "Ethical Development." World Develop-
ment, 24(7): 1209-1221.
RW Rawls, John. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Belknap
Press of Harvard University Press.
or
Rawls, John. 1982. "Social Unity and Primary Goods." In Utilitarian-
ism and Beyond, edited by Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams, 159-
186. New York: Cambridge University Press.
R Ryff, Carol D. 1989. "Happiness is Everything, or Is It? Explorations
on the Meaning of Psychological Well-Being." Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 57: 1069-1081.
RS Ryff, Carol D. and Burton Singer. 1998. "The Contours of Positive
Human Health." Psychological Inquiry, 9(1): 1-28.
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ST Scitovsky, Tibor. 1976. The Joyless Economy: An Inquiry into Human
Satisfaction and Consumer Dissatisfaction. New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press.
SM Seligman, Martin E.P. 2002. Authentic Happiness: Using the New Pos-
itive Psychology to Realize Your Potential for Lasting Fulfillment. New
York: Free Press.
SN Sen, Amartya. 1985. Commodities and Capabilities. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
SSF Stiglitz, Joseph E., Amartya Sen, and Jean-Paul Fitoussi. 2009. Re-
port by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and
Social Progress. www.stiglitz-sen-fitoussi.fr
SLW Sumner, L.W. 1995. "The Subjectivity of Welfare." Ethics, 105(4): 764-
790.
TJ Tomer, John F. 2010. "Enduring Happiness: Integrating
the Hedonic and Eudaimonic Approaches." Available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1708212
WA Waterman, Alan S. 1993. "Two Conceptions of Happiness: Contrasts
of Personal Expressiveness (Eudaimonia) and Hedonic Enjoyment."
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 64(4): 678-691.
WSC Waterman, Alan S., Seth J. Schwartz, and Regina Conti. 2008. "The
Implications of Two Conceptions of Happiness (Hedonic Enjoyment
and Eudaimonia) for the Understanding of Intrinsic Motivation."
Journal of Happiness Studies, 9: 41-79.
PANAS Watson, David, Lee Anna Clark, and Auke Tellegen. 1988. "Devel-
opment and Validation of Brief Measures of Positive and Negative
Affect: The PANAS Scales." Journal of Personality and Social Psychol-
ogy, 54(6): 1063-1070.
WD White, Matthew P. and Paul Dolan. 2009. "Accounting for the Rich-
ness of Daily Activities." Psychological Science, 20(8): 1000-1008.
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HRS This includes aspects that are inspired by the Psychosocial Leave-
Behind from the Health and Retirement Study. These are distinct
from usual SWB measures, since they tend to be more detailed than
questions typically included on other large-scale surveys.
Aspect Class 4.
Int Our own introspection.
Aspect Class 5.
Sum New combination-aspect "summary measures.
Aspect Class 6.
Obj Subjective measures of "objective" indicators.
C.1.4 Our Master List of 136 Aspects:
1. how satisfied you are with your life (SWB, DS)
2. your rating of your life on a ladder where the lowest rung is "worst possi-
ble life for you" and the highest rung is "best possible life for you" (SWB,
KD, DKS)
3. how close your life is to being ideal (MS, DE)
4. the overall well-being of you and your family (Sum, BHKS)
5. you feeling that things are going well for you (MS, DE)
6. you getting the things you want out of life (ABS, DE, SN)
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7. the extent to which you feel the things you do in your life are worthwhile
(DLM)
8. how fulfilling your life is (SN, SLW, KN, DE)
9. how rewarding the activities in your life are (WD, DLM)
10. you having a beautiful life story, or a life that is "like a work of art" (RS)
11. how full of beautiful memories your life is (Int, BHKS)
12. how grateful you feel for the things in your life (DE, SM)
13. how much you appreciate your life (SM, TJ)
14. the absence of regret you feel about your life (SM, HRS)
15. how desirable your life is (KR)
16. how glad you are to have the life you have rather than a different life (KN,
ABS)
17. the extent to which you "have a good life" (SN, KN)
18. how much you like your life (Sum, BHKS)
19. you feeling that you have been fortunate in your life (Sum, BHKS)
20. your sense of optimism about your future (SM, DE-Flourishing)
21. you having many options and possibilities in your life and the freedom to
choose among them (SN, DS, RW)
22. your sense that things are getting better and better (DBD)
23. how happy you feel (SWB, DS)
24. how much of the time you feel happy (SWB, DS, KD, DE)
25. how often you smile or laugh (G, SM, DS, KD, SWB)
26. how much you enjoy your life (DBD, AHC, Q, DS, KD, SWB)
27. the absence of sadness in your life (DE-SPANE, DS, KD, DKS)
28. you not feeling depressed (GHQ, ABS, R)
29. the absence of anger in your life (DKS, DE-SPANE, KD)
30. the absence of frustration in your life (WD, DS)
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31. the absence of fear in your life (SN, PANAS, DE-SPANE, DS)
32. you not feeling anxious (DLM, WD)
33. the absence of stress in your life (DKS, GHQ, DLM, DE, KD, DS)
34. the absence of worry in your life (DLM, GHQ, KD, DKS)
35. the quality of your sleep (DKS)
36. your physical safety and security (GBF, CR, G, Q, DG, M2, SN, SSF)
37. the amount of order and stability in your life (Int, BHKS)
38. your sense of security about life and the future in general (Int, BHKS)
39. your physical comfort (M1)
40. your freedom from pain (DG, BHKR, SN, DKS)
41. how easy and free of annoyances your life is (HRS)
42. how peaceful, calm, and harmonious your life is (TJ, GBF)
43. how often you can feel relaxed instead of feeling your life is hectic (DLM,
WD, WSC)
44. you feeling that you have enough time and money for the things that are
most important to you (BHKS)
45. your financial security (DBD, DLM, G, DG)
46. yourmaterial standard of living (DE, WSC, SSF)
47. your ability to dream and pursue your dreams (LU)
48. your ability to use your imagination and be creative (SN, AHC, KN, RW)
49. you having many moments in your life when you feel inspired (SM,
PANAS)
50. how much beauty you experience in your life (WA, SM, RW)
51. the amount of pleasure in your life (WD, BBM, DE, DS)
52. the amount of fun and play in your life (SN, BHKR, GBF)
53. you having new things, adventure, and excitement in your life (ST)
54. your sense of discovery and wonder (SM, M(desire))
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55. you feeling that you understand the world and the things going on around
you (DG, BMP, M(desire))
56. your knowledge, skills, and access to information (GBF, SM, SN, SSF, RW)
57. how often you are able to challenge your mind in a productive or enjoy-
able way (WA, DE)
58. how interesting, fascinating, and free of boredom your life is (DE, ABS,
PANAS, BHKR, DS)
59. your ability to be yourself and express yourself (WA, BMP, LU, M5)
60. your personal growth (R, BMP)
61. you "being the person you want to be" (SN, BHKS)
62. your ability to fulfill your potential (TJ, WSC, R, M5)
63. your sense of purpose (R, DE-Flourishing, KN, TJ, BHKR, DS)
64. you feeling that your life has direction (RS, AHC, RW)
65. your sense of control over your life (SN, G, BHKR, R)
66. your sense that your life is meaningful and has value (G, LU,R, SM, KN,
GBF, TJ, DE-Flourishing, DS, M(desire))
67. your sense that you are making a difference, actively contributing to the
well-being of other people, and making the world a better place (DS, DE-
Flourishing, BBM, LU, DLM)
68. the overall quality of your experience at work (DS, KSS, DG, DE, SM,
DLM, SN, SSF)
69. how often you become deeply engaged in your daily activities (so deeply
engaged that you lose track of time) (DE-Flourishing, DS, WSC)
70. your feeling of independence and self-sufficiency (SN, R, DCG, M4, MS)
71. your sense that you are competent and capable in the activities that matter
to you (DE-Flourishing, WA)
72. your ability to shape and influence the things around you (DCG, R)
73. your sense of achievement and excellence (MS, SN, KN, RS, DS)
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74. your enjoyment of winning, competing, and facing challenges (WA)
75. your success at accomplishing your goals (SLW, DE, DS)
76. your chance to live a long life (SN, AHC, SSF)
77. your health (SM, G, RS, Q, DS, SN, SSF, RW)
78. your mental health and emotional stability (DG, SN, AHC, GHQ, DS,
DLM, TJ)
79. your absence of internal conflict (conflict within yourself) (RS, BMP)
80. your ability to fully experience the entire range of healthy human emo-
tions (LU, SN)
81. you feeling alive and full of energy (DLM, WA, DG, PANAS, RW)
82. your passion and enthusiasm about things in your life (PANAS, SM)
83. your pride and respect for yourself (PANAS, ABS, SN, DE, RW)
84. you having the people around you think well of you and treat you with
dignity and respect (AHC, SN, M4, DE-Flourishing, RW)
85. you having a role to play in society (TJ, AHC, DG, DBD, SN)
86. how much love there is in your life (SN, KN, RS, SM)
87. the quality of your romantic relationships, marriage, love life or sex life
(SM, SN, AHC, KSS, DS, M3, R)
88. your ability to have and raise children (AHC, DCG, KSS, SN)
89. the quality of your family relationships (TJ, AHC, DS, M3, R, SSF)
90. the happiness of your family (BHKR, LU)
91. your sense of community, belonging, and connection with other people
(SN, DS, LU, DE-Flourishing)
92. you having people around you who share your values, beliefs and inter-
ests (HRS)
93. you having people you can turn to in time of need (DE-Flourishing, HRS)
94. you not being lonely (ABS, DS, SM)
279
95. you feeling that you are understood (BHKS)
96. your opportunities to participate in ceremonies, cultural events, and cele-
brations that are meaningful to you (BHKS)
97. your freedom from being lied to, deceived, or betrayed (M(desire), HRS)
98. your freedom from emotional abuse or harassment (BHKS)
99. the absence of humiliation and embarrassment in your life (SN)
100. the absence of shame and guilt in your life (PANAS, DCG, SN)
101. your sense that everything happens for a reason (BHKS)
102. your sense of connection with the universe or the power behind the uni-
verse (TJ)
103. you being a good, moral person and living according to your personal
values (DBD, DE-Flourishing, MS, RS, TJ)
104. you feeling that you are part of something bigger than yourself (SM, TJ)
105. your sense that you are standing up for what you believe in (BHKS)
106. your sense that you know what to do when you face choices in your life
(BHKS)
107. your ability to "be in the moment" (HRS)
108. your ability to keep good perspective in your life (BHKS)
109. how high your income is compared to the income of other people around
you (DS, TJ)
110. your power over other people (BHKS)
111. your social status (DCG, TJ, BHKR, M)
112. you having others remember you and your accomplishments long after
your death (BD)
113. the happiness of your friends (MS, BHKR, LU)
114. the condition of animals, nature, and the environment in the world (SN,
SSF, AHC)
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115. the amount of love in the world (BHKS)
116. the well-being of the people in the world (LU, RS)
117. the extent to which humanity does things worthy of pride (BHKS)
118. the morality, ethics, and goodness of other people in your nation (BHKS)
119. the well-being of the people in your nation (LU, RS)
120. your nation being a just society (MS, SN, GBF)
121. the extent to which your nation does things worthy of pride (BHKS, BD)
122. the amount of freedom in society (G)
123. freedom of speech and people’s ability to take part in the political process
and community life (SN, SSF, Q, DG, AHC, RW)
124. freedom of conscience and belief in your nation (SN, Q, RW)
125. equality of income in your nation (BC)
126. equality of opportunity in your nation (SN, Q, G, RW)
127. society helping the poor and others who struggle (BHKS)
128. people getting the rewards and punishments they deserve (BBM)
129. the amount of order and stability in society (BHKS, BD)
130. freedom from corruption, injustice, and abuse of power in your nation (G)
131. trust among the people in your nation (DS, R)
132. the total size of your nation’s economy (GDP) (Obj)
133. the average income of people in your nation (GDP per capita) (Obj)
134. the rate of economic growth (GDP growth) over time in your nation (Obj)
135. how low the rate of unemployment is in your nation (Obj)
136. how low the rate of inflation is in your nation’s economy (Obj)
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C.1.5 Aspects of Well-Being by Whom They Refer To
We distinguish between five types of aspects according to who is described as
affected by the level of that aspect.
1. You-aspects are aspects of well-being that pertain to one’s own well-being
(e.g. "how satisfied you are with your life") as well as the well-being of
those who are emotionally close (such as one’s family), without refer-
ence to others outside one’s close circle. These aspects may be affected
by the personal decisions of individuals without affecting the entire soci-
ety. Hence, they can differ between individuals living in the same society
(e.g., while one is satisfied with one’s life, others in one’s nation could be
dissatisfied with their lives), but they could also in principle increase or
decrease for everyone simultaneously. We view aspects 1-108 in the mas-
ter list in C.1.4 above as you-aspects.
2. You-only aspects are similar to you-aspects, but they are inherently rela-
tive to others (e.g., "your social status"). Hence, while they may be af-
fected by personal decisions, they also affect others due to the externalities
(positive or negative) they necessarily inflict on others, and they cannot
meaningfully increase or decrease for everyone simultaneously. We view
aspects 109-113 in the master list in C.1.4 above as you-only-aspects. We
view the first four–relative income, power over other people, social status,
and post-mortem fame–as mostly comparative, zero-sum aspects, which
could not in themselves vary for the nation as a whole, except for their
dimensions that are already mostly captured by other aspects. For exam-
ple, we felt that the you-aspects 84 and 85–having the people around you
think well of you and treat you with dignity and respect, and having a role
to play in society–capture important dimensions of the non-zero-sum part
of the idea of social status. As to the fifth you-only-aspect–the happiness
of your friends–we view it as a positive externality that does not mean-
ingfully add up in the context of our scenarios: increasing or decreasing
everyone’s friends’ happiness is reasonably simplified as increasing or de-
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creasing everyone’s happiness.
3. Public-aspects are essentially "public good" aspects: they pertain to an
entire society’s well-being, such as the entire nation (e.g., "equality of op-
portunity in your nation"), or, when stated, the entire world (e.g., "the con-
dition of animals, nature, and the environment in the world"). In contrast
with you- and you-only-aspects, public-aspects cannot typically be affected
by the personal decisions of individuals, but they may be affected through
national policy. Moreover, public-aspects cannot differ between individu-
als living in the same society; their levels are the same for everyone, and
they can only increase or decrease for everyone simultaneously. We view
aspects 114-136 in the master list in C.1.4 above as public-aspects.
4. Everyone-aspects are you-aspects applied simultaneously to all individu-
als in the nation. For example, the you-aspect "how satisfied you are with
your life" is modified to become the everyone-aspect "how satisfied peo-
ple are with their lives"; the legend in the SP survey instructions explains
that by the word "people" we refer to everyone in the nation (see 3.3.2 in
the main text, or C.2 below). Like public-aspects, everyone-aspects can be
affected through policy and cannot typically be affected by the personal
decisions of individuals; and like public-aspects, by construction they can-
not differ between individuals in the same nation and can only increase or
decrease for everyone simultaneously. The list of 108 everyone-aspects–
a modified version of the 108 you-aspects from the list in C.1.4 above–is
provided in subsection C.1.6 below.
5. Others-aspects are similar to everyone-aspects with one exception: as ex-
plained in the SP-survey instructions legend, the word "others" refers
to others in the nation, excluding the respondent and the respondent’s
emotionally-close circle. In other words, others-aspects are you-aspects ap-
plied simultaneously to all individuals in the nation excluding the respon-
dent’s close circle. Hence, for example, the you-aspect "how satisfied you
are with your life" becomes the others-aspect "how satisfied others are with
their lives"; in principle, a you-aspect and the corresponding others-aspect
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together add up to the corresponding everyone-aspect: how satisfied you
and others are with your lives = how satisfied everyone is with their lives.
By including both you- and others-aspects in the same scenario, we could
explore how respondents trade off, e.g., their life satisfaction with the life
satisfaction of unfamiliar others in the nation. As noted, such scenarios are
not analyzed in the present paper. For completeness, however, the list of
108 others-aspects–a modified version of the 108 you-aspects from the list
in C.1.4 above–is provided in subsection C.1.7 below.
A note about everyone- and others-aspects. One might care about aspects of others’
lives for altruistic, ideological, or other reasons. We consider any ethical duty
people feel to speak up for those who are unable to speak up for themselves,
however, to be separate from the preferences regarding what is happening to
other people. In our survey, we told people to assume that other people also had
a vote on policy in an attempt to relieve them from any ethical need to speak up
for those who cannot speak for themselves and thereby isolate the preferences
about what is happening to others from the fairness notion that everyone should
have a voice.
C.1.6 Aspects 1-108 Modified to Apply to Everyone (everyone-
aspects)
1. how satisfied people are with their lives
2. people’s ratings of their lives on a ladder where the lowest rung is "worst
possible life for them" and the highest rung is "best possible life for them"
3. how close people’s lives are to being ideal
4. the overall well-being of people and their families
5. people feeling that things are going well for them
6. people getting the things they want out of life
284
7. the extent to which people feel the things they do in their lives are worth-
while
8. how fulfilling people’s lives are
9. how rewarding the activities in people’s lives are
10. people having a beautiful life story, or a life that is "like a work of art"
11. how full of beautiful memories people’s lives are
12. how grateful people feel for the things in their lives
13. how much people appreciate their lives
14. the absence of regret people feel about their lives
15. how desirable people’s lives are
16. how glad people are to have the lives they have rather than different lives
17. the extent to which people "have a good life"
18. how much people like their lives
19. people feeling that they have been fortunate in their lives
20. people’s sense of optimism about their future
21. people having many options and possibilities in their lives and the free-
dom to choose among them
22. people’s sense that things are getting better and better
23. how happy people feel
24. how much of the time people feel happy
25. how often people smile or laugh
26. how much people enjoy their lives
27. the absence of sadness in people’s lives
28. people not feeling depressed
29. the absence of anger in people’s lives
30. the absence of frustration in people’s lives
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31. the absence of fear in people’s lives
32. people not feeling anxious
33. the absence of stress in people’s lives
34. the absence of worry in people’s lives
35. the quality of people’s sleep
36. people’s physical safety and security
37. the amount of order and stability in people’s lives
38. people’s sense of security about life and the future in general
39. people’s physical comfort
40. people’s freedom from pain
41. how easy and free of annoyances people’s lives are
42. how peaceful, calm, and harmonious people’s lives are
43. how often people can feel relaxed instead of feeling their lives are hectic
44. people feeling that they have enough time and money for the things that
are most important to them
45. people’s financial security
46. people’smaterial standard of living
47. people’s ability to dream and pursue their dreams
48. people’s ability to use their imaginations and be creative
49. people having many moments in their lives when they feel inspired
50. how much beauty people experience in their lives
51. the amount of pleasure in people’s lives
52. the amount of fun and play in people’s lives
53. people having new things, adventure, and excitement in their lives
54. people’s sense of discovery and wonder
55. people feeling that they understand the world and the things going on
around them
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56. people’s knowledge, skills, and access to information
57. how often people are able to challenge their minds in a productive or en-
joyable way
58. how interesting, fascinating, and free of boredom people’s lives are
59. people’s ability to be themselves and express themselves
60. people’s personal growth
61. people "being the people they want to be"
62. people’s ability to fulfill their potential
63. people’s sense of purpose
64. people feeling that their lives have direction
65. people’s sense of control over their lives
66. people’s sense that their lives are meaningful and have value
67. people’s sense that they are making a difference, actively contributing to
the well-being of other people, and making the world a better place
68. the overall quality of people’s experience at work
69. how often people become deeply engaged in their daily activities (so
deeply engaged that they lose track of time)
70. people’s feeling of independence and self-sufficiency
71. people’s sense that they are competent and capable in the activities that
matter to them
72. people’s ability to shape and influence the things around them
73. people’s sense of achievement and excellence
74. people’s enjoyment of winning, competing, and facing challenges
75. people’s success at accomplishing their goals
76. people’s chances to live long lives
77. people’s health
78. people’smental health and emotional stability
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79. people’s absence of internal conflict (conflict within a person)
80. people’s ability to fully experience the entire range of healthy human emo-
tions
81. people feeling alive and full of energy
82. people’s passion and enthusiasm about things in their lives
83. people’s pride and respect for themselves
84. people having the people around them think well of them and treat them
with dignity and respect
85. people having a role to play in society
86. how much love there is in people’s lives
87. the quality of people’s romantic relationships, marriage, love life or sex
life
88. people’s ability to have and raise children
89. the quality of people’s family relationships
90. the happiness of people’s families
91. people’s sense of community, belonging, and connection with other peo-
ple
92. people having people around them who share their values, beliefs and
interests
93. people having people they can turn to in time of need
94. people not being lonely
95. people feeling that they are understood
96. people’s opportunities to participate in ceremonies, cultural events, and
celebrations that are meaningful to them
97. people’s freedom from being lied to, deceived, or betrayed
98. people’s freedom from emotional abuse or harassment
99. the absence of humiliation and embarrassment in people’s lives
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100. the absence of shame and guilt in people’s lives
101. people’s sense that everything happens for a reason
102. people’s sense of connection with the universe or the power behind the
universe
103. people being good, moral people and living according to their personal
values
104. people feeling that they are part of something bigger than themselves
105. people’s sense that they are standing up for what they believe in
106. people’s sense that they know what to do when they face choices in their
lives
107. people’s ability to "be in the moment"
108. people’s ability to keep good perspective in their lives
C.1.7 Aspects 1-108 Modified to Apply to Others (others-
aspects)
1. how satisfied others are with their lives
2. others’ ratings of their lives on a ladder where the lowest rung is "worst
possible life for them" and the highest rung is "best possible life for them"
3. how closeothers’ lives are to being ideal
4. the overall well-being of others and their families
5. others feeling that things are going well for them
6. others getting the things they want out of life
7. the extent to which others feel the things they do in their lives are worth-
while
8. how fulfilling others’ lives are
9. how rewarding the activities in others’ lives are
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10. others having a beautiful life story, or a life that is "like a work of art"
11. how full of beautiful memories others’ lives are
12. how grateful others feel for the things in their lives
13. how much others appreciate their lives
14. the absence of regret others feel about their lives
15. how desirable others’ lives are
16. how glad others are to have the lives they have rather than different lives
17. the extent to which others "have a good life"
18. how much others like their lives
19. others feeling that they have been fortunate in their lives
20. others’ sense of optimism about their future
21. others having many options and possibilities in their lives and the free-
dom to choose among them
22. others’ sense that things are getting better and better
23. how happy others feel
24. how much of the time others feel happy
25. how often others smile or laugh
26. how much others enjoy their lives
27. the absence of sadness in others’ lives
28. others not feeling depressed
29. the absence of anger in others’ lives
30. the absence of frustration in others’ lives
31. the absence of fear in others’ lives
32. others not feeling anxious
33. the absence of stress in others’ lives
34. the absence of worry in others’ lives
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35. the quality of others’ sleep
36. others’ physical safety and security
37. the amount of order and stability in others’ lives
38. others’ sense of security about life and the future in general
39. others’ physical comfort
40. others’ freedom from pain
41. how easy and free of annoyances others’ lives are
42. how peaceful, calm, and harmonious others’ lives are
43. how often others can feel relaxed instead of feeling their lives are hectic
44. others feeling that they have enough time and money for the things that
are most important to them
45. others’ financial security
46. others’material standard of living
47. others’ ability to dream and pursue their dreams
48. others’ ability to use their imaginations and be creative
49. others having many moments in their lives when they feel inspired
50. how much beauty others experience in their lives
51. the amount of pleasure in others’ lives
52. the amount of fun and play in others’ lives
53. others having new things, adventure, and excitement in their lives
54. others’ sense of discovery and wonder
55. others feeling that they understand the world and the things going on
around them
56. others’ knowledge, skills, and access to information
57. how often others are able to challenge their minds in a productive or en-
joyable way
58. how interesting, fascinating, and free of boredom others’ lives are
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59. others’ ability to be themselves and express themselves
60. others’ personal growth
61. others "being the people they want to be"
62. others’ ability to fulfill their potential
63. others’ sense of purpose
64. others feeling that their lives have direction
65. others’ sense of control over their lives
66. others’ sense that their lives are meaningful and have value
67. others’ sense that they are making a difference, actively contributing to
the well-being of other people, and making the world a better place
68. the overall quality of others’ experience at work
69. how often others become deeply engaged in their daily activities (so
deeply engaged that they lose track of time)
70. others’ feeling of independence and self-sufficiency
71. others’ sense that they are competent and capable in the activities that
matter to them
72. others’ ability to shape and influence the things around them
73. others’ sense of achievement and excellence
74. others’ enjoyment of winning, competing, and facing challenges
75. others’ success at accomplishing their goals
76. others’ chances to live long lives
77. others’ health
78. others’mental health and emotional stability
79. others’ absence of internal conflict (conflict within a person)
80. others’ ability to fully experience the entire range of healthy human emo-
tions
81. others feeling alive and full of energy
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82. others’ passion and enthusiasm about things in their lives
83. others’ pride and respect for themselves
84. others having the people around them think well of them and treat them
with dignity and respect
85. others having a role to play in society
86. how much love there is in others’ lives
87. the quality of others’ romantic relationships, marriage, love life or sex life
88. others’ ability to have and raise children
89. the quality of others’ family relationships
90. the happiness of others’ families
91. others’ sense of community, belonging, and connection with other people
92. others having people around them who share their values, beliefs and
interests
93. others having people they can turn to in time of need
94. others not being lonely
95. others feeling that they are understood
96. others’ opportunities to participate in ceremonies, cultural events, and cel-
ebrations that are meaningful to them
97. others’ freedom from being lied to, deceived, or betrayed
98. others’ freedom from emotional abuse or harassment
99. the absence of humiliation and embarrassment in others’ lives
100. the absence of shame and guilt in others’ lives
101. others’ sense that everything happens for a reason
102. others’ sense of connection with the universe or the power behind the
universe
103. others being good, moral people and living according to their personal
values
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104. others feeling that they are part of something bigger than themselves
105. others’ sense that they are standing up for what they believe in
106. others’ sense that they know what to do when they face choices in their
lives
107. others’ ability to "be in the moment"
108. others’ ability to keep good perspective in their lives
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C.2 Instructions Screen
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C.3 Demographics from the Census
Table C.2: Detailed Citation for the Census Information in Table 3.1
Variable Detail
Marital
Status
Table S1201: Marital Status, 2010 American Com-
munity Survey 1-Year Estimates. Calculated for
the U.S. population 20 years and older. "Other" in-
cludes widowed, divorced, and separated.
Highest
Education
Level
Completed
Table S1501: Educational Attainment, 2010 Amer-
ican Community Survey 1-Year Estimates. Calcu-
lated for the U.S. population 25 years and older.
Age Table QT-P1: Age Groups and Sex: 2010, 2010 Cen-
sus Summary File 1
Income Table HINC-06. Income Distribution to $250,000
or More for Households: 2010, Current Population
Survey, 2011 Annual Social and Economic Supple-
ment
Region Table GCT-P2: Age Groups and Sex: 2010 - United
States– Region, Division, and States; and Puerto
Rico, 2010 Census Summary File 1. Calculated for
population 18 years and older.
Race Table QT-PL: Race, Hispanic or Latino, Age, and
Housing Occupancy: 2010, 2010 Census National
Summary File of Redistricting Data. Calculated for
the U.S. population 18 years and older.
Household
Size
Table QT-H2: Tenure, Household Size, and Age of
Householder: 2010, 2010 Census Summary File 1
Employment
Status
Table CP03: Selected Economic Characteristics,
2010 American Community Survey 1-Year Esti-
mates. Calculated for the U.S. population 16 years
and older.
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C.4 Detecting Overlap in Survey Questions
Here we extend our theoretical framework to accommodate the possibility that
individual survey questions may encompass more than one fundamental as-
pect, and survey questionsmight therefore overlap in content. Using this frame-
work, we sketch an extension of our SP survey that could be used to test whether
there is overlap between a given pair of survey questions. We emphasize that
the purpose of this appendix is not to provide a complete analysis of overlap–an
endeavor to which an entire paper could be devoted–but rather to demonstrate
that methods based on stated preferences for detecting overlap can be devel-
oped, and to take some initial steps toward developing such methods. We note
that it may be possible to prioritize which pairs of questions to test for overlap
on the basis of researchers’ intuitions or respondents’ answers to direct probes
asking about conceptual overlap. Our focus here, however, is on the test itself
rather than on the prioritization process.
As mentioned in section 3.6.1 of the main text, the overlap-detection method
we propose proceeds in three steps. First, a set of SP-survey scenarios offers
choices between a fixed, small increase in the first aspect in the pair being
tested–say, life satisfaction–and various amounts of a small increase in a third
aspect that serves as a numeraire. The amount of increase in the numeraire
that makes the respondent indifferent is a measure of the utility gain from the
increase in life satisfaction. Second, another set of SP-survey scenarios offers
choices between a fixed, small increase in the second aspect in the pair–say, life
worthwhileness–and various amounts of a small increase in the numeraire. The
estimated numeraire indifference amount measures the utility gain from the in-
crease in life worthwhileness. Third, a final set of SP-survey scenarios offers
choices where one option is both the fixed increase in life satisfaction and the
fixed increase in life worthwhileness, and the other option is various amounts
of a small increase in the numeraire. These scenarios yield an estimate of the
utility gain from the joint increase. We then compare the utility gain from the
joint increase to the sum of the utility gains from the separate increases. Intu-
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itively, if life satisfaction and life worthwhileness capture nonoverlapping ar-
guments of preferences, then since any smooth utility function is locally linear,
the utility gain from the small joint increase in both arguments will be equal to
the sum of utility gains from the small separate increases in each. In contrast, if
the two questions assess overlapping arguments of preferences, then the utility
gain from a small joint increase will be less than the sum of utility gains from
the small separate increases because the overlapping part of the joint increase is
taken into account by the survey respondent only once.
While this intuition may seem straightforward, it is less trivial than it ap-
pears. The subtlety is that a respondent could have different interpretations of
what happens to the underlying fundamental aspects of well-being when told
that two SWB questions separately increase than when told that they jointly
increase.
This appendix develops a theoretical framework for analyzing respondents’
interpretations of SP-survey scenarios, and proposes two distinct sets of con-
straints on respondents’ interpretations under which this overlap-detection
method is valid. Importantly, we note that some of these constraints can be
mademore likely to hold in practice by appropriately formulating the SP-survey
instructions to encourage respondents to interpret the scenarios in accordance
with the constraints. We emphasize, however, that while we believe that the
constraints we propose are reasonable ones, we would advocate further analy-
sis and, as much as possible, empirical testing of the assumptions underlying
these constraints before the overlap-detection method we describe is used in
practice.
The remainder of this appendix is organized as follows. Subsection C.4.1
illustrates the overlap-detection method in the context of a specific example.
Subsection C.4.2 formally introduces the theoretical framework. Subsections
C.4.3 and C.4.4 define the two different sets of constraints and demonstrate that,
given either set of constraints, the overlap-detection method is justified. Proofs
are relegated to subsection C.4.5.
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C.4.1 Illustrative Example
The government wants to test whether conceptually-overlapping information is
contained in an individual’s responses to a proposed list of N = 5 SWB-survey
questions:
(r1) In general, how would you say your health is?
(r2) Overall, how happy did you feel yesterday?
(r3) Overall, how anxious did you feel yesterday? [reverse-coded so that higher
responses mean less anxiety]
(r4) Overall, how satisfied are you with your life nowadays?
(r5) Overall, to what extent do you feel the things you do in your life are worth-
while?
(Question 1 is a standard self-reported overall healthmeasure; this particular
one is taken from the AGES-Reykjavik Study. Questions 2-5 are the four U.K.
questions listed in the Introduction of the main text, here reordered.) While in
reality the SWB survey would likely elicit each response rn on a discrete scale
(e.g., a number from 1-100 scale), for the purpose of the theory, we assume that
the rn’s are real numbers.
We distinguish between the responses to SWB survey questions (the rn’s) and
the respondent’s levels of the fundamental aspects (the w j’s) that the questions
are intended to measure. To accommodate the possibility of overlap in the rn’s,
we need to generalize the theory from the main text by allowing the rn’s to be
functions of more than one fundamental aspect. In this example, suppose that
there are J = 3 fundamental aspects–i.e., preferences are defined over three
fundamental goods:
(w1) health
(w2) happiness
(w3) lack of anxiety.
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Each response to a SWB question is a function of the respondent’s
fundamental-aspect levels. We call this relationship the response’s "production
function." To illustrate, assume the following production functions:
r1 = f1(w1) = w1 (C.1)
r2 = f2(w2) = w2 (C.2)
r3 = f3(w3) = w3 (C.3)
r4 = f4(w1;w2) =
1
2
w1 +
1
2
w2 (C.4)
r5 = f5(w2;w3) =
1
2
w2 +
1
2
w3 (C.5)
In this example, the production function f2 means that the response r2
elicited by the question "Overall, how happy did you feel yesterday?" is equal
to the respondent’s current level of happiness, w2. The production function f4
means that the response r4 (to the life satisfaction question), is equal to the aver-
age of the respondent’s levels of w1 (health) and w2 (happiness). In this subsec-
tion, the production functions are assumed to be linear. In the more general for-
mulation in subsequent subsections, the functions will be assumed to be smooth
and hence can be approximated as linear for small changes in the w j’s around
current levels, (w¯1; w¯2; w¯3). This linearity means that possible complementarities
in the fn’s can be ignored in the analysis.
Since r1, r2, and r3 each elicit exactly one fundamental aspect, we call them
"fundamental responses," while r4 and r5 are "combination responses." Two re-
sponses "overlap" if their production functions depend on the same fundamen-
tal aspect. For example, r4 and r5 overlap because f4 and f5 both depend on w2.
(For the same reason, they both also overlap with r2.) The researcher observes
the responses, but not the fundamental-aspect levels. Furthermore, the produc-
tion functions are unknown to the researcher; if they were known, it would be
straightforward to identify pairs of SWB questions whose responses overlap,
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and an overlap-detection method would not be needed.
The respondent’s preferences depend on the levels of the fundamental as-
pects. For the example, we assume preferences can be represented by the utility
function
u(w1;w2;w3) = w1 + w2 + w3: (C.6)
Once again, in the more general formulation that follows, preferences will be
assumed to be smooth, and linearity will be justified as an approximation that
holds when the changes in the w j’s are small. The linear utility function means
that possible complementarities in preferences can be ignored in the analysis.
Consider our method for detecting overlap, and the corresponding design of
the SP survey, in the simplest case: testing for overlap between two responses
that happen to be fundamental, r2 and r3, and hence in fact do not overlap. In
the first of themethod’s three steps, a set of SP-survey scenarios asks the respon-
dent to choose between a 1-unit gain in "happiness yesterday" (r2) and varying
amounts of a gain in a survey question that serves as a numeraire, say health
(r1). (In this example, the numeraire is a fundamental response (r1), but we will
showmore generally that any response could be chosen as the numeraire.) This
set of scenarios assesses the amount of gain in r1 that would make the respon-
dent indifferent to the 1-unit gain in r2. Given the utility function in equation
C.6, this amount is 1 unit, and thus we will find that the relative marginal utility
of r2 is 1. The second step analogously assesses the relative marginal utility of r3
with a set of scenarios where Option 1 is always a 1-unit gain in lack-of-anxiety
(r3), and Option 2 is varying amounts of a gain in r1. This relative marginal util-
ity is also 1. In the third step, Option 1 is a 1-unit gain in r2 and a 1-unit gain in r3,
and as usual Option 2 is varying amounts of a gain in r1. The relative marginal
utility of this joint increase is 2, which equals the sum of the relative marginal
utilities of the separate increases.
The potential difficulties mentioned above arise when dealing with combi-
nation responses. The basic problem is that when one of the options in a SP sur-
vey specifies a given change in a combination response, there are many possible
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changes in the underlying fundamental aspects that could correspond to that
specified change in the combination response. To analyze which of the possible
fundamental-aspect changes is actually conceived by the respondent, we will
define "interpretation functions." They characterize the changes in fundamental
aspects that a respondent envisions as a function of the changes in responses
specified in the SP-survey option. These interpretation functions are unknown
to the researcher.
To illustrate, consider testing for overlap between two combination re-
sponses that overlap, r4 and r5. The first set of SP-survey scenarios asks the
respondent to choose between a 1-unit gain in the response to the life satisfac-
tion question (r4) and varying amounts of a gain in the numeraire, health (r1).
Suppose the respondent interprets a 1-unit gain in life satisfaction as meaning
that there is a 1-unit gain in each of its constituents, health (w1) and happiness
(w2). Then we will find that the respondent is indifferent between a 1-unit gain
in r4 and a 2-unit gain in r1. The second set of SP-survey scenarios asks the
respondent to choose between a 1-unit gain in the response to the life worth-
whileness question (r5) and varying amounts of a gain in health (r1). Supposing
the respondent interprets a 1-unit gain in life worthwhileness as meaning that
there is a 1-unit gain in each of its constituents–happiness (w2) and lack of anx-
iety (w3)–then we will again find that the relative marginal utility is 2. In the
third step, Option 1 is a 1-unit gain in r4 and a 1-unit gain in r5, and as usual Op-
tion 2 is varying amounts of a gain in r1. Suppose that the respondent interprets
Option 1 as meaning that there is a 1-unit gain in each of health (w1), happiness
(w2), and lack of anxiety (w3). While not the only possible interpretation, it may
seem natural: it is consistent with r4 and r5 each having increased by 1 unit, and
it matches the interpretation of what happens to w2 under either of the separate
increases in r4 and r5. Given that interpretation, the relative marginal utility of
the joint increase is 3, which is indeed less than the sum of the relative marginal
utilities of the separate increases.
Of course, this example made specific assumptions about how the respon-
dent interprets the changes in the combination responses. In the remainder of
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this appendix, we will provide a more general framework for analyzing SP-
survey responses. Rather than assuming particular interpretations, we show
that our proposed overlap-detectionmethodworks under awide range of possi-
ble interpretation functions, as long as they satisfy certain plausible constraints.
There are interpretation functions satisfying each of the two sets of constraints
that we will analyze that in fact will generate the interpretations that we simply
assumed in the above example.
C.4.2 Theoretical Framework
We assume that a respondent’s preferences can be represented by a
continuously-differentiable utility function, u(w1; :::;wJ), that is a monotonically
increasing function of each of J fundamental aspects. Without loss of general-
ity, here we orient the w j’s so that higher levels are more preferred (e.g., "lack of
anxiety" rather than "anxiety" is the fundamental aspect).
While the government cannot directly elicit the w j’s, the government can
elicit responses to a set of N SWB-survey questions, r1,...,rN . Each such response
rn is a continuously-differentiable and strictly increasing function fn of a subset
of the fundamental aspects. We call fn the production function for response rn.
Abusing notation, we write "w j 2 rn" to signify that w j is an argument of fn.
We suppose that the SWB survey elicits the respondent’s level of each rn on
a quantitative scale (e.g., points on a 1-100 scale), and the SP survey asks the
respondent about quantitative changes on the same scale (unlike the simplified
SP survey that we used in the main text). If some fn is a function of just a single
fundamental aspect w j, then the response rn corresponds one to one with w j; any
such rn can thus be used as a measure of w j on both the SWB and SP surveys.
We call such a rn a fundamental response. We call any rn whose corresponding
fn depends on more than one fundamental aspect a combination response. The
government does not observe which, or even how many, fundamental aspects
each rn depends on.
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We say that rn and rn0 overlap if fn and fn0 share at least one fundamental as-
pect as an argument. We say that rn and rn0 locally overlap if there is some funda-
mental aspect w j such that both
@ fn
@w j
and @ fn0
@w j
, evaluated at current fundamental-
aspect levels, are non-zero. Because our overlap-detection method relies on SP-
survey scenarios involving small changes from current fundamental-aspect lev-
els, it is designed to detect local overlap. Local overlap is a sufficient condition
for global overlap. Moreover, under our assumption that each fn is a strictly in-
creasing function, local overlap is also a necessary condition for global overlap.
Let w¯1; :::; w¯J denote the respondent’s current levels of the fundamental
aspects. The current responses to the SWB survey are therefore (r¯1; :::; r¯N),
where each r¯n is equal to the value of fn evaluated at the current levels of its
fundamental-aspect arguments. We consider scenarios on a SP survey that give
the respondent a choice between two options, each of which is a specific vector
of responses (r1; :::rN) in a neighborhood of (r¯1; :::; r¯N). Equivalently, we will de-
scribe each option as a vector of changes relative to current levels, (r1; :::;rN).
We use the term option to refer to such a specified vector of changes (which
corresponds to the way we use the term "option" in the main text). We note that
in a typical option, many of the rn’s will equal zero.
In order to analyze the change in utility from specified rn’s, we need to
describe what the respondent envisions in terms of changes in the fundamental
aspects as a function of thesern’s. To do so, we define a family of interpretation
functions, one for each subset of responses that could be specified as changing
in an option. For example, for any option where r4 is non-zero and the other
rn’s equal zero, the vector-valued function I4(r4jw¯1; :::; w¯J) = (w1; :::;wJ) de-
notes the respondent’s interpretation of what changes in the vector of funda-
mental aspects occurred as a function of the specified change in r4 and of cur-
rent fundamental-aspect levels. Similarly, for any option where r5 is non-zero
and the otherrn’s equal zero, the function I5(r5jw¯1; :::; w¯J) = (w1; :::;wJ) de-
scribes the respondent’s interpretation in terms of fundamental-aspect changes.
For any option where both r4 and r5 are non-zero but all other rn’s are
zero, the respondent’s interpretation is described by I4;5(r4;r5jw¯1; :::; w¯J) =
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(w1; :::;wJ).
Each interpretation function is continuously differentiable and approaches
the value 0 in the limit in which all its rn arguments approach 0. By defin-
ing separate interpretation functions depending on the subset of responses that
is specified as changing, we allow for the possibility that the interpretation of a
change in a given response may depend on which other responses are also spec-
ified as changing (e.g., the interpretation of a change in life satisfaction can de-
pend on whether life worthwhileness also changes). In particular, we do not as-
sume that a respondent’s interpretation is continuous when a response switches
from being unchanged in an option to being specified as changed; for example,
I4(r4jw¯1; :::; w¯J) is not required to be equal to limrs!0 I4;5(r4;r5jw¯1; :::; w¯J) (and
such discontinuities occur in many of the examples below). Each interpretation
function may also take the value ;, meaning that the respondent was unable to
interpret the option, which would occur if the constraints (discussed below) on
the I function cannot all be satisfied given the specified option. To accommo-
date this possibility, we require the SP survey to allow the respondent to tell us
"this choice option does not make sense." Because (w¯1; :::; w¯J) is fixed in the anal-
ysis that follows, we suppress I()’s dependence on it for brevity. We denote by
I( j)() the jth element of the respondent’s interpretation, that is, the interpreted
change in fundamental-aspect j.
Implicit in our formulation of the interpretation functions is an assumption
that the interpretation depends only on changes in responses specified in the
option being evaluated, and not also on changes specified in the other option.
We consider that assumption to be reasonable, but it could be made more likely
to hold by instructing respondents to consider the two options independently
of each other.
As an example of specific interpretation functions, the following are consis-
tent with the example in subsection C.4.1 (recall that in the example, N = 5 and
J = 3):
I4(r4) = (r4;r4; 0) (C.7)
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I5(r5) = (0;r5;r5) (C.8)
I4;5(r4;r5) = (r4;maxr4;r5;r5): (C.9)
The interpretation function C.7 indeed implies, consistent with the example in
subsection C.4.1, that a 1-unit increase in r4 generates a 1-unit increase in each
of w1 and w2. Similarly, interpretation function C.8 implies that a 1-unit increase
in r5 generates a 1-unit increase in each of w   2 and w3. And according to C.9,
a joint 1-unit increase indeed implies a 1-unit increase in each of w1, w2, and w3.
We collect some basic assumptions regarding the interpretation functions
that we believe are reasonable into the "same-sign constraint," which has three
parts. First, a fundamental aspect is not envisioned to change unless it is an
argument of at least one response that is specified as changing. Second, when
only a single response is specified as changing, then all of its constituent fun-
damental aspects are envisioned to change at least a little in the same direction.
Third, when changes in each of two responses would have been interpreted as
generating the same direction of change in a fundamental aspect, then a joint
change is interpreted as generating a change in the same direction. While the
first part, and perhaps also the third part, may be intuitive (and unobjection-
able), the second part is more substantive.
To facilitate formalizing the same-sign constraint, define N j := njrn , 0 and w j 2 rn
to be the set identifying the responses for which w j is an argument in the pro-
duction function that are specified as changing.
Same-sign constraint:
(i) For every interpretation function, if N j is empty, then the interpretation
function’s implied change in w j is zero.
(ii) If w j 2 rn and rn > 0, then I( j)n (rn) > 0. (Similarly when the inequalities
are replaced by < and <.)
(iii) If I( j)n (rn and I
( j)
n0 (rn0 are both  0 with at least one inequality strict, then
I( j)n;n0(rn;rn0) > 0. (Similarly when the inequalities are replaced by  and
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.)
To illustrate, suppose as in the example in subsection C.4.1 that r4 = f4(w1;w2)
and r5 = f5(w2;w3). The first part implies: I
(3)
4 (r4) = 0 and I
(1)
5 (r5) = 0. The
second part implies: if r4 > 0, then I
(1)
4 (r4) > 0 and I
(2)
4 (r4) > 0. These together
with the third part imply: if r4 > 0 and r5 < 0, then I
(0)
4;5(r4;r5) > 0 and
I(3)4;5(r4;r5) < 0 (but the sign of I
(2)
4;5(r4;r5) is not constrained); alternatively, if
r   4 > 0 and r5 > 0, then I(1)4;5(r4;r5) > 0, I(2)4;5(r4;r5) > 0, and I(3)4;5(r4;r5) >
0.
Wewill focus on optionswhere thern’s, and impliedw j’s, are small. Doing
so allows us to use the following approximations, which hold in a neighborhood
of (w¯1; w¯2; w¯3):
u 
IX
j=1
@u
@w j
w j
w j 
X
n s.t. w j2rn
@I( j)()
@rn
rn for all j
rn 
X
j s.t. w j2rn
@ fn
@w j
w j for all n
Due to these functions being locally linear, we can ignore a variety of pos-
sible complementarities: in preferences, in the production functions, and in the
interpretation functions. Any such non-linearities would confound the infer-
ences that can be drawn from comparing the relative marginal utility of a joint
increase with the sum of the relative marginal utilities of separate increases.
Our reliance on small changes also justifies the possible use of any response
307
as a numeraire for the overlap-detection method. A commodity can be used
as a numeraire if preferences are quasi-linear in that commodity, and due to
the linear approximations, preferences are (approximately) quasi-linear in any
response. To illustrate, suppose that I4(r4) = (r4;r4; 0) consistent with the
example in subsection C.4.1, and suppose that r4 is used as the numeraire. For
small r4’s, utility is roughly linear in changes in the "commodity" (w1+w2), and
thus treating r4 as the numeraire would be justifiable.
The same-sign constraint and changes being small are not by themselves
sufficient to ensure that the overlap-detection method is valid; additional as-
sumptions are needed. The two sets of assumptions outlined in the next two
subsections (respectively) constitute alternative ways to complete the theoreti-
cal framework.
C.4.3 The composite-aspect approach
The first approach combines an assumption that the combination responses cor-
respond to "composite aspects" with a constraint on the interpretation functions.
A response rn corresponds to a composite aspect if there exists an alternative
representation of preferences besides u(), call it v()˙, that is a function of rn and
of the fundamental aspects that are not arguments of fn. For example, consider
the set-up in subsection C.4.1 in which J = 3 and N = 5. If r4 = f4(w1;w2)
corresponds to a composite aspect, then there is a function v(cot) such that
u(w1;w2;w3) = v(r4;w3). In words, the fundamental aspects that comprise a com-
posite aspect whose level is conveyed by r4 matter for preferences only via f4.
Indeed, with production functions C.4 and C.5 and preferences that can be rep-
resented by C.6, r4 corresponds to a composite aspect because the utility func-
tion can be re-expressed as u = 2r4+w3, and r5 corresponds to a composite aspect
because the utility function can be re-expressed as u = w1 + 2r5. Intuitively, such
"composite responses" are combination responses that could be viewed as subu-
tility functions.
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The additional constraint on the interpretation functions requires that the
fundamental-aspect changes envisioned would actually produce (according to
the production functions) the changes in responses specified in the option.
Consistency constraint: For every interpretation function and any rn argu-
ments of the interpretation function, the implied vector of w j’s produces the
rn arguments of the interpretation function.
For example, for the interpretation function I4;5(r4;r5) = (w1;w2;w3),
the consistency constraint implies that for every (r4;r5), the resulting
fundamental-aspect vector (w1;w2;w3) must satisfy r4 = f4(w1;w2)   f4(w¯1; w¯2)
and r5 = f5(w2;w3)  f5(w¯2; w¯3). Given the production functions C.4 and C.5, the
interpretation functions C.7 and C.8 satisfy the consistency constraint, but inter-
pretation function C.9 does not: for example, I4;5(1; 2) = (1; 2; 2), but the change
in r4 produced by the implied changes in w1 and w2 is 112 .
Note that the consistency constraint only requires that the envisioned
fundamental-aspect changes be consistent with the responses that are explicitly
specified in the option. It does not additionally require consistency with rn’s
that are not explicitly specified as changing in an option. If it were modified
to have this additional requirement, then the modified constraint would mean
that a respondent is unable to interpret an option that specifies only a change in
a combination response, since a change in a combination response also implies
a change in at least one fundamental response. For example, I4(r4) would be
un-interpretable because r4 implies a non-zero change in r1 or r2, but neither
is specified as changing. Under this modified constraint, identifying combina-
tion responses would be easy: respondents could be asked a series of SP-survey
scenarios where each option specifies a change in exactly one of the responses.
If the option specified a change in a fundamental response, then the respondent
would be able to interpret the option, while if the option specified a change
in a combination response, then the respondent would report that "this choice
option does not make sense." We believe that respondents in fact would not
have difficulty interpreting options that specified a change only in a combina-
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tion response, and therefore we believe the modified version of the consistency
constraint is implausible.
Even with the (unmodified) consistency constraint as stated above, for some
options the respondent’s interpretation would be ;. This would occur, for ex-
ample, if two responses directly contradicted each other in what they imply for
the change in some fundamental aspect. In such a case, there does not exist any
interpretation function that would satisfy the consistency constraint.
A respondent would also have an interpretation of ; if the consistency con-
straint and the same-sign constraint could not be satisfied simultaneously for
the responses specified in a particular option. To understand this point, con-
sider again the production functions C.4 and C.5. Although interpretation func-
tion C.9 does not satisfy the consistency constraint, the following interpretation
function both satisfies the consistency constraint and fits the example interpre-
tation from subsection C.4.1 (i.e., it has the property that I4;5(1; 1) = 1):
I4;5(r4;r5) =
 
3
2
r4   12r5;
1
2
r4 +
1
2
r5;
3
2
r5   12r4
!
: (C.10)
It may seem strange that an increase in r4 is interpreted as decreasing w3, es-
pecially since w3 is not even an argument of r4’s production function. However,
this feature of the interpretation function is necessitated by the consistency con-
straint! The reason is that an increase in r4 implies an increase in w2, which taken
by itself would produce an increase in r5; in order to not affect r5, the increase
in r4 has to also decrease w3. Symmetrically, the increase in r5 necessitates a de-
crease in w1 in order to avoid affecting r4. However, the consistency constraint’s
implication that some of the implied w j’s decrease when the rn’s increase can
clash with the same-sign constraint’s requirement that these w j’s increase. For
example, the above interpretation C.10 violates the same-sign constraint if r4
and r5 are both positive and r5r4 > 3. If a respondent had interpretation C.10,
then the respondent would envision the changes in fundamental aspects ac-
cording to equation C.10 as long as doing so satisfies the same-sign constraint,
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but the respondent’s interpretation would be ; if the same-sign constraint were
violated.
The following proposition demonstrates that these assumptions are suffi-
cient to justify the overlap-detection method.
Proposition 16. Suppose that combination responses correspond to composite aspects,
and suppose that the interpretation functions satisfy the same-sign constraint and the
consistency constraint. For small rn > 0 and rn0 > 0 such that none of the relevant
interpretations are ;: if rn and rn0 do not locally overlap, then
u
 
In;n0 (rn;rn0)
  u (In (rn)) + u (In0 (rn0)) ;
while if rn and rn0 locally overlap, then
u
 
In;n0 (rn;rn0)

< u (In (rn)) + u (In0 (rn0)) ;
Figure C.1 illustrates the logic underlying the proposition using a Venn di-
agram. We suppose the production functions are given by equations C.4 and
C.5, and preferences are represented by equation C.6. The fundamental aspects
w1, w2, and w3 are drawn as having equal areas since their marginal utilities
are equal (in general, the areas would be proportional to the marginal utilities).
Due to the composite-aspect assumption, we can define re-scaled versions of the
combination responses that are subutility functions of u: r˜4 = 2r4 and r˜5 = 2r5.
These re-scaled composite aspects can be represented graphically as the union
of the areas of the fundamental aspects they comprise. The same-sign constraint
implies that a joint increase in r4 and r5 must involve an increase in all three fun-
damental aspects. The consistency constraint implies that a weighted average
of the increases in w1 and w2, with weights equal to their respective areas, must
equal the specified increase in r˜4. Similarly, a weighted average of the increases
in w2 and w3, with weights equal to their respective areas, must equal the speci-
fied increase in r˜5. The net increase in utility is the area-weighted average of the
increases in all three fundamental aspects. But since the increase in w2 is shared,
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the gain in utility from the joint increase is smaller than the sum of the gains in
utility from separate increases.
Figure C.1: Illustration for Proposition 16
w1 w2 w3
r˜4 r˜5
Neither the composite-aspect assumption nor the consistency constraint
without the other is sufficient for Proposition 16. To see the necessity of the
composite-aspect assumption, continue to suppose that the production func-
tions are given by equations C.4 and C.5, but now suppose that preferences can
be represented by u(w1;w2;w3) = 4w1 + w2 + 4w3 so that r4 and r5 do not corre-
spond to composite aspects. Suppose that the interpretation functions, which
satisfy the consistency constraint, are given by I4(r4) =

1
2r4;
3
2r4; 0

, I5(r5) =
0; 32r5;
1
2r5

, and I4;5(r4;r5) =

7
4r4   14r5; 14r4 + 14r5; 74r5   14r4

. The
gain in utility from separate 1-unit increases in r4 and r5 are each 4

1
2

+1

3
2

= 312 ,
but the gain in utility from a joint 1-unit increase in both r4 and r5 is:
h
7
4 (4)   14 (4)
i
+h
1
4 (1) +
1
4 (1)
i
+
h
7
4 (4)   14 (4)
i
= 1212 . It is greater than the sum of gains in utility from
the separate increases. What went "wrong" here is that the joint increase in r4
and r5 is interpreted as involving greater increases in w1 and w3 than the sepa-
rate increases would have, and w1 and w3 are particularly valuable fundamental
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aspects.
A simpler example shows that the composite-aspect assumption alone is not
sufficient. Consider applying the overlap-detection method to non-overlapping
responses, r1 and r2. Suppose I1(r1) = (r1; 0; 0), I2(r2) = (0;r2; 0), and
I1;2(r1;r2) =

1
2r1;r2; 0

, meaning that a 1-unit increase in "how you would
say your health is" is interpreted as a 1-unit increase in health when it appears
alone in an option but as a 12 -unit increase when it appears together with an in-
crease in "how happy you felt yesterday." In such a case, it would not be true
that the joint marginal utility is equal to the sum of the separate marginal util-
ities. (If there were reason to be concerned about such an "interference effect,"
respondents could be instructed to consider different rows in the aspect table
independently if doing so is possible.)
We conclude this subsection by noting that if the combination responses cor-
respond to composite aspects, then in accordance with what we note in footnote
30 of the main text, they could be substituted in the index for the fundamental
responses corresponding with their underlying fundamental aspects.
C.4.4 The averaging-interpretation approach
The second approach–which does not require assuming that the combination re-
sponses correspond to composite aspects–does not impose the consistency con-
straint but instead imposes the "averaging constraint." To facilitate formalizing
this constraint, we refer to a function A(x1; :::; xn) as an n-argument generalized
averaging function if it is continuous and satisfies minfx1; :::; xng  A(x1; :::; xn) 
maxfx1; :::; xng for all x1; :::; xn.
Averaging constraint: For every interpretation function, if N j is non-empty,
then there exists an jN jj-argument generalized averaging function A such that
the interpretation function’s implied change in w j is
A

fI( j)n (rn)gn2N j

:
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The constraint states that, for any fundamental aspect, the interpretation of
a joint change in responses is weakly in between the minimum and maximum
change that would be implied by separate changes in the responses. The inter-
pretation functions C.7-C.9, which fit the example from subsection C.4.1, satisfy
the averaging constraint.
To give another example, suppose that the separate interpretations for r4 and
r5 are:
I4(r4) = (r4;r4; 0) (C.11)
I5(r5) =
 
0;
3
2
r5;
1
2
r5
!
: (C.12)
Each of the following interpretation functions for a joint increase would satisfy
the averaging constraint:
I4;5(r4;r5) =
 
r4;r4;
1
2
r5
!
I4;5(r4;r5) =
 
r4;
 
1
4
!
r4 +
 
3
4
!
3
2
r5;
1
2
r5
!
I4;5(r4;r5) =
 
r4;minfr4; 32r4g;
1
2
r5
!
:
The value of w3 must be 12r5 because r5 is the only response specified
as changing that relates to w3, and therefore nothing else is being averaged
with the change in w3 implied by a separate change in r5, namely 12r5. Sim-
ilarly, the value of w1 must ber4. For w2, each of the three interpreta-
tions corresponds to a different generalized-averaging function for a separate
change in r4 or r5: A

r4; 32r5

= r4, A

r4; 32r5

=

1
4

r4 +

3
4

3
2r5, or
A

r4; 32r5

= minfr4; 32r4g.
Neither the averaging constraint nor the consistency constraint implies the
other. For example, as noted above, given production functions C.4 and C.5,
interpretation function C.9 satisfies the averaging constraint but not the consis-
tency constraint. While interpretation functions C.7, C.8, and C.10 satisfy the
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consistency constraint, they violate the averaging constraint: I(1)4 (2) = 2 and
I(1)5 (1) = 0, I
(1)
4;5(2; 1) = 2
1
2 , which is greater than both.
Note that if the consistency constraint is not imposed, then the production
functions for the responses do not play a role in determining a respondent’s
interpretation of an option. In large part due to that fact, there exist families of
interpretation functions that satisfy the same-sign constraint and the averaging
constraint for any option, and therefore there is no reason for the interpretation
to ever take the value ; when only these constraints are imposed.
The SP-survey instructions could be written to discourage respondents from
trying to satisfy the consistency constraint and encourage them to satisfy the
averaging constraint. In particular, the instructions could state that the rows of
the aspect table should not be understood as all being true, but rather as col-
lectively describing the overall sense of the option, and with one row possibly
overriding another. Alternatively or additionally, respondents could be explic-
itly instructed to envision the option as being the average of what is described
across the rows of the aspect table. We emphasize here, as above, that survey in-
structions would need to be carefully formulated and empirically tested before
being used in practice.
The following proposition establishes that the same-sign and averaging con-
straints taken together are sufficient for the overlap-detection method to be
valid.
Proposition 17. Suppose that the interpretation functions satisfy the same-sign con-
straint and the averaging constraint. For small rn > 0 and rn0 > 0: if rn and rn0 do
not locally overlap, then
u
 
In;n0(rn;rn0)
  u (In(rn)) + u (In0(rn0)) ;
while if rn and rn0 locally overlap, then
u
 
In;n0(rn;rn0)

< u (In(rn)) + u (In0(rn0)) ;
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The intuition underlying why the averaging constraint implies the last in-
equality is that, for each fundamental aspect that is envisioned to increase, the
sum of the separate gains in utility due to the increase in that aspect is nec-
essarily greater than the average of those gains. Consider a numerical exam-
ple with interpretations C.11, C.12, and I4;5(r4;r5) =

r4;minfr4; 32r4g; 12r5

,
andwith preferences represented by utility function C.6. The gain in utility from
a separate 1-unit increase in r4 is 1(1) + 1(1) = 2, and the gain from a separate
1-unit increase in r4 is 32 (1)+
1
2 (1) = 2 so the sum is 4. The gain in utility from the
joint 1-unit increase is 1(1) + 1(1) + 12 (1) = 2
1
2 , which is smaller.
In this appendix, we have explored one SP-survey-based overlap-detection
method, and we have explored two sets of constraints on respondents’ interpre-
tations that would justify it. There may well be other plausible constraints that
respondents could be encouraged to satisfy that would also validate the method
we have considered, and there may be other reasonable overlap-detectionmeth-
ods that are altogether distinct. These remain open questions for future research.
C.4.5 Proofs
Proposition 16: Suppose that combination responses correspond to composite
aspects, and suppose that the interpretation functions satisfy the same-sign con-
straint and the consistency constraint. For small rn > 0 and rn0 > 0 such that
none of the relevant interpretations are ;: if rn and rn0 do not locally overlap,
then
u
 
In;n0 (rn;rn0)
  u (In (rn)) + u (In0 (rn0)) ;
while if rn and rn0 locally overlap, then
u
 
In;n0 (rn;rn0)

< u (In (rn)) + u (In0 (rn0)) :
Proof. We first focus on the right-hand side of both expressions in the proposi-
tion. The same-sign constraint implies that if w j < rn then I
( j)
n (rn) = 0. The con-
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sistency constraint implies that the changes in the fundamental aspects implied
by In(rn) in fact produce rn. Local linearity, together with rn being a com-
posite response (i.e., a response corresponding to a composite aspect), implies
that u (In(rn))  @vn@rnrn, where vn()˙ is the alternative representation of u() that
depends on rn. Similarly, u (In0(rn0))  @vn0@rn0 rn0 , where vn0() is the alternative
representation of u() that depends on rn0 . Hence,u (In(rn)) + u (In0(rn0)) 
@vn
@rn
rn +
@vn0
@rn0
rn0 . We now turn to the left-hand side of both expressions in the
proposition. Local linearity implies that
In;n0(rn;rn0) 
0BBBBB@@I(1)n;n0(rn;rn0@rn rn + @I
(1)
n;n0(rn;rn0
@rn0
rn0 ; :::;
@I(J)n;n0(rn;rn0
@rn
rn +
@I(J)n;n0(rn;rn0
@rn0
rn0
1CCCCCA :
Using local linearity again,
u
 
In;n0(rn;rn0)
  X
j
@u
@w j
0BBBBB@@I( j)n;n0(rn;rn0@rn rn + @I
( j)
n;n0(rn;rn0
@rn0
rn0
1CCCCCA :
We now decompose the set of all fundamental aspects into those that are argu-
ments of rn, those that are arguments of rn0 , and those that are arguments of both
(the same-sign constraint implies that no other fundamental aspects change):
u
 
In;n0(rn;rn0)
  X
j s.t. w j2rn
@u
@w j
0BBBBB@@I( j)n;n0(rn;rn0)@rn rn + @I
( j)
n;n0(rn;rn0)
@rn0
rn0
1CCCCCA
+
X
j s.t. w j2rn0
@u
@w j
0BBBBB@@I( j)n;n0(rn;rn0)@rn rn + @I
( j)
n;n0(rn;rn0)
@rn0
rn0
1CCCCCA
 
X
j s.t. w j2rn;w j2rn0
@u
@w j
0BBBBB@@I( j)n;n0(rn;rn0)@rn rn + @I
( j)
n;n0(rn;rn0)
@rn0
rn0
1CCCCCA
The consistency constraint implies that the first summation is the first-order
effect on utility from rn, which equals @vn@rnrn due to the composite-aspect as-
sumption. Similarly, the second summation is the first-order effect on utility
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from rn0 , which equals
@vn0
@rn0
rn0 . If rn and rn0 do not overlap, then the third sum-
mation is zero because the set of fundamental aspects over which the sum is
taken is empty. If rn and rn0 overlap, then the set is non-empty, and the same-
sign constraint implies that the third summation is strictly positive. The result
follows.
Proposition 17: Suppose that the interpretation functions satisfy the same-
sign constraint and the averaging constraint. For small rn > 0 and rn0 > 0: if
rn and rn0 do not locally overlap, then
u
 
In;n0(rn;rn0)
  u (In(rn)) + u (In0(rn0)) ;
while if rn and rn0 locally overlap, then
u
 
In;n0(rn;rn0)

< u (In(rn)) + u (In0(rn0)) :
Proof. We first focus on the right-hand side of both expressions in the propo-
sition. The first part of the same-sign constraint implies that if w j < rn, then
@I( j)n (rn)
@rn
= 0. That fact, together with local linearity of u() and I( j)(), implies:
u (In(rn)) 
X
j s.t. w j2rn
@u
@w j
0BBBB@@I( j)n (rn)
@rn
rn
1CCCCA
u (In0(rn0)) 
X
j s.t. w j2rn0
@u
@w j
0BBBBB@@I( j)n0 (rn0)@rn0 rn0
1CCCCCA
Adding these together and decomposing the set of all fundamental aspects into
those that are arguments of rn but not rn0 , those that are arguments of rn0 but not
rn, and those that are arguments of both:
u (In(rn)) + u (In0(rn0)) 
X
j s.t. w j2rn;w j<rn0
@u
@w j
0BBBB@@I( j)n (rn)
@rn
rn
1CCCCA
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+
X
j s.t. w j<rn;w j2rn0
@u
@w j
0BBBBB@@I( j)n0 (rn0)@rn0 rn0
1CCCCCA
+
X
j s.t. w j2rn;w j2rn0
@u
@w j

I( j)n (rn) + I
( j)
n0 (rn0)

:
We now turn to the left-hand side of both expressions in the proposition. The
averaging constraint and the same-sign constraint together imply: for any j’s
such that w j < rn and w j < rn0 , I
( j)
n;n0(rn;rn0)  0; for any j’s such that w j 2 rn and
w j < rn0 , I
( j)
n;n0(rn;rn0)  I( j)n (rn); for any j’s such that w j < rn and w j 2 rn0 ,
I( j)n;n0(rn;rn0)  I( j)n0 (rn0); and for any j’s such that w j 2 rn and w j 2 rn0 ,
I( j)n;n0(rn;rn0)  A

I( j)n (rn); I
( j)
n0 (rn0)

. Hence
u
 
In;n0(rn;rn0)
  X
j s.t. w j2rn;w j<rn0
@u
@w j
0BBBB@@I( j)n (rn)
@rn
rn
1CCCCA
+
X
j s.t. w j<rn;w j2rn0
@u
@w j
0BBBBB@@I( j)n0 (rn0)@rn0 rn0
1CCCCCA
+
X
j s.t. w j2rn;w j2rn0
@u
@w j

A

I( j)n (rn); I
( j)
n0 (rn0)

:
Thus, the right-hand side and the left-hand sides of the expressions in the propo-
sition are approximately equal, except for the third summation. If rn and rn0 do
not overlap, then the third summation is zero because the set of fundamental
aspects over which the sum is taken is empty. If rn and rn0 do overlap, then the
same-sign constraint implies that I( j)n (rn) and I
( j)
n0 (rn0) are strictly positive for
all j, and therefore so are the third summations. Moreover, by definition of the
generalized averaging function, A

I( j)n (rn); I
( j)
n0 (rn0)

 max
n
I( j)n (rn); I
( j)
n0 (rn0)
o
<
I( j)n (rn) + I
( j)
n0 (rn0). The result follows.
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